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abstract of thesis 
The Island Race: geopolitics and identity in British foreign policy 
discourse since 1949 
This thesis examines Britain’s foreign policy identity by analysing the use of geopolitical tropes 
in discursive practices of ontological security-seeking in the British House of Commons since 
1949, a period of great change for Britain as it lost its empire and joined NATO and the EC.  
The Empire was narrated according to a series of geopolitical tropes that I call Island Race 
identity: insularity from Europe and a universal aspect on world affairs, maintenance of Lines of 
Communication, antipathy towards Land Powers and the Greater Britain metacommunity.  The 
aim of this thesis is to genealogically historicise and contextualise these tropes through 
interpretivist analysis of Commons debates concerning a series of events and issues from the 
establishment of NATO to the current parliament.  By conceptualising parliamentary discourse 
as a social practice involving the fixing of ontologically secure subject positions, it presents a 
new reading of modern British foreign policy that addresses the traditional neglect of 
geopolitics and identity in approaches depicting a materially declining state engaging in the 
pragmatic pursuit of realist national interests. 
 
The analysis shows how Britain’s foreign policy identity continues to be reliant on the 
geopolitical constitutions of islandness that discursively defined the empire.  This is not 
indicative of imperial nostalgia so much as it is evidence of how discursive practices of 
ontological security-seeking in a political environment with a shared debating culture tend to 
mobilise established identity tropes that have retained relevance even without their imperial 
underpinnings.  Narrations of the Cold War and NATO, relations with the rest of Europe and 
globalisation are shown to be reliant on Island Race tropes that, through contextual interactions, 
fix Britain in subject positions of relevance according to how British values, forged by insular 
geography, are of universal relevance to a world in which Britain is in a pivotal geopolitical 
position. 
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chapter 1 
Introduction to the Island Race: geopolitics and identity in British 
foreign policy 
Our story concerns an island  
Winston Churchill (1956), A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Volume I, p. viii. 
 
We are an island race  
Edward Heath, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, Blackpool, 13 October 1973. 
 
It’s true that our geography has shaped our psychology.  We have the 
character of an island nation 
David Cameron, Speech, London, 23 March 2013. 
1. Introduction: Rethinking British foreign policy 
In this thesis, I will resituate modern British foreign policy in terms of identity, ontological 
security-seeking and geopolitics by analysing discourse from a series of British parliamentary 
debates from the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 to the present day.  I will show 
that, in spite of the hugely changed contexts of international politics and Britain’s own situation 
in this period, the geopolitical identity tropes of the British Empire have remained at the locus 
of a continuing struggle to seek British ontological security, or ‘security as being’.1  This claim 
is based upon my reading of the discursive social construction of British imperial geopolitical 
identity, the tropes of which I collectively call the Island Race: a quintessential liberal sea 
power, insular from the rest of Europe and with privileged access to the world’s oceans, the 
highway on which it established and maintained the largest empire the world has ever known in 
opposition to Land Powers.2  Roxanne Doty argues that ‘Great Britain was the British Empire’ 
and decolonisation ‘shook that identity to the core.’3  But did it?  What has happened to the 
Island Race since the 1940s when Clement Attlee’s government began to reduce the Empire and 
                                                          
1 For the theory of ontological security see particularly Guzzini (2012a) (especially Guzzini (2012b & d); 
Manners (2002); McSweeney (1999), pp. 1-12; Mitzen (2006a & b); Shapiro (1997); Steele (2005). 
2 Crucial texts in this regard include Charles Dilke’s Greater Britain and Problems of Greater Britain, 
James Froude’s Oceana, Halford Mackinder’s ‘Geographical Pivot of History’ address and Britain and the 
British Seas and John Seeley’s The Expansion of England (Dilke (1869); (1890); Froude (1886); Mackinder 
(1904b); (1907); Seeley (1883)). 
3 Doty (1996), p. 130. 
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committed Britain to a subordinate position in NATO?4  If Britain was its empire, if there was a 
constitutive process in which the spatial (amongst other) tropes of imperialism were thoroughly 
adopted by the metropole, have these simply atrophied along with the empire itself?  The 
tendency of geopolitical studies to concentrate on the most materially powerful and the fashion 
for depicting post-imperial British foreign policy as the pragmatic pursuit of national interests, 
uninformed by any particular geopolitical identity, have left these questions underexplored.   
 
By conducting a genealogy of British foreign policy discourse from the Hansard record of 
parliamentary proceedings I will be able to show the continuity of Island Race tropes such as 
partial insularity from Europe, a belief in Britain’s universality or global reach, the maintenance 
of Lines of Communication, antipathy towards Land Powers and membership of a liberal, 
Western metacommunity.5  In so doing, I will be able to demonstrate that, in varied contexts, in 
response to a multitude of issues across time, the Island Race traditions of foreign policy 
thought have remained the representations of British identity most commonly mobilised in order 
to seek ontological security.  This is not because of imperial nostalgia or revanchism, but rather 
social-discursive imperatives in parliamentary debate to fix Britain in subject positions that are 
secure according to established notions of Self, and the continued fecundity of a thoroughly 
malleable and flexible account of Britain’s island geopolitics co-constituted with its rendering 
of an exceptional history: ‘the coming together of […] past history, present situation, and future 
possibilities.’6  What becomes evident is change within continuity as international events are 
interpreted, represented and responded to in ways which best ontologically ‘fit’ Island Race 
identity, discursively ensuring relevance for Britain in a multitude of situations.7 
 
David Cameron’s Conservative Party, which now governs alone after leading a coalition from 
2010 to 2015, has gone further even than Margaret Thatcher’s in asserting Britain’s 
independence from the rest of Europe and matched Tony Blair’s government in its insistence on 
Britain having a global role.  Cameron has led this while asserting the importance of Britain’s 
‘island story’; a narrative that, while not ‘un-European’, emphasises Britain’s ‘connections to 
the rest of the world’, to wit his desire to ‘never […] pull up the drawbridge’, in spite of the 
Conservatives’ promise to hold an ‘in/out’ referendum on membership of the EU by 2017.8  
                                                          
4 See, for example, Peter Taylor, who conceptualised 1945 as a ‘geopolitical transition’ for Britain (Taylor 
(1990)). 
5 <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/> (1803-2005); 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/> (1988- ); on genealogy in International 
Relations see especially Der Derian (1987); Shapiro (1992); (1997); Campbell (1993); (1998); Hansen 
(2006); Vucetic (2011a & b). 
6 Fay (1996), pp. 191-2. 
7 Guzzini (2004), p. 45; Vucetic (2011a), pp. 10-5; see also Barnett (1999), p. 9; Jackson (2011), p. 392. 
8 Cameron (2013); <https://www.conservatives.com/SecuringABetterFuture/StrongerCountry.aspx> 
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Meanwhile his first Foreign Secretary, William Hague, embarked upon a reinvigoration of 
Britain’s ‘diplomatic network’ that would commit the country to ‘an international, global role.’9  
These references to Britain’s spatial identity have not been taken seriously enough by 
International Relations (IR) scholars and historians who view geopolitics as an unworthy prism 
through which to analyse the foreign policy of a ‘second-rate power’ like Britain and take for 
granted the designation of British foreign policy-makers as rational, pragmatic pursuers of the 
national interest.  The tropes hinted at in this introduction to the policies of Cameron and Hague 
are the latest episodes in British attempts to seek ontological security through the recrudescence 
of a particular set of geopolitical identity narratives, forged in its imperial heyday.  Yet the story 
of the Island Race remains unfinished, mothballed at the terminus of empire, leaving the 
subsequent analyses of British foreign policy to the mercy of the realists (when they bother with 
it at all) and narrative historians. 
 
If the ‘present arrangements’ that we need to ‘loosen[…] the hold of’—as Michael Shapiro 
would have it—comprise the stolid reproduction of pragmatic Britain being stubborn in its 
relations with the rest of Europe or else ‘not doing’ strategy at all, what is to be done?10  By 
taking an interpretivist approach in which one acknowledges that one is studying a world 
already interpreted by British foreign policy-makers and pursuing the idea that their 
interpretations of the world and their identity exist in a constitutive relationship or have, 
following Ian Hacking, a ‘looping effect’ on one another, I will be able to present an original 
reading of modern British foreign policy.11  This is a genealogical analysis as described by Lene 
Hansen and Shapiro, in that it ‘traces the evolution of discourse and identity over a series of 
closely knit moments’, ‘provide[s] detailed insights into the structures of present national and 
civilizational identities’ and reveals ‘the process by which humans invest the world with value 
as part of the process through which meanings are produced.’12  By viewing ‘the present as 
peculiar’, recognising the enduring need for national identity to be discursively reiterated and 
understanding the historical foundations of attempts to seek ontological security, new light can 
be shed on persistent issues in British foreign policy.13  Rather than, for example, simply 
accepting an unquestioned and underexplored ‘Self/Other’ dynamic between Britain and the rest 
of Europe, my approach is concerned with how and why this construction is possible by 
examining the historical constitution of Britain’s Island Race identity.  These theoretical and 
methodological considerations will be explored in further detail in the following chapter.  In the 
                                                          
9 Hague (2013). 
10 Shapiro (1992), p. 11. 
11 Guzzini (2004), pp. 46-7; Hacking (1999), p. 34.  On various analytical strategies touching on 
interpretivism, see Åkerstrøm Andersen (2003); for this in practice see, for example, Campbell (1993); 
(1998); Hansen (2006); Hansen & Wæver (2002); Shapiro (1981); (1988); (1997). 
12 Hansen (2006), pp. 79, 79; Shapiro (1992), p. 11. 
13 Ibid., p. 3. 
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meantime I will outline what is meant by the Island Race by presenting a short history of 
imperial British geopolitical identity. I will then discuss and problematise the privileged status 
of pragmatism and rational actor models in analysis of British foreign policy, addressing 
questions of British identity and strategy, before arguing that the Island Race represents an 
enduring concept of exceptional national history combined with a particularist and universal 
geopolitical vision that has a continued explanatory appeal.   
1.1. The Island becomes her: a short pre-history of the imperial Island Race  
The spatial identity of imperial Britain has been well documented: a world island and 
quintessential sea power, insular from Europe and the carrier of an exceptional history of liberal 
benevolence, parliamentary democracy and ‘fair play’ across the oceans which were, for them, 
highways without distance.14  There has been an array of approaches to seeking the roots of this 
construction: from the romantic, primordial evocations of Arthur Bryant, and Carl Schmitt’s 
Elizabethan setting of England’s ‘elemental metamorphosis’ into the ‘big fish, the leviathan’, 
which could ‘set itself in motion in search of other oceans’ to Linda Colley’s contention that 
British identity was forged in war with Catholic France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.15  Disregarding Bryant, Schmitt and Colley identify two significant historical nodes.  
Firstly there were the ‘West Country men’, a group of fêted adventurers associated with 
geographer Richard Hakluyt, such as Walter Raleigh and Francis Drake who successfully 
lobbied the Elizabethan court for North American colonies in the wake of the recent experiences 
of ‘taming’ Ireland.16  The subjugation of Ireland, with which Gearóid Ó Tuathail opens Critical 
Geopolitics, represented the geographical disciplining of a ‘wild’ country, an imperial encounter 
which reified English geography and history.17  This was the start of what Winston Churchill 
called ‘the First British Empire’.18  Mark one was tempered by American independence but the 
second empire, predicated along a similar juxtaposition, this time with Catholic France, was not 
long in coming.  Both moments allowed British geopolitics to be ordered, glorified and rarefied 
as against an Other.  But the importance of this brief, pre-history of the Island Race is in the 
establishment of the foundations of a long-standing set of geopolitical/geohistorical tropes, not 
just in recognising the antagonistic roots of identity.  In other words, by the time of the 
Scramble for Africa, the Channel Tunnel Crisis and the Naval Race with Germany, these 
                                                          
14 On the seas as strategic and cultural highways in imperial thought see, for example: Castlereagh 
(1822); Hughes (1870); Mahan (1890); Curzon (1898); Mackinder (1907); Baldwin (1925); Richmond 
(1923); (1928).  And in more modern analysis: Fleure & Davies (1970); McInnes (1998); Fernández-
Armesto (2004); Law (2005). 
15 Bryant (1984); (1986); Schmitt (1942), pp. 28, 52, 52; Colley (1992). 
16 Taylor (2001), especially pp. 117-37.  For general overviews of Tudor geographical thought see Hakluyt 
(1582); (1589); K. R. Andrews (1984); Cormack (1994); (1998); Mancall (2007); Scott (2012); Taylor 
(1930). 
17 Ó Tuathail (1996), pp. 3-6. 
18 Churchill (1957), pp. 67-152. 
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conceptions had become sedimented to the point of representing that shibboleth of common 
sense and pragmatism: the national interest.19  Furthermore, in the geographic, social and 
political eclecticism of these early encounters, we see how the Island Race was primed for 
mobilisation in a great variety of geographical, social and political situations.  From its 
inception, it was a universalised phenomenon whose referent objects were Britain and the 
world.   
 
In the century between Waterloo and the First World War, the British Empire expanded greatly.  
The loss of the American colonies was offset by huge gains, particularly in Africa and Asia; and 
victory over France in 1815 left British naval and merchant shipping virtually unchallenged on 
the oceans.  What developed concomitantly was the whole way in which Britain imagined itself 
as an international actor and, indeed, the environment in which it acted.  The constitution of 
British geopolitical identity at this time can best be understood via five, interlinked tropes which 
form the bases of what I call the Island Race, recovered through background reading of 
contemporary British imperial texts.  They can be introduced separately but must be understood 
in sum.   
1.2. The five tropes of Island Race identity 
Island Race I: insularity from Europe 
The first is the idea of insularity from Europe.  Epitomised by Lord Salisbury’s dictum of 
splendid isolation in a world in which Britain had no permanent friends or foes, only permanent 
interests, this was, in many ways, a fantastic conceit and revealed to be so by the First World 
War.20  But the British interest in maintaining a lofty detachment from European events while 
ensuring a balance of power on the continent (what Churchill called ‘the wonderful unconscious 
tradition of British Foreign Policy’ and Alec Douglas-Home an ‘automatic muscular reaction’), 
was an influential and enduring part of Island Race identity and crucially must be understood in 
the context of the second trope: universalism.21   
 
Island Race II: the universal island 
Universalism is the idea that Britain could and ought to project its power anywhere, at any time, 
when British interests were seen to be threatened; it is intimately and constitutively linked with 
insularity.  In some ways this is a natural trapping of imperial power, but it ought also to be seen 
                                                          
19 Aron (1967), p. 192. 
20 See David Steele’s political biography of Salisbury and Michael Howard’s overview of the British 
‘continental commitment’ in the early twentieth century (Steele (2001) especially pp. 243-73; Howard 
(1967)). 
21 Churchill (1948), p. 163; Home (1976), p. 144. 
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as a consequence of British conceptions of the world oceanic space as a place of distanceless 
flows in which one was effectively as close to Calcutta as Calais.22   
 
Island Race III: Lines of Communication 
The third aspect of Island Race identity is an extension of the second and it refers to the 
strategic management of this maritime empire.  In order to safeguard British hegemony in the 
far flung and non-contiguous colonies and coaling stations and ensure transport and trade 
between them, Lines of Communication were necessary.23  This entailed the constitution of a 
mental superstructure girdling the globe but mainly enacting British links between its North 
European home and the East.24  Certain geographic nodes were invested with supreme 
importance as the crucial loci upon which this edifice depended: Gibraltar, Malta, Cape Town, 
the Falklands, Suez, Aden, the Malacca Straits, Singapore.  And the greatest threat, before 
German naval expansion, was Russian Land Power which promised not just the severing of 
these arteries by meddling with the Ottoman Empire, but the establishment of rival, continental 
trade routes and the menacing of the imperial jewel itself, India.   
 
Island Race IV: Sea Power versus Land Power 
Through the constitution of these Lines of Communication was established the heir to the role 
of Napoléonic France as the antithesis to British maritime benevolence.25  The Russian Empire 
was everything that the British was not: a large, contiguous bloc, autocratic and seeking 
expansion in every direction.  As the fourth trope, it served a doubly constitutive role as both the 
physical expression of potential disruptor to Lines of Communication as well as the 
dichotomous, existential marker of what was Great about Britain.26   
 
Island Race V: Greater Britain 
                                                          
22 Demangeon (1925), pp. 100-1.  See also Schmitt (1942); (1950), pp. 172-84. 
23 On British maritime trade and strategy see Mahan (1900); Corbett (1911); Kennedy (1976); McInnes 
(1998); for realist theory of sea power or ‘offshore balancing’ see Mearsheimer (2001), especially pp. 
234-66 (and pp. 83-137), and, for a critical geopolitical perspective on Lines of Communication, Ó 
Tuathail (1992).  
24 Halford Mackinder wrote in 1904: ‘To visualize is the very essence of geographical power, which 
should be cultivated until it becomes possible to think of the whole World’s surface at one in all its 
complexities, with its girdles of all kinds, telegraphic, railway, steamer, girdles of power, girdles of 
thought, for every touch of the helm of government, either at Westminster or in the City, produces a 
ripple which goes right round the World, like the wave in the air emitted from Krakatoa meeting 
obstacles and producing varied results.  Nothing happens without producing results in every part’ 
(Mackinder (1904a), pp. 192-3). 
25 Mahan (1907), p. 304. 
26 For contemporaneous accounts of this, see Curzon (1889) (for an anthology of Curzon’s speeches, see 
Raleigh (1906)); Dilke (1890); Mackinder (1904b); Mahan (1900). 
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The final trope of imperial Island Race identity is the notion of Greater Britain.27  This concept 
was based upon the idea that wherever Britain had colonised (but especially the white settler 
communities) was effectively a part of Britain.  This was not meant in the French sense 
whereby, for example, Algeria was considered a political, economic and institutional extension 
of metropolitan France; rather Greater Britain was about the spread and consolidation of British, 
or Anglo-Saxon, values.  So by the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, despite its 
great, independent wealth and strident foreign policy, could nonetheless be considered as one 
more carrier of the exceptional history and values that Britain had bequeathed on the world.  
This, in turn, co-constitutively relied upon the other tropes of Island Race identity: insularity 
had allowed sufficient separation for the forging of unique values; universality and the Lines of 
Communication permitted their transmission around the world; and antipathy towards Land 
Power marked them out as superior against degenerate continental values. 
 
These aspects of British imperial identity hinged upon Britain being an island.  The assortment 
of geographers, strategists and politicians who narrated the empire at its peak in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was instrumental in this construction.  The likes of 
Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, James Froude, John Seeley, Charles Dilke and Albert 
Demangeon all argued that British imperialism was the natural result of Britain being an island 
with an exceptional history in an advantageous location that allowed it to (partially) distance 
itself from Europe and utilise its naval strength for world-wide colonisation and trade.28  The 
geopolitics of Mackinder—pioneer of the study of Geography at Oxford University and, later, 
Conservative MP—was based on the assumption that Britain’s dominance through sea power 
would soon come to an end because of the preponderance of rail and air travel.  If Britain failed 
to adjust to these new geopolitical realities, its power would be surpassed by rivals, in particular 
from the Heartland of Eurasia.29  Mackinder foregrounded Britain’s status as an island, not least 
in his Britain and the British Seas in which he argued that Britain’s island location afforded it 
the complementary qualities of insularity and universality.30   
 
Prone to a greater degree of romanticism than the sober Mackinder, historian Froude’s magnum 
opus was inspired by a seventeenth century utopian tract by James Harrington, The 
Commonwealth of Oceana.31  Froude’s own Oceana or England and her Colonies is an often 
                                                          
27 See Seeley (1883); Dilke (1869); (1890); and, for contemporary analysis of Greater Britain and Seeley, 
Bell (2005); (2007). 
28 See also E.A. Freeman’s ‘Alter Orbis’, a polemic against the proposed late-Victorian channel tunnel in 
which he argues for the insular distinctiveness of a Britain apart from the European continent (Freeman 
(1882)). 
29 Mackinder (1904b). 
30 Mackinder (1907), p. 11. 
31 Harrington (1656). 
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florid account of the glory of the British Empire in which, like Mackinder, he seeks to naturalise 
British imperialism through reference to Britain’s geography and its oneness with the oceans.  
‘After their own island,’ Froude wrote, ‘the sea is the natural home of Englishmen; the Norse 
blood is in us, and we rove over the waters, for business or pleasure, as eagerly as our 
ancestors.’32   
 
According to Cambridge professor John Seeley’s Expansion of England, Britain’s islandness 
came into its own through the vanquishing of France in the eighteenth century, allowing Britain 
to be free from entanglements in Europe and pursue its universalist destiny.33  Similar in tone 
was Greater Britain, in which Britain was becoming a ‘world island’, with distance effectively 
crushed by the export of British language, culture, institutions and trade.34  Its author, Charles 
Dilke, who remarked that ‘[t]hrough America, England is speaking to the world’, was a Liberal 
MP and virulent Russophobe who epitomised the contemporary rendering of Muscovite 
imperialism as the antithesis to Britain; if Mackinder provided the strategic rationale for 
paranoia regarding Russia, Dilke’s contribution was cultural.35    
 
This brief survey has introduced how these Island Race tropes were incorporated into British 
identity through the constitution of island geography in a global, imperial context.  These 
thinkers were some of the enthusiasts of empire, but there were critical voices too.  For all the 
John Ruskins, whose quasi-sacred imperialism was the great patriotic duty of the day, there 
were those (although admittedly fewer in number) like John Hobson, whose Imperialism: A 
Study argued not only that empire was wasteful and immoral as regards both Britons and the 
subject peoples but also that it was less a result of British geopolitics than British capitalism.36  
His views were not anathema to some British foreign policy-makers, amongst whom the 
rapacity of territorial acquisition which particularly marked the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century did not have unanimous support.  Dilke’s imperial 
                                                          
32 Froude (1886), p. 18. 
33 Seeley (1883), p. 144.  For contemporary analysis of Seeley’s thesis see Schwarz (1996); Deudney 
(2001); Bell (2005). 
34 Dilke (1869), especially pp. 70-1, 346-8.  See Bell (2007) for a comprehensive study of the idea of 
Greater Britain. 
35 Dilke (1869), pp. viii, 230.  Although well-travelled, Dilke never visited the country for which he 
reserved such obloquy.  By way of counterpoint, see Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-
Russian Question by George Curzon, soon to become Viceroy of India and, later, Foreign Secretary as the 
Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Curzon (1889), p. 12).  For further, contemporaneous accounts of the 
superiority of British sea power see Corbett (1890); (1911); Demangeon (1925); Herbertson & Howarth 
(1914); Mahan (1890); Richmond (1928); (1946); (1953).    
36 See Ruskin’s inaugural lecture at Oxford University in 1870 quoted in Said (1993), pp. 123-5; Hobson 
(1902).  See also Kearns (1993).  For their explanation of how ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ drove the British 
Empire, see Cain & Hopkins (1993) and Dummett (1999a & b).  Unlike Hobson, imperial administrator 
Frederick Lugard argued that, particularly in Africa, the British Empire had a ‘dual mandate’ (which it 
was fulfilling) towards both British commerce and the native populations (Lugard (1922)). 
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enthusiasm, for example, markedly cooled in direct correlation with the expansion of the 
empire.  His remarks in the otherwise supportive Greater Britain that ‘England in the East is not 
the England that we know’ and how ‘Flousy Britannia, with her anchor and ship, becomes a 
mysterious Oriental despotism’ hinted at the greater pessimism to be found in his later Problems 
of Greater Britain and recalled Edmund Burke’s suggestion that Warren Hastings’ mishandling 
of India was evidence of an invidious ‘geographical morality’ in which ‘actions in Asia do not 
bear the same moral qualities, which the same actions would bear in Europe.’37  Crucially, 
neither Burke nor Dilke disavowed British imperialism itself and scarcely questioned the 
practice of dominion over far-flung lands: the Island Race was predisposed towards hegemony, 
what mattered was the conduct of its rule.   
 
The imperial critiques advanced by William Gladstone, Dilke’s Liberal Party leader, were more 
explicitly spatial.  He problematized an empire of territories ‘severed greatly from one another, 
and uniformly from us, by thousands upon thousands of miles of dissociating ocean’ fearing that 
the huge effort required to defend it would be to the detriment of domestic interests.38  Yet it 
was during Gladstone’s second premiership in 1882 that the Anglo-Egyptian War was launched 
which culminated in the British occupation of the country.  He bemoaned how Britain laid ‘a 
virtual claim to a veto upon all the political arrangements of all the countries and seas which can 
possibly constitute any one of the routes between England and the East’, yet he annexed Egypt 
to protect British financial and strategic interests there.39     
1.3. Conclusion: a project for all times and places 
What we can see is that the Island Race was a holistic conception of not just Britain and its 
place in the world but also an exhaustive account of the international environment itself.  
Through the geopolitics of maritime empire, the Island Race was a fulsome expression that 
transcended simple statements of space to form an economic, political and cultural mise en 
scène of global proportions.  This is hardly surprising in the sense that the British Empire was 
and remains the largest that the world has ever known.  But in its scope and complexity there 
was also an inbuilt malleability which can perhaps be imbricated in the stubbornly famous 
notion of Britain’s foreign policy pragmatism.  What I mean by this is that the discourse of 
British imperialism was so wide-ranging as to be able to ontologically ‘cope’ with almost any 
situation that occurred.  This is not to say that Island Race identity was autonomous of British 
foreign policy-makers but that, such was the scope of the empire that it co-constitutively 
represented, any situation was able to be negotiated according to its own spatial-historical 
reasoning.   
                                                          
37 Dilke (1869), p. 550; (1890); Burke (1788), p. 55. 
38 Bennett (1953a), p. 269. 
39 Thornton (1959), p. 357. 
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There is nothing inherently unique about this imperative to explain the world and the discursive 
practices which comprise it; these are basic and enduring acts of ‘statecraft’ and necessarily rely 
upon praxes that are, in some measure, geo-historical.  Yet the tautology and physical scope of 
British imperialism meant that the entire world was Britain’s concern; in other words, Britain’s 
subject position as an imperial power was secured by its global nature.  Even as the Empire 
waned into insignificance, British foreign policy-makers continued to script the world and 
Britain’s place in it in global terms.40  Furthermore, the British imperial project was always cast 
in the language of providential teleology whereby Britain was the carrier of a unique and 
exceptional history.41  Even with the open acknowledgment of unspecified but definite termini 
in the African empire and Middle Eastern mandates, British imperialism was never represented 
as a temporary phenomenon.  The Empire in all of its guises was the bearer of its own set of 
historical values that would continue beyond the ephemera of any particular period.  The 
utilitarian strategic points guarding the Lines of Communication would ensure future liberal 
trade between Europe and North America and the East; the infantile colonies of Africa would, 
under British tutelage, be developed and civilised for the benefit of future generations; and the 
ancestry and heritage of the white settler colonies, whether fully independent or Dominions, 
would carry forth the Anglo-Saxon values bequeathed them by British settlement.  In sum, the 
British Empire was a project for all times.42 
 
That these tropes might have endured beyond the Empire to continue to fix Britain’s identity as 
a foreign policy actor has been scarcely explored even though much subsequent scholarship has 
noted the importance of islandness to the imperial identity.  We have already mentioned Bryant, 
Schmitt and Colley; more recently we see a slew of British history books in which islandness is 
foregrounded, such as Norman Davies’ The Isles: A History, Brian Lavery’s The Island Nation: 
A History of Britain and the Sea, Christopher Lee’s This Sceptred Isle: The Making of the 
British and Paul Monod’s Imperial Island: A History of Britain and its Empire, 1660-1837.43  
These, and popular phenomena such as the BBC television programme Coast (broadcast so far 
for ten series), show how Britain as an island remains an enduringly popular source of social, 
political and natural history. Yet, for all of the continued visibility of islandness in the British 
history corpus, it remains underexplored as the site of modern British foreign policy identity in 
the sense that long-standing foreign policy issues like the partial stance towards Europe and 
affection for the ‘special’ transatlantic relationship are simply accepted as further manifestations 
                                                          
40 Kearns (1993), p. 9; Aldrich (1992b), p. 21. 
41 See Ferguson (2003), pp. 113-62. 
42 Armitage (2007), p. 5. 
43 Davies (1999); Lavery (2005); Lee (1997); Monod (2009). 
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of pragmatism and rationality.44  By contrast, what is needed is an analysis of how and why 
Europe and the US, for example, continue to be constructed in the fashions that they are through 
recrudescences of Island Race identity.   
2. Trends in the study of British foreign policy 
In the ensuing sections I will review and problematise some of the key studies on post-
imperial/Second World War British foreign policy and identify and question the general lack of 
geopolitical discourse, identity and ontological security-seeking.  In particular I will analyse the 
continued privileged status of rational actor models and the claim that British foreign policy is 
pragmatic, and the influence of ‘declinism’ in the broad sense of offering a reading of British 
history that renders the post-imperial period as inert and directionless compared to the imperial 
heyday.  Subsequently I will explore the strengths and weaknesses of some of the most recent 
scholarship on British foreign policy and identity.  What will be borne in mind throughout are 
the practices which fail to admit social processes such as identity construction into analyses of 
British foreign policy.  Even though the studies in the initial section especially do not have this 
kind of analysis in mind and so have not ‘failed’ on their own terms, it is nonetheless necessary 
and enlightening to highlight some of the drawbacks and limitations that their methods are 
productive of and the kinds of dominant representations of British history that need to be 
unsettled. 
2.1. Pragmatism, rationalism and the national interest 
Many accounts of British foreign policy since 1945 sidestep questions of how socially 
constructed, geopolitical discourse might play an enduring, constitutive role in representations 
of issues and events and policy responses.  In their stead, most reviews of the period (and some 
even of the imperial era) tend to pursue rational actor models in which British foreign policy-
makers are engaged in a sustained, reactive pursuit of national interests according to 
calculations of risk, limitations and maximum possible gains as defined against limited 
objectives.45  Few remarks epitomise this better than Henry Kissinger’s on the foreign policy of 
the third Viscount Palmerston that it ‘required no formal strategy because its leaders understood 
the British interest so well and so viscerally that they could act spontaneously on each situation 
as it arose, confident that their public would follow.’46  This chimes with the endlessly asserted 
self-ascription of many in the high seats of British politics that they are, in the final analysis, 
                                                          
44 See, for example, John Dumbrell’s A Special Relationship (Dumbrell (2006)). 
45 For the theory of rational actor models in IR see for example: Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Zagare 
(1990); Russett (1995). 
46 Kissinger (1994), p. 96.  Palmerston was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on three occasions 
(1830-4, 1835-41, 1846-51) and Prime Minister twice (1855-8, 1859-65). 
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‘pragmatic’.47  Like Bernard Porter’s ‘absent-minded imperialists’ they simply react to events in 
the ‘pointillist’ fashion that drew praise for Thatcher’s foreign policy from one of her advisors.48  
This ‘Whiggish’ narrative tradition of British history has been much derided by the likes of Neil 
Ascherson, David Marquand and Raphael Samuel but its influence is undeniable, not least on 
ways it constitutes the self-images of some British politicians and thus touches the culture of 
debates in the Commons.49  This has been taken for granted in a number of studies of British 
foreign policy, from which several examples will now be discussed.   
 
London School of Economics Professor F.S. Northedge remarked in a 1971 lecture: ‘In any 
close examination I have ever made of the major issues of British foreign policy […] it has 
seemed to me almost true to say that, when all things are taken into account, the responsible 
Ministers could hardly have acted otherwise than as they did.’50  C.J. Bartlett reached similar 
conclusions, deciding that, such had been the ‘strange’ ‘twists’ of twentieth century history, 
‘more intelligent long-term planning might have served the British no better than their own 
pragmatic approach.’51  They are not isolated.  Separated by several decades, Joseph Frankel 
and Peter Mangold, for example, both evaluated the success of British foreign policy in the 
twentieth century; both concluded that pragmatism had generally been advantageous (although 
not without inherent vice) and Frankel concluded his study with the ‘confident’ expectation that 
‘pragmatism will remain the major characteristic of British politics’.52  Frankel was always 
                                                          
47 There are numerous examples of this to be found in the speeches and autobiographies of British 
foreign policy-makers.  In particular, see the memoirs of Alec Douglas-Home, Margaret Thatcher, John 
Major and Tony Blair (Home (1976); Thatcher (1993); (1995); Major (1999); Blair (2010)).   
48 Porter (2004); Cradock (1997), p. 36.  Porter’s title was drawn from Seeley’s sardonic remark that the 
Empire had been gathered up in a ‘fit of absence of mind’ (Seeley (1883), p. 10).  Ronald Robinson and 
colleagues in their Africa and the Victorians were critical of the idea that British imperialists would ever 
‘plant the flag in the middle of the African bush in a fit of absence of mind’ (Robinson et al (1961), p. 
163).  Yet Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, who, as Controller-General and then Consul-General, 
effectively ruled Egypt for a time in the late nineteenth century, remarked: ‘It has indeed become a 
commonplace of English political thought that for centuries past, from the days of Raleigh to those of 
Rhodes, the position of England in the world has been due more to the exertions, the resources, and 
occasionally, perhaps, to the absence of scruple found in the individual Anglo-Saxon, than to any 
encouragement or help derived from British government’ (Kwarteng (2011), p. 232).  Conservative MP 
Kwasi Kwarteng emphasises this in his recent survey of the British Empire (Kwarteng (2011)).  
49 ‘Until recently, English historiography resembled the work of a landscape gardener in a stately home; 
vistas of Saxon lawn and Norman shrubbery led up past Tudor and Hanoverian flowerbeds to the terrace 
of the present, where the proprietor sat contentedly surveying his estate.  Other countries are restless, 
grubbing up old interpretations in each generation’ (Ascherson (2002), p. vii).  See Marquand’s 
reflections on British identity ‘after Whig imperialism’; Samuel returned to this theme often in his work 
on British patriotism, history and national identity (Marquand (1995); Samuel (1989a-c); (1994); (1998)). 
50 Northedge (1972), p. 3. 
51 Bartlett (1989), p. 124. 
52 Frankel (1975); Mangold (2001); Frankel (1975), p. 315. 
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likely to reach such a conclusion, given the lack of enquiry with which his study was 
approached: nothing more (or less) than an ‘analytical description of reality’.53  
 
More recent accounts by David Sanders, Robert Self and John W. Young also explicitly attempt 
to elide theoretical underpinnings, as if fearful that such might taint what ought to be the simple 
narrative of a series of British reactions to external events.54  As in Mangold’s and Northedge’s 
analyses the conclusions are foregone.  Furthermore, these accounts are written in the grip of the 
seemingly permanent situation of British ‘declinism’, a state of affairs that Thatcher claimed to 
have terminated but which, according to Enoch Powell, had been fantasy anyway, given the 
‘qualities’ and ‘insular character’ of the British people and institutions.55  Although many of 
these studies point out, perhaps justifiably, that post-imperial Britain has had largely more 
propitious circumstances than before in terms of many economic and social indicators, the sense 
of comparative failure and inertia in the light of having once ruled a huge empire looms large.56   
 
The effect of this, combined with the incurious nature of some scholarship which takes 
pragmatism for granted, is that a number of them seek only to catalogue the material ‘reality’ of 
Britain’s decline from imperial prominence.  Accordingly, Robert Holland’s In Pursuit of 
Greatness terminates in 1970 because the Sterling Crisis of 1967 ‘finally delivered the coup de 
grâce to those ideas and ideals’ which Britain had pursued even as its empire dwindled.57  
Frankel argued that the process of imperial decline had begun long before the Second World 
War and that British foreign policy-makers had been slowly adjusting to this new reality before 
enacting the final process of withdrawal between 1945 and 1973.58  The only question being: 
how well did Britain adapt to its defenestration?  As has already been noted, the inherent 
pragmatism of British foreign policy-makers apparently insulated Britain from the worst shocks 
                                                          
53 Ibid., p. 8. 
54 Sanders (1990); Self (2010); Young (1997).    
55 Thatcher (1982); (1995), p. 91; Powell (1987), p. 43.  British declinism encompasses a wide range of 
different explanations into the apparent decline taking hold of Britain, beginning in the late 1950s.  Early 
economic accounts were provided by Michael Shanks and Andrew Shonfield who criticised, respectively, 
the conservative attitudes of the élite and poor economic performance fostered by global overstretch 
(Shanks (1972); Shonfield (1958)).  Arthur Koestler pursued a more varied selection in his Suicide of a 
Nation? while C. P. Snow’s lectures problematized the governmental and social exclusion of scientists at 
the expense of literary intellectuals (Koestler (1964); Snow (1959)).  Figures centred on the New Left 
journal, such as Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn, also contributed Marxist critiques of Britain’s plight with 
the Scottish nationalist Nairn updating and expanding his arguments in The Break-up of Britain 
(Anderson (1964); Nairn (1977)).  Finally there are Samuel’s and Patrick Wright’s attacks on the 
debilitating effects of the phenomenon of British heritage and perhaps most famous of all is Corelli 
Barnett’s The Collapse of British Power (Samuel (1989a-c); (1994); (1998); Wright (1985); Barnett 
(1972)).  See also: Marquand (1995); English & Kenny (2000)).   
56 See, for example, David Dilks’ and David Reynolds’ surveys of waning British power in the twentieth 
century (Dilks (1981a & b); Reynolds (1991)). 
57 Holland (1991), p. 9. 
58 Frankel (1975), pp. 1-11. 
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of a rapidly changing world.  The ‘puzzle’, as even Robert Self admits, is how constant British 
foreign policy apparently appears to be, in spite of the fact that it is inherently reactive and the 
world has changed so much: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.59  It is no wonder that so 
many of these studies favour structural, rational actor models in which the pragmatic, ‘official 
mind’ of British foreign policy-makers navigating a sensible course through a changing 
international environment serves as a proxy for enquiry into questions of the discursive, social 
processes which constitute affectations of national interest pursuance.  In these accounts, British 
foreign policy-makers are men untainted by these processes, above the European or Third 
World fashion for national identities, free to pursue their ancien interests while engaging in a 
dignified (or otherwise) withdrawal.  It should be noted, if only in passing, that the man who, if 
anyone, most fervently stoked the ‘declinist’ fire in 1972 with his The Collapse of British 
Power, Corelli Barnett, decried the absence of pragmatism in modern British foreign policy-
makers.60       
2.2. Whither Britishness?  The (geo)politics of modern British identity 
Quite apart from the risks of essentialising what most agree is a complex web of contingency 
and multiplicity, Britishness itself is said to be imperilled; assailed from multiple sites: 
globalisation, European integration, Scottish nationalism, immigration.  For some, like Doty and 
Marquand, it was only the Empire that had provided the British glue to what was, in any case, 
hegemonic English nationalism asserting itself over the Celtic fringe.61  In any case, neither the 
burial of Britain in a United States of Europe nor its breaking up into constituent parts—
prophesied by Tom Nairn in 1977—have yet to be formalised, although the foreign policy (and 
other) implications of a ‘yes’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 were much 
explored prior to the poll.62  Similarly Samuel noted the prospect of Britain ‘unravelling’ and 
both Colley and Peter Ward found Britishness to be, respectively, contingent and unstable.63   
 
Such questions, combined with declinism and the continued emphasis on the supposed 
pragmatism of British foreign policy—or ‘muddling through’ as Peter Hennessy put it—have 
led to persistent suggestions that Britain’s foreign policy (and its identity) is in the throes of a 
                                                          
59 Self (2010), pp. 5-6, 288-301. 
60 Barnett (1972), pp. 36-7, 42-3.  In characteristic Gibbonian prose, Barnett undertook that Britain’s 
increasingly effete nineteenth century élite adopted an evangelical, ethical model of empire which 
allowed it to be gradually eclipsed by more ruthless rivals (Gibbon (1952)).  Attlee, according to Gibbon 
scholar Charles A. Robinson Jr., re-read The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire in the summer of 1949 
(Robinson Jr. (1952), p. ix).  See also Anthony Sampson’s Anatomy of Britain, in many ways a harbinger 
of some of Barnett’s arguments and published ten years prior (Sampson (1962)). 
61 Doty (1996), pp. 124-5; Marquand (1995), pp. 183-4.  See also Krishan Kumar’s and Amelia Hadfield-
Amkhan’s analyses of British identity formation (Kumar (2003); Hadfield-Amkhan (2010)). 
62 Nairn (1977).  See, for example, Andrew Dorman’s analysis of potential defence and security 
implications of a vote for independence in 2014 (Dorman (2014)). 
63 Samuel (1998); (1989a-c); Colley (1992); Ward (2004). 
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long-running ‘crisis’.64  Increasingly unable to manage the fragile balance of Scottish, Welsh 
and other fringe nationalisms and the encroachment of radical Muslims and Brussels 
bureaucrats, this crisis of national Self extends to Britain’s international affairs.  The main well-
spring tends to be an historic and unresolved elision of the choice between European integration 
and the ‘special’ transatlantic relationship.  William Wallace has been particularly vocal in this 
regard, noting in 1991 the ‘tension between American pressure for greater British commitment 
to European integration […] and British desires to use the Anglo-American relationship 
precisely to resist further entanglement, to escape from Europe to the open sea.’65  The ‘British 
national myth’ had been adapted and expanded to cope with the gradual ‘loss of national 
autonomy’ since 1945 but, even fifteen years later he was hardly more sanguine in announcing 
the ‘the collapse of British foreign policy’ as represented by Blair’s bridge across the Atlantic.66  
Britain was, he argued, stuck between Europe and the Anglosphere although, as Justin Gibbins 
notes, it is more often than not Europe, rather than the US, that is cast in the role of Other and 
Atlanticism reified as ‘the means by which Britain’s past survives into the present.’67  For Hugo 
Young, it was the attachment to the ‘blessed plot’ of Britain itself—the ‘struggle[…] to 
reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid’—that vexed the 
question of whether Britain could ‘truly accept that her modern destiny was to be a European 
country’.68  Other major studies have cast Britain as the ‘awkward partner’ or ‘on the sidelines’ 
when it comes to Europe; explanatory foci which tend to depict a Britain, suspicious of the 
European Other, seeking to maximise its dwindling power by bandwagoning with the US.69 
 
The commitment of David Cameron’s government to hold a referendum on Britain’s EU 
membership by 2017 has, once again, brought questions of British foreign policy and identity 
into sharp focus.  A case in point is the recent, special issue of the Journal of Common Market 
Studies entitled ‘Interpreting British European Policy’ whose ‘agent-centred, but not agent-only 
interpretivist perspective’ produces a number of insightful studies.70  Piers Ludlow examines a 
key 1971 parliamentary debate on European accession and touches on issues concerning the 
negotiation of the Island Race tropes of insularity and universality; as do Cary Fontana and 
Craig Parsons in discussing the Thatcherite ‘contradiction’ between neoliberal, global trade and 
strong, nationalist sovereignty, although they fail to conceptualise these tendencies as being 
                                                          
64 Hennessy (1996). 
65 Wallace (1991), p. 71.  Andrew Gamble, Robin Niblett and William Wallace and Christopher Phillips 
have all also rendered a similar dichotomy (Gamble (2003); Niblett (2007); Wallace & Phillips (2009)). 
66 Wallace (1991), p. 70; Wallace (2005a); Blair (2000), p. 239; (2003a), p. 237. 
67 Wallace (2005b); Gibbins (2014), p. 65. 
68 Young (1998), p. 1. 
69 See Stephen George’s An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community and David Gowland 
and colleagues’ Britain and European Integration Since 1945: On the sidelines (George (1998); Gowland 
et al (2010)).  
70 Bevir et al (2015), p. 3. 
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constitutive of one another in British identity.71  Oliver Daddow rightly highlights the ‘outsider 
tendency’ of some British foreign policy-makers as part of the tradition of insularity and this is 
complemented by Ben Wellings and Helen Baxendale’s insights into what they call the 
‘dilemma’ of Europe or a reconstituted Anglosphere.72  This issue points to some pertinent, 
recent examinations of identity in British foreign policy which move beyond the traditional 
focus of pragmatism and the national interest.  These are particularly welcome in the light of 
Daddow’s observation that representations of historic British Euroscepticism have eclipsed 
those of Euroenthusiasm to the point where the latter has become a ‘lost history’.73  In spite of 
these gains, there has been a failure, on the whole, to note and explore the continued constitutive 
relationship between foreign policy and imperial-era, spatial identity tropes in the context of 
ontological security-seeking in a dynamic environment. 
 
A notable recent attempt to do this is Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan’s British Foreign Policy, 
National Identity and Neoclassical Realism.  She explores several case studies of particular 
identity crises facing British foreign policy from the 1882 ‘Channel Tunnel Crisis’ to the 2003 
debate over the Euro currency.  Her insights are a timely recrudescence of identity in the study 
of British foreign policy, especially her admittance of ontological security-seeking, the role of 
discourse and her theorising of English and British nationalisms, yet this is occasionally 
undermined by her use of a neoclassical realist framework which leads to unresolved tension 
between claims of causal and constitutive links in conceptualising foreign policy and identity.74  
Nevertheless, she hints at the continued relevance of discursive spatial identity to post-1945 
British foreign policy-makers, as does Jamie Gaskarth who also discusses Britain’s temporal 
and ethical identities.75  In the main, Gaskarth pursues the argument—like Wallace—that 
Britain is in danger of ‘strategic drift’ because of a lack of reflection on its foreign policy 
identity.76  Bernard Jenkin MP and George Grant made a congruent point, contending in 2011 
that British strategy was at a ‘tipping point’ due to lack of a focussed, strategic identity and 
unwillingness to decide on the extent of its global reach.77  In discussing New Labour, Gaskarth 
laments how, in spite of the ‘plethora of strategy documents since 1997, none sought to consider 
[…] British identity […] in any depth’; a point explored by retired diplomat John Coles who 
                                                          
71 Ludlow (2015); Fontana & Parsons (2015). 
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73 Daddow (2004), pp. 9-18. 
74 Hadfield-Amkhan (2010), pp. 23-42. 
75 Gaskarth (2013), pp. 59-80. 
76 Gaskarth (2014), p. 559.  This was part of a special 2014 issue of the International Affairs journal which 
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argues that the long-standing failure to elucidate ‘a certain idea of Britain’ is ‘not for want of 
trying’, given the quantity of official strategic papers published since 1945, but is hampered by 
a culture of pragmatism at the Foreign Office and the cost-driven nature of many of these 
exercises.78   
 
All of which prompted Patrick Porter to explore ‘Why Britain doesn’t do Grand Strategy’ 
through seven main arguments: the lack of an obvious, major enemy; reluctance to study 
strategic issues in British universities; the absence of fertile conditions, i.e. European stability 
and the paucity of élite and mass demand for strategic studies; that Britain has ‘abandoned 
geography’ in favour of globalism; Britain’s subordinate part in American grand strategy; the 
triumph of presentation over strategy, exemplified by New Labour; and the general point of 
Britain’s identity being unsettled.79  Two main points can be raised to problematise Porter’s 
arguments: firstly, there is a conflict between his insistence that Britain has chosen globalism 
but has been unable or not impelled to elucidate a grand strategy because of the stability of its 
own European region; secondly—and this relates to many of the studies mentioned—the 
apparent incoherence of things like strategic reviews does not equate to the absence of foreign 
policy identity for the latter is better conceived in terms of the reiterated, often anodyne phrases 
and statements which punctuate speeches, reports and debates.80  Porter suggests: being more 
selective in relations with the US; adopting ‘smaller and more bounded concepts of the national 
interest to rebalance ends and means’; and ‘abandon the creation of declaratory documents to 
please opinion, an exercise that creates the surface impression of strategy rather than the 
requisite substance.’81   
 
In his Free World, Timothy Garton Ash identifies the Janus-like predicament of facing both 
Europe and the US, not to mention the former empire, and suggests that Britain has been torn 
between four different foci: regaining its independence; choosing the US; choosing Europe; or 
making the best of its good relations with both.  He is correct both in noting that the latter 
option—‘both Island and World’—has been little favoured by many between Churchill and 
Blair (although perhaps more ought to be made of Macmillan and even Thatcher) and how 
intertwined these ‘four faces of Janus Britain’ are.82  His solution: ‘we must have a national 
strategy that engages fully, on all fronts, with the world’.83  More nuanced is Tarak Barkawi and 
                                                          
78 Gaskarth (2011), p. 84; Coles (2000), p. 178, 59-82.  See also Evans (2014). 
79 Porter (2010), pp. 7-10.  For other recent examinations of British strategy, see Betz & Cormack (2009); 
Newton et al (2010). 
80 Although he does argue in The Global Village Myth that globalism is not the same as grand strategy 
(Porter (2015), especially pp. 18-58). 
81 Porter (2010), p. 10. 
82 Garton Ash (2004), p. 34. 
83 Ibid., p. 208. 
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Shane Brighton’s suggestion that Britain privilege its imperial past (although not in the sense of 
apologism) because it is that which ‘gives global significance to British identity.’84  Although 
they draw attention to what they call ‘the moribund national narrative of the island story’, their 
study is suggestive of the ways in which island identity is imbricated in the nexus between 
parochialism and globalism and, as I will demonstrate, has been constitutive of far more than 
just insipid nostalgia and insularity.85     
 
What this review shows is a small but significant re-ignition of interest in British foreign policy 
identity and there is clearly much to recommend it, especially the ‘agent-centred, but not agent-
only interpretivist perspective’ of the Journal of Common Market Studies issue.86  To build on 
this work, more needs to be done to highlight the continued, historical constitutions of identity 
over a longer period of time, to recognise the importance of geopolitics as an ontologically 
secure framing device in the context of British political debate and its enduring constitutive 
effects in terms of British foreign policy. 
3. The argument: when geopolitics meets an exceptional history 
Informed by and building on the preceding review as well as the theoretical foci outlined in the 
ensuing chapter, I wish to argue that what the Island Race represents is an enduring concept of 
exceptional national history combined with a particularist and universal geopolitical vision.  The 
traces of this idea exist in multiple and diverse sources in the corpora of the likes of Mackinder, 
Schmitt, Samuel, Colley, Paul Kennedy and Niall Ferguson.87  Some have sought to proscribe, 
some to problematise, some to analyse and contextualise and in more recent scholarship too we 
find evidence of an understanding of the discursive pre-histories and histories of what we might 
recognise as Island Race identity.  Alex Law, for example, urges the conceptualisation of the 
British imperial island in terms of routes and roots and navies and navels, linking the desire to 
annihilate the distance of sea space with an island sanctuary that is both besieged and an 
                                                          
84 Barkawi & Brighton (2013), p. 1110.  Contrasts can be drawn here with both Kwarteng’s survey, 
Ghosts of Empire: Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World, in which he argues that the arbitrary, 
individualistic and brutal nature of British imperial rule has been productive of much post-colonial chaos 
in places like Iraq, Burma and Nigeria; and Niall Ferguson’s Empire which casts British imperialism in the 
role of benevolent inspiration for American hegemony (Kwarteng (2011), pp. 3-8; Ferguson (2003), pp. 
1-52).  See also Catherine Baker’s article in which she discusses whether Danny Boyle’s opening 
ceremony of the London Olympic Games in 2012 (entitled ‘Isles of Wonder’) represented an attempt to 
move ‘beyond the island story’ towards a popular ‘mosaic history’ of Britain and Richard Evans’ attack 
on Conservative Education Secretary Michael Gove’s privileging of Britain’s ‘island story’ in the History 
curriculum (Baker (2014), p. 412; Evans (2011); Gove (2010)). 
85 Barkawi & Brighton (2013), p. 1123. 
86 Bevir et al (2015), p. 3. 
87 Mackinder (1904b); (1907); Schmitt (1942); (1950) especially pp. 172-84; Samuel (1998) especially pp. 
3-20, pp. 41-73; Colley (1992) especially pp. 56-70; Kennedy (1976) especially pp. 13-36; Ferguson 
(2003), pp. 113-62. 
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exemplar of universal civilisation.88  Paul Readman and Robert Shannan Peckham make similar 
points: Readman discussing the dual imperatives of British nationalism as both universal 
(empire) and insular (particular) and Peckham noting the nineteenth century discursive 
consecration of islands as carriers of exceptional politics.89  Both fail to conceptualise how this 
might endure, even without empire itself.  In particular, Law suggests that what survived in 
Britain was only a ‘shallow nostalgia’ that will ‘continue to shrivel’ as both the roots and routes 
of island identity grow more distant.90  This is a puzzling assertion, especially given his focus on 
the mythic elements of islandness which surely always possess an inbuilt potential for, if not 
longevity, then resurrection, even in spite of so-called material factors or the passage of time.  
Indeed, within a decade of Law’s argument Cameron made a speech (see chapter 6) in the run-
up to the Scottish Independence Referendum in which he declared his fondness for Henrietta 
Marshall’s Our Island Story and anointed Britain, whose values were ‘of value to the world’, 
‘the most extraordinary country in history’ and ‘the winning team in world history’.91   
 
If Cameron’s remarks represent a significant, contemporary configuration of British identity 
then it needs to be contextualised within a broader history that seeks to answer the question: 
how is this present possible?  As I have acknowledged, the presence of islandness in British 
identity has already been noted, but I wish to take these conceptualisations further.  To begin to 
do this I will draw again on one of Wallace’s arguments.  In a 1991 critique of British identity 
and foreign policy, he contended that ‘the close links between the concept of the British state, 
the centrality of the Westminster parliament, the distinctive traditions of English common law 
and the myth of English exceptionalism—a free country confronting an unfree European 
continent—have made it peculiarly difficult for the political elite to come to terms with the 
redefinition of national identity needed to cope with international economic and social 
interdependence and with Britain’s altered international position.’92  Wallace correctly identifies 
the totems of Britain’s supposed exceptionalism and is right to point out their mythic qualities.93  
Yet our point of divergence originates from his suggestion that these have stopped British 
foreign policy-makers from coping with changes to the international environment.  I would 
argue that Island Race identity, in its own terms and because of its privileged ontological status, 
has proved remarkably adaptable to the vicissitudes of the middle and late twentieth century and 
beyond.  By constitutively shaping British perceptions of international events and issues, there 
has been a ‘looping effect’ which has simultaneously dignified the tropes of Island Race identity 
                                                          
88 Law (2005). 
89 Readman (2014); Peckham (2003). 
90 Law (2005), p. 275. 
91 Cameron (2014); Marshall (1905); Hough (2010). 
92 Wallace (1991), p. 69.   
93 See, for example, Billie Melman’s ‘Claiming the Nation’s Past’ for an analysis of the construction of an 
Anglo-Saxon ‘tradition’ (Melman (1991)). 
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as enduringly ‘relevant’ across time and context.94  This is not to say it has been instrumentally 
or materially successful (or otherwise)—that would be a value-judgement too far for this 
thesis—but, on its own terms and because of British discursive culture and the long-term effects 
of ontological security-seeking, Island Race identity has legitimised foreign policies by 
allowing the perception amongst foreign policy-makers that their ‘national interests’ are 
obtainable and realistic within their own established geo-historical framework.   
 
In one sense then it might be said that I have come full circle and agree with Wallace and the 
others who suggest that British foreign policy-makers have not redefined British national 
identity.  But I would qualify this by arguing that it is flawed to assume that national identity 
can be adequately crystallised in a document, even a series of regularly updated, strategic 
documents, like those to which British governments are now committed every five years.95  
Identity, better conceived, is the emergent, enduring culminations of collectively debated 
readings of shared history and it at least appears to change slowly and tectonically as foreign 
policy-makers seek to ‘discipline’ multiple conceptions of events and issues by enframing them 
within established tropes of selfhood.96  Writing about strategic culture, a phenomenon—as Ken 
Booth showed—thoroughly bound up with identity, Colin Gray remarked: if it ‘is held to be 
significantly reshapable on a year-by-year, or even on a decade-by-decade, basis, then ‘culture’ 
is probably unduly dignified, even pretentious, a term to characterize the phenomena at issue.’97   
 
This argument relies on theories of discursive practice and ontological security-seeking which 
will be expanded upon in the following chapter.  So utilised in this thesis, we have a novel 
reading of British foreign policy identity in which the particular contours of islandness remain 
as a bedrock of ontological security-seeking.  That they were most thoroughly and politically 
inscribed in the imperial period is merely a coincidence, although a highly significant one, for 
the imperial island without the imperialism is still the island.  The discursive constitutions of the 
geopolitics of the British Empire were so reliant on the spatial ontologies of the island that they 
became fused and inseparable, such that, even among and since the fitful and incremental 
atrophying of the empire, the space of the island remained fecund with these meanings. 
 
Furthermore, as I argued earlier, there was the all-encompassing nature of this identity, with few 
areas of the world outside the purview of British imperialism.  From Alaska to Antarctica and 
Beijing to Beirut, the Island Race was relevant as an explanatory framework.  Gradually without 
                                                          
94 Hacking (1999), p. 34. 
95 HM Government (2010), p. 9. 
96 Kleuters (2009), p. 520; Campbell (1998), p. 81.  See also Lapid (2001). 
97 Booth (1979); Gray (1999), p. 132. 
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the empire (but with some of the trappings of a Great Power) the world still needed explaining 
according to the demands of a pluralist, democratic parliament with time set aside precisely to 
debate international issues and comprising Members ever more aware of them.  To explain what 
was and is happening in the world requires—indeed is co-constitutive with—reference (explicit 
and implicit) to a set of co-ordinates forged in tandem with references to a collective Self that, 
of course, is a part of that world.  This Self had been irrevocably and comprehensively global in 
nature.  So it is not just that—as Patrick Porter says of globalism—that a ‘world so fragile that it 
must be superintended by a benevolent liberal hegemon’ was and is imagined, but that a world 
is imagined at all; because this practice of imagining in itself was what secured (and still 
secures) British relevance in a multitude of situations and locales.98  The primary referent object 
of its ontological security-seeking is thus Britain as a relevant actor in international politics, a 
discursive practice that has relied upon constitutions of its historic geopolitical identity as the 
Island Race.  Put this way, my argument becomes rather anodyne: that British foreign policy-
makers try to make Britain seem relevant when they talk about the world.  However, the 
consequences of this are significant because of the particularities of the Island Race identity that 
is a crux of their discursive practice. 
 
For a government of the day to take the appeals of the likes of Porter, Garton Ash and Gaskarth 
at their word and attempt wholesale to reassess or reorient British foreign policy identity would 
actually require a reorientation of what British islandness means, not necessarily Britishness 
itself.  Rather than proscribing how British foreign policy-makers might better conceive their 
national identity and so practice more effective foreign policy, this thesis aims at decentring the 
narratives of the Island Race precisely by exposing them as the discursive geo-historical 
constitutions that they are and demonstrating that they do not rely on any eternal geographical 
truths but emergent discursive cultures of ontological security-seeking that have been 
marginalised in many studies. 
4. Chapter summaries 
In the following chapter I will outline the theoretical framework and methodological focus of 
this thesis.  This will entail discussions, firstly, of critical geopolitics and ontological security in 
which I will conceptualise the ways in which foreign policy-makers mobilise spatial themes and 
frames of reference in order to elucidate familiar renderings of the world and the state’s place in 
it.  Then I will outline how discourse is fundamental to this by arguing that it ought to be 
theorised as a social practice.  Following that, I will explain my interpretivist, genealogical 
approach which impels a study of historic constitutions of identity and how they are mobilised 
in order to seek the afore mentioned ontological security.  Finally I will present some 
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considerations related to my choices of primary material—debates in the British House of 
Commons—and how they will be ‘put to work’ in the thesis and test my hypothesis. 
 
The empirical chapters are structured according to several key ‘moments’ in British foreign 
policy since the Second World War.  There are individual reasons for the choosing of each, 
which are expanded upon in general terms in the following chapter and in more detail in the 
chapters themselves.  What they have in common is how Island Race identity tropes were 
particularly activated in the ways the events and issues were narrated in the Commons.  Chapter 
3 focusses on several debates surrounding the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 and the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 and argues firstly that the inauguration of NATO co-constitutively 
mobilised the reiteration of the Greater Britain trope of Island Race identity as MPs linked the 
two through references to the democratic heritage of the North Atlantic region and the 
importance of the civilised (Anglo-Saxon) values which emanated from it and differentiated 
them from the ‘typical Land Power’ of the Soviet Union.  Taken together, we will see how 
aspects of Island Race identity were mobilised to represent NATO as an opportunity for and 
proof of Britain’s continued relevance, rather than American usurpation of British global 
hegemony.  The relative consensus around NATO can then be compared and contrasted with the 
debates surrounding the Suez Crisis.  Nonetheless, we will be able to see how the deeply 
polarised arguments of both Eden’s Conservative government and Gaitskell’s Labour 
opposition drew upon Island Race identity tropes in order to seek ontological security in an 
unfamiliar context by narrating the importance of Lines of Communication and Britain’s 
relevance as a global arbiter of moral values. 
 
Chapter 4 presents several debates concerning Britain’s attempts to join the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in the 1960s, from the tentative 1960 suggestion that Britain ‘take notice’ of 
greater unity on the continent and the announcement the following year that accession 
negotiations were to open, to the French rebuff in 1963.  Examination of these debates will 
demonstrate several important things about Island Race identity and ontological security-
seeking: firstly, the importance of Mackinder’s ascription of British geopolitics as being at once 
both insular and universal in character; secondly, how the two concepts essentially constituted 
one another, with British foreign policy-makers still finding it discursively difficult to reckon 
with the idea of being strongly engaged with Europe and having a world-wide role; and thirdly, 
the extent to which NATO and Suez had been assimilated into the Island Race narrative, i.e. 
inability to completely rely on the US; the continued importance of the Soviet threat and the 
place of Western Europe as a further bulwark against Russian expansionism; the place of Britain 
amongst a proximal group of democratic, civilised countries.  These were difficult debates for 
the Island Race, involving thorough negotiations of what the concepts of insularity and 
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universality really meant.  For example, Euro-enthusiasts argued that British universalism could 
be ensured by being part of the EC; sceptics regarded Britain’s involvement with Europe as 
constituting insularity.  Nevertheless, this further demonstrates the importance of the two tropes 
as central pillars of Island Race identity in their enduring mobilisations to fix ontologically 
secure subject positions for Britain in novel contexts.  The enthusiasm with which insularity and 
universality were linked with one another and with the ontologically secure notion of British 
global relevance once British membership of the EEC had been vetoed, only confirms this.   
 
Chapter 5 examines British foreign policy identity in the early years of Margaret Thatcher’s 
time as Prime Minister.  The focus is on debates surrounding two events: the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Falklands Conflict of the spring of 1982.  I will argue 
that the discourse of the government constituted an historical erasure of the period since Suez by 
seeking ontological security through a rendering of Island Race identity tropes from the period 
prior to 1956.  This is evidenced by the ways in which the Soviet invasion was greeted in the 
Commons with a large-scale critique of British and Western global strategy.  The importance of 
this for Island Race identity and ontological security was: a reassertion of Britain’s part in a 
democratic metacommunity that knew no bounds to its potential area of influence; confirmation 
of the importance of Lines of Communication in upholding benevolent patterns of free trade; 
and the juxtaposition, again, of Britain and its allies with rapacious Soviet land power.  The 
discourse of the Falklands Conflict was constituted similarly: through emphasis on the common 
island heritage and democratic credentials of the Falklanders as opposed to fascist Argentina 
and the Soviet Union; and the valorisation of the journey of the British Naval Task Force across 
the vast distance separating Portsmouth and the Falklands confirming the importance of Britain 
maintaining a global reach.  Furthermore, the Conflict was historicized by Thatcher as being 
part of the episodic chronicle of Britain that finally lay to rest the ghosts of Suez.  What all of 
this shows is how these ‘crises’ co-constitutively mobilised Island Race identity tropes, securing 
Britain’s contextual relevance. 
 
Bringing my genealogy up to date, chapter 6 examines constitutions of Island Race identity 
since the Labour Party came to office in 1997.  Taking a more general approach that focusses on 
wide-ranging foreign policy debates rather than specific issues, this chapter places the 
parliamentary discourse from both the Labour governments of 1997-2010 and the Conservative 
administrations since side by side.  This demonstrates an overarching narration of the post-Cold 
War, geopolitical environment as one that co-constitutively reifies Island Race identity tropes 
through emphases on cultures of global threats and opportunities and mutable distances.  
Furthermore, the promise of an ‘in/out’ referendum on Britain’s membership of the European 
Union brings to the fore questions of the nexus between insularity and universality that I have 
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drawn in this chapter.  In chapter 6 we see how the two main Westminster parties drew on these 
notions as they articulated political positions on the issue of Britain and Europe.  Taken in sum 
with what Prime Minister David Cameron has called ‘our island story’ and his first Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague’s policy of a reinvigorated global diplomatic network, we can see the 
contours of an exemplary posture of parochialism and globalism in which the insular Britain 
island has forged unique values that are of relevance to a world badly in need of their 
superintendence. 
 
The conclusion will restate my argument and findings, considering in sum how the tropes of 
Island Race identity have endured in British parliamentary discourse and reflecting on their 
future configurations.  I will explore the theoretical and practical implications of these findings, 
questioning constructivism’s tendency to highlight continuity over change and arguing that a 
more nuanced view of change within continuity is made possible by a genealogical approach 
which highlights the domestic imperatives of foreign policy practice such as parliamentary 
debates and the inter- and intra-party struggles to define national identity according to the 
mediation of established tropes.  This will lead into considerations of potential future avenues of 
research opened up by my thesis.   
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chapter 2 
Theoretical framework and methodology: critical geopolitics, 
ontological security, discourse and genealogy 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will outline in more depth the theoretical and methodological approaches opened 
up by my introduction in chapter 1 and discuss how they will be applied to the central research 
question concerning British foreign policy discourse and Island Race identity.  Firstly I will 
introduce two theoretical approaches which are of particular importance to my thesis and argue 
for their compatibility.  The first, critical geopolitics, proposes that the geographical 
assumptions of foreign policy-makers are socially constructed (not to mention state-centric, 
chauvinistic and imperialistic), rather than deriving from eternal, spatial truths.  The second, 
ontological security, conceptualises how state élites seek ‘security as being’ through 
mobilisations of particular narratives that familiarise the world.1  I will argue that, by taking a 
critical geopolitical approach, the socially constructed tropes I identified in chapter 1 can be 
taken as fundamental to practices of ontological security-seeking because of the ways in which 
they mobilise certain, established subject positions in novel contexts; this further strengthens my 
conceptualisation of British foreign policy identity as an emergent social practice that is 
dynamic and contingent rather than immutable.2  Following this I will outline the importance of 
discursive approaches to the study of foreign policy and identity by arguing, following Lene 
Hansen, that discourse is a ‘practice’ existing in a co-constitutive rather than causal relationship 
with national identities.3  This will lead into an explanation of why I am pursuing genealogical 
methods informed by an interpretivist perspective in which one is concerned with how—as 
David Campbell (after Michel Foucault) put it—‘rituals of power arose, took shape, gained 
importance, and effected politics’ by asking ‘how certain terms and concepts have historically 
functioned within discourse.’4  Finally I will discuss the specifics of the study related to its 
focus on debates in the British House of Commons by introducing the cultural and discursive 
practices which predominate there and, in reference to the preceding framework, begin to 
elucidate how they will be ‘put to work’ through my choices of primary material. 
                                                          
1 For the theory of ontological security in IR see especially Manners (2002); McSweeney (1999), pp. 1-12; 
Mitzen (2006a & b); Steele (2005). 
2 Ó Tuathail (2002), pp. 617-22. 
3 Hansen (2006), pp. 15-36. 
4 Campbell (1998), p. 6; Foucault (1979), p. 31.  See also, for example, Åkerstrøm Andersen (2003), pp. 
17-23; Der Derian (2008). 
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2. Critical geopolitics: in search of space 
Island Race identity is primarily understood in this thesis as a discursive spatial phenomenon, in 
the sense that British foreign policy-makers tend to articulate geographical assumptions based 
on the discursive tropes outlined in chapter 1.  As such, it is necessary to firstly explore some of 
the implications of what it means to claim that Island Race identity is geopolitical.  The purpose 
of this section is to introduce the approaches of critical geopolitics, with the aim of suggesting 
how they might be brought to bear on the study of British identity and problematise why they 
have not generally been employed thus far. 
 
The critical approaches to studying geopolitics pioneered by the likes of Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 
Simon Dalby, John Agnew, Klaus Dodds et al not only reveal the implicit and explicit 
spatialisations of foreign policy discourse, but also problematize them within broader themes of 
power relations and post-colonial politics.  This is an important component of this thesis.  Of 
greatest importance is the following argument: in spite of the truism that it is a ‘non-discursive 
phenomenon’ and therefore ‘separate from the social, political and ideological dimensions of 
international politics’, geography is socially constructed.5  When a British foreign policy-maker 
invokes geography in a speech or text, what they are talking about is not a realm of neutral facts 
and time-honoured truths but a multitude of contested spaces that are never finalised and always 
subject to ‘radical indeterminacy’.6  The discourse itself is often—in some ways, ideally—
mundane and whose repetition gives it the sense of being ‘everyday’ and commonsensical.  To 
accept this discourse as coming from a ‘real world’ of geographical facts is to normalise an 
approach in which geography has triumphed over history; as Agnew pointed out: ‘social science 
has been too geographical and not sufficiently historical, in the sense that geographical 
assumptions have trapped consideration of social and political-economic processes in 
geographical structures and containers that defy historical change’.7  
 
Rather than accepting this way of viewing the world, critical geopoliticians argue that ‘territory 
must be conceived as a historically and geographically specific form of political organisation 
and political thought.’8  What the critic is ‘up against’ is what Dodds describes as the 
‘establish[ed …] narrative with sequentially ordered plot, a cast of characters, identifiable and 
attributable forces in order to make sense of the unknown.’9  Of course, foreign policy-makers 
will need to ‘generalise about certain parts of the world’ but ‘what is absolutely critical is that 
the labels that are used […] are always contested’ for, as Edward Said put it, the ‘struggle over 
                                                          
5 Ó Tuathail & Agnew (1992), p. 192. 
6 Krause & Renwick (1996), p. xi. 
7 Agnew (1995), p. 379. 
8 Elden (2010), pp. 757-8. 
9 Dodds (1993), p. 72. 
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geography […] is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about 
images and imaginings.’10  Cognizance of this is critical in order to challenge what Dalby and Ó 
Tuathail describe as ‘the mundane repetition of particular geopolitical tropes which constrain 
the political imaginary.’11  It is these repetitions and their constitutive relationship with Island 
Race identity in British foreign policy discourse which are crucial to this thesis.   
   
Yet critical geopolitics has displayed an occasional reluctance to excavate ‘traditions of 
geopolitics […] by dividing geopolitics into certain national traditions’ with Andrew Crampton 
and Ó Tuathail warning that ‘[s]uch descriptions have a general utility but they tend to 
homogenize the heterogeneous mix of geopolitical perspectives and approaches that 
characterize any particular configuration of world order.’12  The most common indulgences of 
this practice have tended to be cases studies of the US and Nazi Germany, it being apparently 
acceptable to fall prey to Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’ given the spectacular (and, we are told, 
abhorrent) nature, scale and violence of those particular geopolitics, but one ought not to make a 
habit of it.13  This is more understandable when one considers how the establishment of 
geopolitics as a method of analysing the international environment was so intimately bound up 
with the imperialisms of so-called Great Powers.14  Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel and 
Alfred Mahan were not only seeking to explain the interaction of geography and politics in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they also outlined explicit proscriptions of how the 
foreign policy-makers of their countries (Britain, Germany and the United States) might utilise 
geographic factors in maximising their power.15  Britain has come to be seen as a ‘classic’ case 
in this regard: a physically small polity which took advantage of both its insular position to 
(partially) free itself from messy European entanglements and its early industrialisation to 
pursue naval imperialism, gaining pre-eminence on the oceans to which it had privileged 
access.16   
 
The geopolitics of states which are not Great Powers have presented scholars with a series of 
problems which bring to mind Foucault’s plea for one to consider not only ‘the great strategies 
                                                          
10 Ibid., pp. 72-3, 73; Said (1993), p. 6. 
11 Dalby & Ó Tuathail (1996), p. 452. 
12 Crampton & Ó Tuathail (1996), pp. 533-4. 
13 Ó Tuathail, for example, compares and contrasts both geopolitical traditions (Ó Tuathail (1996), pp. 
111-40).  Agnew (1994). 
14 Grygiel (2006), pp. 21-39. 
15 For Mackinder, see, for example: Mackinder (1904b); (1907); (1919); Blouet (2005); Kearns (2009).  
Ratzel: Ratzel (1898); Hunter (1983).  Mahan: Mahan (1890); (1907); Hattendorf & Jordan (1989); 
Sumida (1999).  See the following for contemporaneous Japanese thought: Inagaki (1890); Patalano 
(2011); (2012). 
16 Kennedy (1976), pp. 97-122. 
32 
 
 
 
of geopolitics’ but also ‘the little tactics of the habitat.’17  While very few British foreign policy-
makers themselves have claimed Great Power status for Britain in the period under question 
(certainly not since 1956), even fewer would argue that the fate of Britain without empire 
according to the fears of one Victorian MP—‘Guernsey a little magnified’—has been realised.18  
Either way, according to the structural realist logic of many geopoliticians Britain is no longer a 
Great Power and thus its foreign policy has been largely precluded from geopolitical analysis.19  
Although the likes of Mackinder, Ratzel and Mahan were indisputably writing about power 
(‘geo-power’, Ó Tuathail calls it), their—especially Mackinder’s—sometimes forensic analyses 
of geographical factors hinted at the possibility that foreign policy-makers from all polities 
might, in some sense, reiterate certain geopolitical narratives that are fundamental to identity 
(re)formation and the fixing of ontologically secure subject positions in emergent contexts.20  
However, the renaissance of geopolitics in the Cold War and since has privileged the material 
‘facts’ of power more than ever.  Geopolitics à la Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Colin 
Gray and Geoffrey Sloan has become even more thoroughly imbricated with questions of grand 
strategy, leading many towards studying the most ‘materially’ powerful according to their own 
logic; the US, China or Russia being the only contemporary actors mighty enough to ‘enact’ 
grand, geopolitical strategy.21  The geopolitics of a state like Britain is thus voided because of its 
post-imperial limitations, hence Brzezinski’s remark that it is an ‘increasingly irrelevant’, 
‘retired geostrategic player’.22   
 
If Brzezinski is right and there is any enduring truth in what Blair called Dean Acheson’s 1962 
‘barb’ that Britain had ‘lost an empire and not yet found a role’, why bother studying the 
geopolitical identity of Britain?23  Furthermore, if geopolitics only theorises the behaviour of 
Great Powers, what use is it in the case of post-imperial Britain?  Several points need to be 
made here.  In the first place and as I outlined in chapter 1, although British foreign policy has 
been and continues to be extensively studied, most tend to favour the sort of rational actor 
models which privilege the self-professed pragmatism of British foreign policy-makers.  The 
results of many of these studies are inadequate, foregone conclusions about how well Britain’s 
decline has been managed and the efficacy or appropriateness of Britain’s prioritisation of 
national interests.  On the second point, since the emergence of critical geopolitics as a field of 
                                                          
17 Foucault (1977), p. 189; see also Crampton & Elden (2007).  See the following attempts at examining 
national geopolitics not necessarily from the most powerful sites: Aalto (2000); Dijkink (1996); Dodds & 
Atkinson (2000); Flint (2011); Guzzini (2012a); van der Wusten & Dijkink (2002). 
18 Dilke (1869), p. 398.  By way of counterpoint see, for example, Hobsbawm (1977). 
19 For two paradigmatic examples of realist IR thought, see Waltz (1979); Morgenthau (1985). 
20 Ó Tuathail (1996), pp. 1-20. 
21 See Kissinger (1951); (1979); (1994); (2014); Brzezinski (1978); (1997); (2004); Gray (1977); (1988); 
(1999); Sloan (1988); Gray & Sloan (1999). 
22 Brzezinski (1997), pp. 42, 43. 
23 Wickham-Jones (2000), p. 19; Brinkley (1990). 
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analysis in IR, it seems possible and indeed worthy to explore the spatial identities of so-called 
‘second-rank’ powers such as Britain, given that geopolitical discourse can rightly be seen as 
contingent, subjective, frequently mundane and therefore a common practice of all foreign 
policy-makers: ‘Simply to describe a foreign policy problem is to engage in geopolitics for one 
is implicitly and tacitly normalizing a particular world.’24   
 
Bearing the work of critical geopolitics in mind, one can therefore make the claim that 
geopolitics is about more (or, indeed, less) than just the strategies of aggrandisement pursued by 
Great Powers and that each polity enacts its own spatial narratives, something emphasised by 
Gertjan Dijkink and Stefano Guzzini.25  This leads us towards the next theoretical claim of the 
thesis, put particularly well by Michael Shapiro when he argued that geography ‘is a primary 
part of the ontology of a collective’; ‘it constitutes a fantasy structure implicated in how 
territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice 
the meanings of self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as 
threats or antagonists.’26   
3. Ontological security: locating foreign policy in collectively 
understood identity 
This idea of collective ontologies builds on the notion that politicians do not simply engage in 
explaining what ‘we’ are going to do; it falls to them also to explain what ‘we’ are.  Indeed, one 
can go further and assert that the two—action/policy and self—are mutually constitutive; in 
Hansen’s words: 
‘Policies require identities, but identities do not exist as objective 
accounts of what people and places ‘really are,’ but as continuously 
restated, negotiated, and reshaped subjects and objects.  […] identity 
and policy are constituted through a process of narrative adjustment 
[…] they stand, in social science terminology, in a constitutive, rather 
than causal, relationship.’27 
In order for pronouncements of foreign policy to ‘make sense’ they rely on the presence of sets 
of shared understandings of the world and their state’s place in it.28  These understandings, or 
                                                          
24 Ó Tuathail & Agnew (1992), p. 193.  On critical geopolitics see, for example, Agnew (1994); Agnew & 
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25 Dijkink (1996), pp. 1-16; Guzzini (2012d), pp. 49-55. 
26 Shapiro (1997), p. xi. 
27 Hansen (2006), p. xvi. 
28 Dodds (1993), p. 72; Guzzini (2012e), p. 220; Ó Tuathail (2002), p. 603; Taylor (1993b), p. 37; Weldes 
(1999). 
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traditions, are not—in contrast to Alexander Wendt’s argument—pre-given but evolve with and 
are dependent upon interpretations and representations of contexts.29  This is what is meant by 
ontological security in IR: how those who speak for states elucidate secure accounts of what 
their polity means in a given situation by seeking ‘security as being’.30   
 
The practice of establishing a ‘subject-position’ relative to any event or issue can thus be 
theorised as how received traditions of national Self are mobilised in relation to a particular 
context, representations of which become contingent on the established narratives of and create 
a ‘window’ into self-identity.31  This is important for foreign policy-makers in securing 
legitimation for policy: to speak for a state requires an adequate presentation and assumed 
understanding of what that state is.  In other words, policy and identity are ‘ontologically 
interlinked’ given that states have ‘no ontological status apart from the various acts which 
constitute its reality.’32  Therefore foreign policy cannot be taken for just a series of isolated 
pronouncements bereft of meaningful socio-historical context.  Accordingly Jennifer Mitzen 
argues:  
‘actors value their sense of agency, the ability to make choices and 
pursue favourable outcomes.  That ability rests on knowing one’s own 
preferences and interests.  In other words it rests on an identity, which 
means that actors need stable identities to be ‘actors’ or ‘agents’ at 
all.’33 
Consequently, what one finds in foreign policy is what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper 
call ‘situated subjectivity’.34  This means that the subject—in this case, Britain—is not pre-
given but reproduced through how it is situated in subject positions, a social-discursive process 
Jennifer Milliken defines in terms of how it is ‘assigned capacities for modes of acting and 
interacting.’35  While there may be a shared understanding that Britain is an island, this is not 
automatically productive of any one particular meaning or policy.36  Instead, islandness (and, 
therefore, Britishness) is always contextually situated and subject positions are elucidated for 
Britain that mobilise and are mobilised by established identity tropes ‘that already make 
                                                          
29 Wendt (1999), p. 225.  By way of counterpoint see, for example, Campbell (1998), pp. 219-21. 
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33 Mitzen (2006a), p. 271. 
34 Brubaker & Cooper (2000), p. 17. 
35 Milliken (1999), p. 232. 
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sense.’37  In this constitutive circuit, it is the ways that secure identities are actuated in varying 
contexts that we can see practices of ontological security-seeking taking place. 
 
Ontological security-seeking thus goes some way towards accounting for the persistence of 
national identity tropes in a dynamic and unsettling environment, such as Britain has 
experienced since 1949.  Yet this ‘routinisation’ identified by Mitzen opens up the theory to 
several problems that need to be addressed: firstly, that national identity is being essentialised; 
secondly, that it contributes to the anthropomorphisation of states; and thirdly, Mark Laffey’s 
charges of self-fulfilling prophecies concealed by poststructuralist claims of indeterminacy in 
times of profound changes.38  The critique of supposed essentialism is understandable given the 
expediential use of the word ‘identity’, and it is therefore with greater urgency that those 
studying the subject must echo Robin Cohen’s assertion that there can be no ‘‘essential’ 
national character because this inconceivably assumes a single genetic blueprint radically 
different to that of other nations, or a set of traumatic historical experiences that affected the 
whole nation uniformly.’39  Instead, states such as Britain are correctly viewed as constellations 
of multiple identities that are mediated and disciplined through social discursive practices that 
fix essential subject positions relative to emergent contexts.40   
 
To anthropomorphise and treat states, theoretically, as if they are people is seductive if 
misleading yet, as Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim point out, to claim the obverse—that 
collective units do not possess distinct identities, however constituted—‘entails assuming that 
every decision is made fresh, on “facts,” without consideration for enduring interests (for the 
very concept of “interests” presupposes an identifiable entity to which they can be attributed).’41  
Finally, Laffey’s problematization—levelled primarily at Judith Butler and David Campbell—
that poststructuralist methodology leads to the persistent emphasis of continuity over change in 
state identities can itself be unsettled by emphasising again, as Campbell does, the tendency for 
statespersons to seek to ‘discipline’ the ambiguities inherent in multiple identities through the 
telling and retelling of traditional narratives as a fundamental part of foreign policy praxis.42  
This is highly relevant for a thesis such as this in which large numbers of actors are being 
analysed over a long period of time in multiple contexts.  Continuity is thus, in a sense, easily 
located but the more salient point is how, as Mitzen points out, the fixing of ontologically 
secure subject positions is a ‘basic need’ of state élites; as such, the purpose of positing it ‘is not 
                                                          
37 Weldes (1999), p. 15. 
38 Mitzen (2006a), p. 271; Laffey (2000). 
39 Cohen (1994), p. 192. 
40 Krause & Renwick (1996), p. xii. 
41 Wendt (2004) and see Peter Lomas’ response (Lomas (2005)); Dittmer & Kim (1993), p. 5. 
42 Campbell (1998), p. 81.  See also Lapid (2001). 
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to explain behavioral variation, but rather to help uncover processes by which continuity is 
produced.’43  Thus, even though there is no essential British identity, foreign policy-makers 
speak and act as if there were by drawing on traditions of foreign policy thought that fix 
ontologically secure subject positions, especially in a dynamic environment. 
 
A further point to be emphasised here is how these traditions do not equate to a neat set of 
shared opinions.  Guzzini puts it well when he argues: ‘What characterises a foreign policy 
tradition is not a ready-made ideational toolkit, making debates unnecessary; on the contrary, 
the existence of such a tradition is what allows political debates to happen in the first place, 
since it defines the stakes, draws the boundaries of relevant/competent debate, and ensures that 
people speak the same language when they dispute each other’s points.’44  Collectively and 
socially, dominant representations of events and issues are constitutively mediated through their 
interactions with ontologically secure renderings of identity and resultant policies themselves.45  
Thus, ‘traditions’ in foreign policy thought are not inflexible—‘the world does not issue a 
summons to speak in a particular way’—but negotiable within limits and malleable to contexts, 
with which they exist co-constitutively.46  It is this that leads Hansen to characterise foreign 
policy as ‘practice’, the collective (re)construction of national norms which legitimise certain 
actions.47 
 
When theorising identity or national Self as something that can be ontologised it is important to 
clarify on what bases they can be secured.48  A relational understanding of identity posits that it 
is constructed on the basis of representations of interactions with one or more international 
Others.  These might be friendly or antagonistic or any shade in between, the salient point being 
that it is through the relationships that a state has with others that identity is secured.49  
According to Hansen, this is generally achieved through discursive practices of ‘linking’ and 
‘differentiation’ in which commonality or enmity is defined.50  The emphasis on the possibility 
of sameness is a useful complement to Campbell’s threatening Others and Der Derian’s 
‘estrangement’ and takes one beyond Said’s binary oppositionism.51  Ole Wæver suggests that 
ontological security might be sought against a perceived view of one’s own past, as in the case 
of modern European discourse whose primary Other is constructed as its own history of disunity 
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47 Hansen (2006), pp. 211-2. 
48 Guzzini (2012b), pp. 2-6. 
49 Mitzen (2006b), p. 342. 
50 Hansen (2006), pp. 41-6. 
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and warfare.52  A further useful insight is Jef Huysmans’ argument that ontological security-
seeking is a practice directed towards ‘guarantee[ing] the principle of determinability itself, that 
is, the possibility of creating an acceptable degree of certainty.’53  This apparent desire for the 
‘mediation of chaos and order’ posits the ontologically secure subject as the subject that itself 
requires secure ontologising; in other words, just as important as relations or threats is the very 
ability to connote ‘meaning’ and ‘intelligibility’ upon these interactions: ‘the possibility of the 
activity of ordering itself.’54   
4. Geopolitics as ontological security: the spatiality of identity 
(re)formation  
This is where geopolitics comes into the framework once more as we begin to see its 
importance regarding ontological security-seeking because of my argument that British foreign 
policy tends to hinge on particular, geopolitical identity tropes mobilised across time to secure 
Britain’s subject position relative to varying issues and events.  When discussing geopolitics in 
this sense, it is important to recognise that adherents of classical and critical geopolitics both 
emphasise the utility of it in national identity construction.  Classical geopoliticians, for whom 
geopolitics materially exists, argue that statespersons ought to at least—in Mackinder’s words—
possess a ‘horse-sense’ of what Gray calls the ‘truly permanent geographical reality’, that is: 
where is the state and what are the natural resources of the state relative to others in both local 
and global perspective.55  At the heart of critical geopolitical perspectives is the socially 
constructed nature of these geographies and their use (and abuse) in practices of statecraft.56  Of 
particular note here might be Peter Taylor’s notion—expanded upon by Ó Tuathail—of 
‘practical geopolitical reasoning’.57  Guzzini points out that the distinction is in whether 
geopolitics is thought to be a first-order or second-order phenomenon.58  This thesis takes it to 
be second-order, a fundamental part of discursive, ordering strategies utilised by foreign policy-
makers in the construction and reconstruction of national identity. 
 
The importance of geopolitics in discursive constructions of ontologically secure subject 
positions that mobilise established national identities can be conceptualised in several ways.  
Firstly there is the contention, hinted at already in chapter 1, that modern statehood is 
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thoroughly intertwined with geopolitics because of the manifold ways in which the primary 
practice of states is the inking of sovereignty and disciplining of space.59  This is both a 
generalised assertion building on the work of the likes of Richard Ashley, Rob Walker and 
Roxanne Doty but also has specific relevance in the British case, as I argued in chapter 1 when I 
sketched out the history of Island Race identity.  Secondly, geopolitical discourse has been 
theorised as possessing a number of attributes that make it thoroughly attractive for practitioners 
of statecraft.  By drawing on the supposed neutrality of geography, spatial discourse is 
especially appealing to foreign policy-makers because of the connotations of rationalism, eternal 
truths and simple, explanatory power.60  Agnew and Ó Tuathail have both referred to 
geopolitics’ ‘view from nowhere’ in which this highly social practice is leant the quality of 
‘antiseptic and chloroform’ and ‘[s]tate actions begin to take on all the unglamorous stability of 
natural self-explanatory facts.’61  Both of these assertions locate geopolitics as—in Shapiro’s 
words—‘a primary part of the ontology of a collective’.62 
 
The implications of this are that the subject for critical investigation ought to be the specific 
national sites of ontological security themselves, whose discursive histories reify and perpetuate 
geopolitical narratives.  Rather than seeking to side-step the ‘territorial trap’ by refusing to 
dignify the bounded, national sovereignties upheld by statist, geopolitical discourse, one ought 
to look deeper into the trap, to investigate not only ‘how it constrains our thinking, and 
hamstrings our potential for critique’ but also ‘how it is produced’.63  Such a move is made in 
the case of Britain in the belief that what will be found is a history of the endurance of its own 
imperial Island Race identity through its repeated mobilisation for the purposes of fixing 
ontologically secure subject positions.  For British foreign policy-makers, it has arguably been 
especially vital for these subject positions to be secured according to established tropes, given 
the novelty of the situations they have faced since 1949 (NATO, the Cold War (and its ending), 
European integration, decolonisation) relative to Britain’s imperial past.  What this impels is a 
conception of identity in foreign policy as being subject to ongoing processes of construction 
and, rather than being completely arbitrary, in Doty’s words, ‘[i]t stands to reason that there 
must be certain focal points of meaning around which various dimensions converge to form 
national identity.’64  The next task of this chapter is to identify where these constitutions of 
British identity can be found. 
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5. Conceptualising discourse as social practice  
If, as Mitzen contends, ‘[s]tates not only seek to secure their territory and governance structure; 
they also seek to secure their identity as a particular kind of actor’, how might one gain access 
to these attempts at ontological security?65  Since it is language that humans use to construct the 
social world—not least the spatial, social world—the analysis of foreign policy discourse must 
be fundamental to the framework of this thesis.66  Written and spoken forms of communication 
allow humans to argue, persuade, reason and explain action.67  Individual instances of 
communication are texts, understandable by other humans who ‘acquire ‘thoughts’ because they 
are able to converse publicly using a shared ensemble of interpretative resources called a 
‘language.’’68  But the limited level on which one might ‘understand’ a simple, isolated 
statement from a complete stranger is not what is being conceived of here; greater 
understanding is mobilised if that statement forms part of a larger discourse, a set of texts 
concerning a similar subject.  At once we begin to see the constitutive nature of text and 
discourse and how they comprise and define one another: a discourse cannot exist without the 
set of texts which comprise it; and a text is only a text as part of a discourse, creating ‘no sense 
in itself but only in connection with knowledge of the world and of the text.’69  As the sum of 
their textual parts, discourses must be recognised as contingent, dynamic and socio-historical.  
This is to take seriously and build upon Julia Kristeva’s assertion of ‘intertextuality’, according 
to which ‘any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and 
transformation of another.’70  The implications of this are significant.  If each text is only 
understandable as part of a larger whole (and vice versa), there is an object of study at hand that 
is clearly of importance for the ways in which issues such as foreign policy and identity are co-
constituted. 
 
In this way the accumulations of texts—foreign policy discourses—can rightly be seen as sets 
of historical ‘capabilities’.71  In sum, and also on an individuated basis, they represent the 
totality of meaning for a foreign policy actor in the world (which is not to exclude material 
actions themselves, but to recognise that they are given meaning by the discourse which 
proscribes and articulates them).  Discourses are dependent on subject positions, the elucidation 
of ontologically secure stances concerning an issue or event.  The intertextuality of such a claim 
inevitably implies a relationship with what has been articulated before, or the trace of its own 
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discursive history.  Foreign policy-makers are not mere automatons or ‘cultural dupes’; 
discourses are both constraining and enabling and, in a study such as this, the agency of actors 
ought not to be excluded.72  This point brings us back to an argument from earlier in this 
chapter: that national identities are not monolithic but that the practice of seeking ontological 
security means that foreign policy-makers tend to speak as if they were.  In this regard, the 
importance of an appreciation of the workings of discourse means that identity articulation and 
ontological security-seeking are social practices requiring the mediation and negotiation of 
established historical and contemporary discourses.73  Politics, at least in a pluralist, 
parliamentary democracy like Britain, is itself constituted by the debates on which its practice is 
based, making Guzzini’s point about how foreign policy traditions and debates are co-
constitutive of one another all the more relevant.74 
 
This brings us further towards crystallising the methodological focus of the thesis, an 
explanation of how exactly the discourse is to be ‘put to work’ in the analysis.  Rather than 
pursuing ‘a history of mere words’, the way discourse has been theorised in tandem with 
ontological security-seeking and geopolitics means that what is to be studied is the sustained 
constitution of discourse as a constitutive social practice mobilising particular ways of 
conceiving the world.75  As Merje Kuus puts it, the object of analysis is ‘not what is said’, but 
‘the set of assumptions that enable specific statements and make them legible and legitimate.’76  
This provokes inquiry based on ‘how’ rather than ‘what’ questions: ‘how is this statement 
possible?’ rather than ‘what does this statement mean?’77  The intent is not to reveal the inner 
thoughts of foreign policy-makers but to seek to understand the enduring discursive practices 
which mobilise particular geopolitical ontologies. 
6. Genealogy and interpretivism: the historic ordering of discourse as 
methodology 
To order this discourse over the period of time under question herein requires a specific method 
of ‘mapping’ that places the object of study—British foreign policy identity—under a kind of 
scrutiny that differs from more traditional methods of historiography.  The principles of 
genealogy, pioneered by Friedrich Nietzsche and advanced by Foucault, are concerned with 
‘loosen[ing] the hold of present arrangements by finding their points of emergence as practices’ 
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that have created the ‘sedimentation of current representations’.78  In other words, the present 
constructions of geopolitical identity, rather than simply being accepted as ‘normal’, are viewed 
as ‘peculiar’ and the products of (continuing) historical struggles among and within competing 
discourses; in the words of Henri Lefebvre: ‘If space is produced, if there is a productive 
process, then we are dealing with history’.79  It is therefore the task of the scholar to identify 
points at which these constructions took shape and trace their historical evolution in order to 
unsettle the apparent stability of the present discursive order.   
 
This approach has been built upon in recent decades by the likes of Der Derian, Shapiro, 
Campbell, Hansen and Srdjan Vucetic.80  As Vucetic and Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen point out, 
it has become a personalised phenomenon, with different writers appropriating their own 
genealogical methods; the difference between genealogical and traditional history is now 
perhaps one of degree rather than type.81  Hansen’s approach, to which my own is broadly 
aligned, posits the importance of ‘basic discourses’ that ‘point to the main points of contestation 
within a debate’ and thus ‘provide a lens through which a multitude of different representations 
and policies can be seen as systematically connected’.82  The recovery of these discourses and 
their intertextuality and co-constitutive relationship with emergent events and issues aims at 
decentring the finality of present, apparently fixed notions of politics in which there are always 
‘historical and logical foundation[s] for the status quo’.83  Genealogy instead offers a reading of 
how politics is contextually and historically dependent: ‘events never just happen to political 
actors so much as they are discursively “fitted”’.84  As a ‘history of the present’, a genealogy is 
not only a history of this present but a history of multiple presents; how representations of the 
political world are always contingent upon established tropes of identity, contemporary 
configurations of power and their discursive interactions with emergent contexts.85 
 
In order to successfully enact a study of this nature, it is necessary to take an interpretivist 
stance; the primary reason being that what is being studied herein is the world that has already 
been interpreted by British foreign policy-makers, rather than the world itself.  Following 
Åkerstrøm Andersen, this ‘second-order strategy for the observation of how “the social” 
emerges in observation’ means that, instead of attempting to dig beneath the discourse of British 
foreign policy-makers to find out what the real world is really like, this thesis is engaged with 
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examining the world that has been and is being constructed by their ‘indirect’ perceptions of the 
world, their discourse and the ‘unremarkable assumptions underpinning’ this.86  This is of 
critical importance to any attempt to understand the (re)formation of foreign policy identities 
since what is being dealt with is a set of thoroughly social activities in which—as Helge 
Jordheim and Iver Neumann would have it—‘semantic struggles’ are waged to fix meanings.87  
Island Race identity is not something concrete that can be seen or touched as such; it is an 
always emergent social construction articulated through its performance in (among other places) 
foreign policy discourse and which thus defines and is defined by its own spatial implications of 
what and where Britain is.  One cannot approach this with an overt concern for materiality for, 
such as there is, has already been interpreted by British foreign policy-makers and in order to 
elucidate the identity that is being formed as result, one must focus on the ways in which they 
interpret it.  
 
This, however, becomes a highly ‘real world’ concern since it is through reiterations of Island 
Race identity that British foreign policy is communicated and rendered understandable and 
acceptable to recipients.  Hansen points out that studies concerned with discourse and social 
construction are often ‘chastised for being removed from the study of the real world’ yet, for her 
and this author,  
‘policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country, 
security problem, or crisis that they seek to address.  Foreign policies 
need to ascribe meaning to the situation and to construct the objects 
within it, and in doing so they articulate and draw upon specific 
identities of other states, regions, peoples, and institutions as well as 
on the identity of a national, regional, or institutional Self.’88  
It is precisely this dependency that is at stake in this thesis.  Seen in such a light, British foreign 
policy discourse becomes dependent for its meaning upon the Island Race identity and its 
political implications.  In adopting an interpretivist approach to the study of IR, one is not 
claiming ‘that materiality does not matter’ but rather to make the point that any attempt to 
define, say, a security threat that is objectively ‘real’ and transcends discursive construction is 
likely, according to Barry Buzan and colleagues, to be ‘“right” on its own terms’ anyway.89   
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In sum, ‘the point is not to disregard material facts but to study how these are produced and 
prioritized.’90  This is what is allowed by an interpretivist perspective and genealogical methods: 
an appreciation of the peculiarity of sedimented discourses of disciplined identity through the 
resurrection of their contingent histories.  And rather than returning theories of identity to their 
former subaltern position within the ‘dominant ontology and epistemology of stability and 
continuity’, one can show how this semblance of constancy is maintained as well as the subtle 
changes within.91  
7. Locating the Island Race: Discursive practice in the House of 
Commons 
Taking all of the above into account, what is being looked for in the British discourse under 
question is the ways in which Island Race identity is mobilised in a series of debates concerning 
a range of issues and events.  The focus is on debates in the House of Commons, the lower, 
legislative chamber of British politics which currently comprises 650 Members of Parliament 
(MPs), elected to represent territorially-bounded constituencies, usually on a party basis.92  MPs 
are the ‘privileged storytellers […] to whom narrative authority […] is granted’ in British 
politics; theirs is the primary seat of debate in which national identity is negotiated.93  The focus 
on them and their debates reflects the previously theorised notions that foreign policy-makers 
seek, through practices of discourse and ‘social signification’, ontological security.94  The 
constitutive or social epistemology which informs this thesis means the possibility of infinite 
‘conceptual regress’ inherent in causal analyses in which ‘anything goes’ in an environment of 
manifold identities is avoided through the very conceptualisation of foreign policy ‘experts’ and 
the shared, social identity of their particular milieu.95  Given the relatively consensual nature of 
British foreign policy I have taken foreign policy-makers—in the context of House of Commons 
debates—to mean any and all Members who speak.  These debates are not called in order to 
thrash out a piece of statutory legislation with the regularity that, say, Home Affairs might be; 
often they are general discussions capable of ranging widely around an event, such as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  As such I will also, in chapter 6, be analysing several debates 
that were called purely to discuss Britain’s general approach to international affairs as well as 
those (the joining of NATO and the EEC) in which MPs were gathered to vote on motions.    
    
                                                          
90 Hansen (2006), p. 22. 
91 Lapid (2001), p. 7.  On continuity and change in identity see, for example, Chacko (2014); Jackson 
(2011); Kleuters (2009). 
92 In the first parliament of this period of study (1945-50) there were 640 MPs.  Since then, due to 
constituency boundary changes, the number has fluctuated between 625 and 659.  
93 Campbell (1993), p. 7. 
94 Milliken (1999), p. 233. 
95 Guzzini (2012d), p. 50. 
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Any Member can table a question in advance of these debates; often, with large numbers 
wishing to speak, they must ‘catch the eye’ of the Speaker of the House, a Member who chairs 
these sittings.96  The Speaker will tend to invite speeches in alternating sequence between the 
two main political parties represented in the House, proportionally allocating time to minor 
parties as appropriate and sometimes imposing time-limits on speeches.  If the government is 
proposing a motion for the House to vote on, an amendment can be tabled, usually in opposition 
to the government’s position which will first be introduced by a Minister.97  In these situations, 
the Members are usually instructed to vote along party lines, in a process called ‘whipping’; 
however, this does not preclude Members making speeches which contradict the official view of 
their party and they frequently do so. 
 
The online Hansard records of parliamentary proceedings represent a vast body, with near 
complete coverage from 1803 to the present.98  To filter this large resource I searched within the 
titles of House of Commons debates for those concerned with foreign policy, foreign affairs and 
international affairs and, realising the limitations of this approach (debates are often titled 
‘Middle Eastern Affairs’, ‘European Affairs’ or according to a specific event), then searched 
within lists of debates that Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries took part in.  In the material 
I was left with I looked for instances of MPs expressing what an issue or event meant for 
Britain’s international identity, recovering these inductively according to the conceptions of 
imperial-era Island Race identity that I had previously identified from historical texts while 
nonetheless remaining sensitive to contingency.  I catalogued these instances of identity 
constitution and the fixing of particular subject positions, roughly categorised them according to 
Island Race tropes and then looked for high frequency clusters.  This presented me with 
particular issues and events which seemed especially to mobilise constitutions of identity; 
accordingly I honed in on several key debates relating to them and carried out deeper analyses.  
The abandonment of bases East of Suez under Harold Wilson’s governments of the 1960s is just 
one example of an issue that might have been included herein but considerations of space 
precluded it as much as the desire to include a plurality of issues that took in European relations 
as much as decolonisation specifically.  
 
I chose to study a series of debates in each chapter, in order to enlarge the time-frame of each 
case and thus the scope of research.  For example, when considering Britain joining the EEC in 
chapter 4, there were several crucial ‘moments’ which I felt needed to be taken into account, 
                                                          
96 Some Traditions and Customs of the House (2010), p. 3. 
97 See Erskine May for an exhaustive, constitutional account of British Parliamentary practice (May 
(2011)). 
98 <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/> (1803-2005); 
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/> (1988- ). 
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from the 1960 announcement that Britain was beginning negotiations, through to the reaction to 
de Gaulle’s 1963 rebuff.  This allowed me to look for constitutions of Island Race identity 
across time, related to a specific issue but in thoroughly different contexts.  In other cases, I 
looked at different issues in a restricted period, for example the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the Falklands Conflict in chapter 5, to see how Island Race identity was constituted in 
differing contexts within a shorter period of time.  In the chapter on Island Race identity since 
1997 I took a more general approach, looking for constitutions of identity and discursive 
ontological security-seeking across a range of issues, contexts and events.99  These are not 
necessarily conceptualised as being identity ‘crises’ in the way that Guzzini and Hadfield-
Amkhan do since identities are, in a sense, permanently in crisis, hence the need for their 
recrudescence.100  A crisis is only a crisis if so conceived by foreign policy-makers.  Indeed, in 
placing the two events of chapter 3 alongside one another, for example, one can see the same 
constitutions of identity even though one (the 1949 signing of the North Atlantic Treaty) was 
largely greeted as a positive development for Britain and the other (the 1956 Suez Crisis) was 
hugely divisive and unambiguously represented as a political, material and existential crisis both 
at the time and post facto.  
 
Several things of particular importance need to be borne in mind when dealing with Commons 
discourse.  Firstly, that there is a tradition in British parliamentary debate that speeches, to some 
degree, refer to those preceding them; secondly, and in spite of the ‘formal and adversarial’ 
style of the Commons, foreign policy is a relatively consensual realm in British politics.101  The 
convention of broadly referring to what has come before, of being ‘not discontinuous’, 
distinguishes Commons debates from Harvey Sacks and colleagues’ definition of 
conversation.102  Furthermore, it gives the lie to the notion that politicians (at least in the 
Commons and away from Ministerial level) are robotically parroting official, pre-prepared party 
dictates.  Indeed reading a speech (although not the use of notes) is expressly forbidden, in order 
to ‘maintain the spontaneity of debate’.103  The consequences for this thesis are important.  That 
Members are responding to each other as well as the multiple external stimuli and private 
prejudices to which they are all subject means that parliamentary debates on foreign policy are 
truly social activities and present one with excellent opportunities to analyse negotiations and 
constitutions of identity.104  Moreover, this means that, although mediated by the external, 
Commons debates become relatively self-contained entities in which certain points are 
                                                          
99 See Hansen (2006), pp. 74-87. 
100 Guzzini (2012d), pp. 49-57; Hadfield-Amkhan (2010), pp. 43-66. 
101 Shaw (2000), p. 401. 
102 Ibid., p. 404; Sacks et al (1974), p. 696. 
103 Some Traditions and Customs of the House (2010), p. 4. 
104 Hansen (2006), pp. 213-5. 
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repeatedly referred to, discussed, dismissed or supported.  In this way, even ideas of Britain’s 
identity which are unpopular in the House become part of the negotiated discourse on that day 
(and beyond) because, in order to be discursively dismissed according to the conventions of 
debate, they must be argued against.105  Concepts such as insularity, frequently invoked in the 
debates under question, attain an ontological status through their repetition, even if this is often 
done in order to denigrate them.  Beyond individual debates, Members often speak on the same 
subject several or many times (as in the EEC/EC debates of the 1960s), referencing themselves 
and others in the process, sometimes over a period of decades.106  The weight of Westminster 
history, the longevity of some Members’ tenure and the unreflective ways in which the genius 
(or the obverse) of certain predecessors and their policies—Churchill, Attlee, Bevin, Eden, 
Heath, Thatcher, Blair et al—are summoned as inspiration or lesson, all combine with the 
highly social nature of the Commons in which certain terminology, turns of phrase and passages 
of logic proliferate and reproduce (not least in terms of party political culture), to become a 
discursive superstructure in itself.  Discourse, so conceived, is ‘dynamic, rather than inert’ and 
has to be ‘constructed and re-enacted in order to live on.’107   
 
The consensual nature of British foreign policy is fictive to the extent that individual members 
may have wildly divergent views on particular issues but, in the main, the policy aims of the 
major parties do not significantly differ and are usually couched in vague terms relating to the 
national interest and Britain having an important role in the world.108  With the Suez Crisis as a 
notable exception, hugely divisive issues such as entry into the EEC/EC were nonetheless 
marked by relative consensus between the front benches.109  Even the highly charged, 
contemporary debates over British membership of the EU see the leadership of both Labour and 
the Conservatives committed to membership, although only the latter promised a referendum 
after the 2015 General Election.110  Many British foreign policy-makers have noted the 
importance of some degree of continuity in matters of foreign policy, as if there is a broad, 
national interest which transcends party politics.111  These misty notions of continuity and 
                                                          
105 Guzzini (2012d), p. 53. 
106 Edward Heath, for example, (Prime Minister 1970-4) was an MP for over fifty years (1950-2001) and 
spoke frequently on foreign affairs.  His views on issues such as European integration were familiar to all 
in the House. 
107 Driver (2001), p. 201. 
108 Steve Smith and Michael Smith, for example, provide an overview of how British foreign policy is 
characterised by apparent consensus on national interest (Smith & Smith (1988)). 
109 Labour under Wilson vacillated several times over Europe in the 1960s and 70s, but provided support 
for Conservative governments in several crucial votes. 
110 Conservative Party (2015); Labour Party (2015). 
111 Former Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Rosebery, told his audience in 
1896: ‘one government should, so far as it is practicable without sacrifice of principle, endeavour to 
interweave its foreign policy with that of the preceding government, so as to preserve a consistent 
attitude abroad and prevent foreign Powers from building on our party differences and dissensions at 
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national interest hide the more profound ‘historically developed practices’, the ‘process[es] of 
articulation’ which give events and issues ‘particular meanings on which action is then 
based.’112  This is how identity is constituted and reconstituted and means that the apparent 
paucity of change becomes, in some measure, precisely the point of the study because of how 
mundane discursive practices discipline the inherent ambiguities of multiple and collective 
identities into something that appears unremarkable and relatively constant. 
8. Conclusion 
In chapter 1 I outlined the inadequacies of present approaches to the study of recent British 
foreign policy and explained the need for its conceptualisation in terms of five, interlinked, 
geopolitical identity tropes related to the British Empire.  This chapter has shown how I hope to 
accomplish this.  In the first place, the critical geopolitics corpus draws attention to how space is 
socially constructed by those who speak for states.  Cognizance of this and the literature on 
ontological security locates these spatial constructions as attempts to elucidate secure subject 
positions which co-constitutively mobilise established identity tropes in changing international 
environments.  These are to be honed in on by taking a discursive approach that conceptualises 
context and identity as existing in a co-constitutive, rather than causal, relationship with one 
another so that representations of a given situation and constructions of identity are dependent 
upon one another.  To see the large-scale dynamics at work here, recognise the historical nature 
of these shared conceptions of identity and avoid privileging and leaving unquestioned the 
present formulations, interpretivist genealogical methods are necessary, as well as sensitivity to 
the particular cultures of the place from which this discourse is drawn. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
home’ (Rosebery (1896)).  Two later Foreign Secretaries made similar arguments which illustrate the 
point: Ernest Bevin told the Commons that ‘the whole course a country is taking in foreign policy cannot 
suddenly be altered by a General Election.  Geography remains the same; the facts remain the same, 
stubborn as they are’; and Lord Carrington the Lords that ‘the broad continuity of policy which flows 
from government to government is reassuring to our friends and allies, and discourages those who do 
not wish us well from trying to exploit our domestic differences.  It is a source of real strength and 
stability’ (House of Commons (HC) Debate 28 March 1950, volume 473, column 318-9; House of Lords 
(HL) Deb 22 May 1979, vol. 400, col. 235).   
112 Shapiro (1988), p. 7; Weldes (1999), p. 285, 285. 
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chapter 3 
A North Atlantic heritage and a Middle Eastern Crisis: the Island 
Race from the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty to the Suez 
Crisis 
1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that collective identity formation can be studied by 
pursuing genealogical methods to analyse discourse and that this will allow a new reading of 
British foreign policy as the search for ontological security mediated through historical, 
geopolitical, identity tropes that I call the Island Race.  The focus of this chapter is two 
important events in British foreign policy from the middle of the twentieth century: the joining 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 and the Suez Crisis of 1956.  The 
aim is to explore how established traditions of Island Race identity were mobilised to seek 
ontological security in the contexts of the two issues.  Genealogically, this is important on two, 
co-constitutive fronts: it allows NATO and the Suez Crisis to be properly understood as having 
distinct contemporary contexts including recent and historic constitutions of socially mediated 
identity; and it permits the ensuing and current situations of Island Race identity to be 
understood as part of a genuine discursive history in which British parliamentary debating 
culture and the battle to fix ontologically secure meanings shaped the evolution of Island Race 
identity tropes.  To the existing corpus this will add an understanding of the specific, national-
cultural roots of NATO in British discourse, sensitive to the fact that international bodies such 
as NATO are not simply perpetuated at a supra-national, institutional level, they also exist by 
sufferance of their representations by individual state élites; and rather than seeing Suez as a 
rupture, in an analytical discursive history, it becomes part of the always emergent story of how 
mobilisations of particular identity tropes discipline ambiguous novel events by establishing 
ontologically secure renditions amongst mediated contexts. 
 
The discursive context of this period was very much one of sustained and open questioning of 
the nature and scope of British power in the world.  In spite of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s 
flirtation with constituting Britain as a ‘third force’ in the world, it was widely recognised that 
the United States and the Soviet Union were globally predominant and that Britain’s position, 
for the first time in centuries and in spite of the development of their own atomic weapons (first 
tested by Britain in 1952), was inferior to other Powers.1  Furthermore, it wasn’t simply a matter 
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of being eclipsed by the rise of others: the British Empire itself was shrinking, the first 
defenestration (since Irish Home Rule in the 1920s and the Japanese takeover of Singapore in 
World War Two) coming in the Indian subcontinent in 1947.   
 
These changes in the international environment were profound for Britain, whose imperial 
foreign policy identity—as I argued in chapter 1—was constituted by its own worldview as a 
superior Power.  Yet these identity tropes hinged as much upon island as imperial geopolitics.  
As Britain became ‘post-imperial’, what happened to Island Race identity?  Articulations of 
identity do not take place in a vacuum and cannot be separated from definitions of the ‘real 
world’, the discourse comprising which constitutes how subject positions are fixed according to 
established notions of the state as a foreign policy actor.  Therefore, the interactions of these 
identity concepts and concomitant contextual representations are the objects of study insofar as 
they represent how foreign policy-makers seek to fix ontologically-secure subject positions for 
Britain and its established identity around events and issues by utilising geopolitical tropes.  
What will become evident is how the Island Race tropes I identified in chapter 1 remained 
crucial in the parliamentary practice of the late 1940s and 50s.  With no one moment signifying 
its end, British imperial identity could not, in any case, be jettisoned overnight.  However, the 
persistence of Island Race tropes in British discourse demonstrates not so much stubborn 
nostalgia as it does the persistent, social force of their original configurations in discursive 
attempts to fix meaning and identity around one another in changing circumstances.  
 
The two events have been chosen primarily because of their continued importance in the annals 
of British history.  NATO has remained a cornerstone of British security policy, regardless of 
the governmental hue of the day.2  Even in times of prominent anti-American rhetoric in society 
and parliament itself (such as the Iraq War (2003-11)) NATO itself has remained largely non-
controversial, suggesting a decoupling of sentiment towards its most powerful member and the 
organisation itself.3  The Suez Crisis—although many consider the post-1945 empire to be, at 
best, an illusion of power—has come to signify a rupture in British history perhaps more than 
                                                          
2 An exception in several other regards, not even Labour’s 1983 general election manifesto contested 
British membership of NATO (Labour Party (1983)).  The party’s leader from September 2015, Jeremy 
Corbyn, has questioned the country’s part in NATO but it remains to be seen whether this will become 
official policy (see ‘Arguing for a radically different international policy’).  See the latest Strategic 
Defence and Security Review for evidence of NATO’s continued importance to Britain (HM Government 
(2010)). 
3 Michael John Williams argues that NATO has existed in a ‘perpetual state of crisis’ since its very 
inception but British membership has scarcely been questioned (Williams (2013), p. 362).  Margaret 
Thatcher, for example, one of NATO’s greatest enthusiasts in British politics, identified a threat to NATO 
in the post-Maastricht era but only that of Europe’s trying to forge a distinct defence identity rather 
than any existential crisis in the organisation itself.  The problem came from NATO being undermined 
and British membership was not debated; on the contrary, this was just further proof of its importance 
(Thatcher (1995), p. 471). 
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any other twentieth century event.4  This is complemented by popular and social histories in 
which Suez and relatively contemporaneous phenomena such as Rock and Roll music and 
nascent youth culture are coupled to render 1956 as the Year Zero of British modernity.5  Thus 
the Crisis is both an end and a beginning, with subsequent British foreign policy-makers 
rendering its significance as purgative, epitomised by Suez ‘rebel’ Anthony Nutting’s account, 
No End of a Lesson.6  Harold Wilson (Labour Prime Minister: 1964-70, 1974-6), for example, 
said he had learnt to avoid ‘unilateral, go-it-alone, do-it-yourself, military adventures’ and based 
his policy on ‘the rejection, equally, of Suez imperialism and the delusion of the so-called 
independent deterrent.’7  Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher (Conservative Prime Ministers: 
1970-4, 1979-1990 respectively) both noted how it forced the establishment to confront the 
reality of the waning empire, with the latter mourning how the ‘peaceful and necessary transfer 
of power from Britain to America as the ultimate upholder of Western interests and the liberal 
international economic system’ mutated into what she called the ‘Suez syndrome’, in which the 
British political class ‘went from believing that Britain could do anything to an almost neurotic 
belief that Britain could do nothing.’8  It was only, she claimed, her actions over the Falklands 
that reversed this ‘long retreat.’9   
 
In these ways, both NATO and Suez play critical roles in subsequent historiography of British 
foreign policy by acting as markers for the security of the British international Self: NATO the 
silent arbiter of British defence and Suez the event (like appeasement) to be avoided if British 
policy is to be ‘successful’.  They have become part of the socially signified geo-history of the 
Island Race (as we will see in subsequent chapters), hence the importance of studying the roots 
of their conceptualisations within a discursive genealogy of Island Race identity.   
1.1. Island Race identity tropes in the context of NATO and Suez 
What can be seen in my analysis of a series of parliamentary debates around the joining of 
NATO and the Suez Crisis is the interaction of the established tropes of Island Race identity and 
the contemporary contexts and how the discourse of MPs reveal the seeking of ontological 
security through the mobilisation of geopolitical tropes.  The two events were represented and 
responded to in ways congruent with established, socially mediated norms of British foreign 
policy identity; by the same token, the identity tropes themselves had to be sensitive to these 
new and distinct contexts.  Thus, what we will see are co-constitutive processes in which both 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Robert Holland’s and Wm. Roger Louis’ accounts in which they argue that Britain’s 
power was diminishing long before Suez (Holland (1991), p. 9; Louis (2006), pp. 1-34). 
5 See, for example, MacDonald (1997); Sandbrook (2005).  
6 Nutting (1967).  As an example of this historiography in scholarship, see Scott Lucas’ Britain and Suez: 
The Lion’s Last Roar, especially chapter 12, ‘Anatomy of a failure’ (Lucas (1996), pp. 89-101). 
7 Wilson (1968). 
8 Heath (1998), pp. 177-8; Thatcher (1995), pp. 90, 91, 91. 
9 Thatcher (1993), p. 173. 
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identity and issue were shaped via the discursive negotiations of British parliamentary practice 
and ontological security-seeking.  Prior to the analysis itself, in this section I will briefly sketch 
out some of the contextual details of both events and how they relate to the established tropes of 
Island Race identity.    
 
The proposed signing of the North Atlantic Treaty represented something both novel and 
familiar to MPs.  On one hand, it would commit Britain to a new kind of peacetime alliance 
with a relatively large number of states (including Britain, twelve) in which an attack on one 
was considered an attack on all; on the other, this was, largely, a formalisation of the alliance 
system of the Second World War.10  The position of Britain in NATO, especially relative to the 
US, is similarly ambiguous: few in British politics were in doubt about the strategic and 
material decisiveness of the US intervention in the Second World War; yet the discourse of 
Britain as the island standing alone against Nazi Europe was already something of a truism, 
even though Winston Churchill (Conservative Prime Minister: 1940-5, 1951-5) had infamously 
synthesised the two elements (British insularity and the English-speaking alliance) in his 
‘Fulton’ address of 1946.11  There was little doubt about how British power had been 
superceded; from its lofty position of pre-eminence, sculpted over centuries, how would British 
foreign policy-makers respond to their country joining an alliance in which they would occupy a 
position of subordination or at least parity?12  
 
The Suez Crisis too had elements both familiar and unfamiliar.  Britain’s involvement in the 
Middle East had been extensive since at least the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of the post-World War I mandates; in Egypt, Britain had been a significant 
presence since the previous century.  The status of the Middle East had been a crucial salient in 
the making of the Second British Empire in terms of both Orientalism and its positioning 
relative to the non-contiguous colonies of the East, especially India.13  Thus the strategic 
imperatives of resolving what unfolded at Suez in the summer of 1956 were of a piece with 
more vintage, imperial situations, usually revolving around preserving maritime Lines of 
Communication.  Within these historic discourses of threats to the Middle East, tsarist Russia 
had been represented as the foremost threat to British interests and their communist descendants 
were believed to be playing a sinister hand in 1950s Egypt.  These evident historical 
familiarities were offset by the circumscribed nature of actual British power in the region.  
                                                          
10 The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), p. 1; Risse-Kappen (1995), p. 217. 
11 Churchill (1946a).  See also Attlee (Labour Prime Minister: 1945-51): HC Deb 22 August 1945, vol. 413, 
col. 670; Churchill (1949), pp. 92, 198, 555; Vucetic (2011a), p. 3. 
12 See, for example, Churchill: HC Deb 16 August 1945, vol. 413, col. 83-4. 
13 Said (1978), pp. 255-84.  See the contributions to Michael Bonine and colleagues’ volume Is There a 
Middle East? for analysis of how the Middle East developed as a geopolitical concept (Bonine et al 
(2012)). 
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Nonetheless, Britain continued to perceive its interests in the Middle East to be considerable in 
size and scope even with the loss of India.14  What was novel about the scenario, especially in 
the context of World War II and the joining of NATO, was the intransigence of the US.  These 
tensions had to be mediated by British foreign policy-makers when they debated the Crisis.  
What did the old, imperial Lines of Communication mean by 1956?  Whither the English-
speaking alliance without US support in censuring Egypt? 
 
The discourse of Members reveals how ontological security was sought in these novel contexts 
through the mobilisation of established geopolitical tropes.  As I argued in the preceding 
chapters, these are more than just neutral expressions of rational gain-maximising; they are 
enduring conceptions of national identity.  The traditional concepts of Island Race identity 
would serve as the main well-spring of experiential and discursive knowledge informing the 
responses to these issues.  Even though the Empire was mutating beyond familiar recognition, 
they still made up the corpus of understanding of Britain and Britain in the world.  What follows 
is an analysis of several debates around the signing of NATO and the Suez Crisis, in which I 
explore how Island Race identity concepts were deployed in the interpretation of these events 
and framed policy responses.  The events tended to mobilise and be constituted by three of the 
Island Race tropes in particular: Firstly, the idea, exemplified by notions of Greater Britain, that 
Britain was part of a primarily English-speaking metacommunity of values.  Countries like the 
US and Canada (and Australia and New Zealand) were the natural allies of Britain because of 
their language, history, institutions and values.  Moreover, they were the carriers of this unique 
heritage, meaning that the particularist vision of British history and politics was carried into the 
future by the very presence of what Dilke called ‘the greater Saxondom’.15  Secondly, Britain as 
an exemplary Sea Power implied that it acted in the world in accordance with the democratic 
values which it had bestowed upon Greater Britain, politically opposed to Land Powers such as 
Napoléonic France, Tsarist Russia and Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany.  The third facet of Island 
Race identity discursively ‘fitted’ to the contexts of NATO and Suez was Britain’s role as 
guardian of the Lines of Communication which allowed the free flow of trade between it and the 
Far East.   
2. The signing of NATO, 1949  
2.1. NATO as carrier of Island Race values 
The language with which the North Atlantic Treaty was introduced to and then debated within 
the Commons in 1949 unambiguously cast it as an extension of Island Race values.  The pre-
                                                          
14 See, for example, Aldrich & Zametica (1992). 
15 Dilke (1869), p. 398. 
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amble of the Treaty itself, which the Labour Foreign Secretary Bevin quoted, reflected this 
cultural aspect:  
‘The Parties to this Treaty […] are determined to safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded 
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.  
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 
area.’16 
NATO has come to be seen as primarily a security-oriented organisation but in its initial 
reception in the Commons was cast as a totem of Western liberal-democratic values through 
terms such as ‘civilisation’ and ‘heritage’ and the linking of these concepts to a shared 
‘common’ history.  In so doing, this projected British values into the past (heritage) while also 
situating them temporally in the present (civilisation) and geographically in Britain’s immediate 
area (the Atlantic Ocean).  Yet what Bevin called ‘a wider roof of security […] which stretches 
over the Atlantic Ocean’ was a novel arrangement for Britain.17  Such had been the network of 
interests coterminous with its expansive range of colonies, dependencies and dominions, the 
imperial Island Race had, in essence, conceptualised security in global, even systemic, terms 
based on its Lines of Communication.18  Scions of empire like Churchill disliked the idea of 
formal spheres of influence with their power to limit influence elsewhere; the only sphere that 
the British Empire needed, in Carl Schmitt’s characterisation, was a global maritime one.19  
Indeed Bevin sought to clarify: ‘I want to make it clear, however, that [NATO] must not be 
taken as weakening or limiting in any way our obligations towards other States which are not 
included in that geographical area.’20 
 
This unfamiliar strategic arrangement was rendered ontologically secure according to Island 
Race identity (and vice versa) through the discourse of shared values, language, culture and 
heritage familiar from the narratives of Greater Britain in the nineteenth century.21  This had 
been a fundamental part of the British identity as a Power able to project influence over large 
areas of the globe, particularly those which were either definitively no longer under its control 
(USA) or gradually slipping away (Australia; Canada; New Zealand) but also as a more general 
concept which geopolitically legitimised the disparate, non-contiguous nature of the Empire.  In 
this way it was a fundamental component of maritime imperialism.  Thus the expediency of this 
aspect of Island Race identity was in its connotations of ownership of a NATO project based on 
                                                          
16 HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 2534; The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), p. 1. 
17 HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 2534. 
18 Darwin (1991), p. 4. 
19 Churchill (1954), pp. 65, 203; Schmitt (1950), p. 173. 
20 HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 2534. 
21 Dilke’s Greater Britain and Problems of Greater Britain and Seeley’s Expansion of England are the most 
crucial texts for an understanding of the concept of Greater Britain (Dilke (1869); (1890); Seeley (1883)). 
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the values that Britain had bestowed upon the world (particularly North America).  Bevin 
highlighted this when he drew a link between the ‘common origin in the people living round the 
Atlantic Ocean, common moral and ethical standards and institutions derived from common 
origins and traditions’ and ‘the traditional British conception’ of security: ‘that the ocean is a 
link and not a barrier.’22  The association was ‘a natural one’, a ‘community of interest’ that had 
‘always existed’ of ‘co-operation with like-minded peoples’.23  The Foreign Secretary’s 
representations cast NATO not as a novel phenomenon either culturally or strategically.  It was 
a descendent of the concepts of Greater Britain that had so dignified the British legacy in North 
America and drew on the time-honoured strategic identity motif of the ocean as indivisible.  The 
meanings condensed in the concept of Greater Britain represented ontologically secure notions 
of Britain’s identity as a Power of global relevance whose values were present in the former 
white settler colonies.  Conferred upon NATO, the concept retained relevance as the context 
was familiarised according to traditions of British foreign policy thought.  The discursive force 
of this linking of an established identity concept to a new context is evident in the mobilisation 
of particular geopolitical tropes congruent with Island Race identity: the ocean as a link; the 
permanence of British values; Britain’s propitious location.   
 
Other examples from the May 12th debate epitomise this further.  Now Leader of the 
Opposition, Churchill was still in the throes of Anglophilia, having had to delay completion of 
his History of the English-Speaking Peoples because of the Second World War.24  As against the 
oppositional discourse—advanced by Willie Gallacher and other Leftist Members—that NATO 
represented subservience to the US, Churchill celebrated ‘the fraternal association of the 
English-speaking world’ which, in tandem with ‘the union of Europe’, would ensure that ‘the 
peace and progress of mankind can be maintained.’25  Clement Davies, the leader of the Liberal 
Party, anticipated the approval of ‘the free peoples not only of this country but of the 
Commonwealth’ and the whole world, ‘on behalf of democracy and democratic institutions.’26  
It was, he said, ‘the beginning of a new commonwealth’ which would ‘safeguard our freedom, 
our common heritage, and our own form of civilisation, founded, as they are, upon principles of 
                                                          
22 HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2016.  Conservative Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe echoed this later: 
‘The Atlantic Ocean is no longer a barrier between the New World and the Old; the Atlantic Ocean now 
is the link by which the New World and the Old are united in their determination to remain free’ (ibid., 
col. 2084).  
23 Ibid., col. 2019; ibid., col. 2019; ibid., col. 2019; ibid., col. 2022.   
24 Churchill (1956-8). 
25 HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2024.  Gallacher, along with Phil Piratin, represented the 
Communist Party of Great Britain.  Their pungent remarks throughout the debate were broadly 
supported by Labour Members such as Sydney Silverman, William Warbey and Konni Zilliacus.  Churchill 
collectively branded them ‘that small band of Communists, crypto-Communists and fellow-travellers’ 
and correctly prophesied that they would be the only voices raised in opposition to the Treaty (ibid., col. 
2025). 
26 Ibid., col. 2031. 
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democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.’27  For Davies, as others, the Treaty 
represented not just ‘collective security’ but the atavistic reification and preservation of the 
‘heritage’ and ‘way of life’ of an exclusive group of ‘free peoples’.28  To Independent 
Conservative Member, Daniel Lipson, it was nothing less than ‘a new family of nations’ which 
reminded him ‘very much of the British Commonwealth’ and in his summing up Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel-Baker, concluded that ‘democracy is no longer 
a series of isolated units but a cohesive organism.’29   
 
These represent one prong of the attempt to provide ontological security by anchoring the 
meaning of NATO in associations with Island Race identity tropes.  Through social discursive 
processes of ‘linking’, NATO was condensed with the meanings of established geopolitical 
identity tropes (and vice versa) and incorporated into the unfolding narrative of British history.30  
Rather than being a threat to British pre-eminence, NATO was the vessel of the continued 
importance of British values which, as established by Greater Britain, were coterminous with 
British power and influence and its unique island geopolitics.  As I argued earlier, most 
accounts of British foreign policy in the twentieth century have tended to emphasise either the 
pragmatism of officials in bandwagoning with the US to pursue the national interest of 
maintaining power while the Empire waned, the structural and geo-strategic imperatives of the 
early Cold War or else have favoured the idea that Britain at this time was, to use Hennessy’s 
phrase, simply ‘muddling through’.31  What has not been conceptualised is how things like 
membership of NATO were fitted to established concepts of British identity and how, 
                                                          
27 Ibid., col. 2033; ibid., col. 2032-3. 
28 Ibid., col. 2035. 
29 Ibid., col. 2107; ibid., col. 2128.  Warbey and Piratin were scathing about NATO’s democratic 
credentials, in particular decrying the presence of Salazar’s Portugal.  Warbey said: ‘The inclusion of 
Portugal makes complete nonsense of the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, which speaks of the 
signatories being determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.  Democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law do not exist in Portugal’ (ibid., col. 2038).  Both men warned that 
the next step would be the admission to NATO of Spain which, under Franco, remained a pariah for the 
British Left, partly because the likes of Churchill favoured its ascension to the Pact.  Piratin also drew 
attention to the lack of liberty experienced by blacks at the hands of lynch mobs in the Southern States 
of the US (ibid., col. 2101).     
30 Hansen (2006), pp. 41-6.  See Bevin: HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 2534-6; HC Deb 12 May 
1949, vol. 464, col. 2016; Rab Butler (Conservative): HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 2536; HC Deb 
12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2116; Robert Boothby (Conservative): HC Deb 18 March 1949, vol. 462, col. 
2539; Churchill: HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2024; Clement Davies: ibid., col. 2031-5; Thomas 
Reid (Labour): ibid., col. 2060; Rhys Davies (Labour): ibid., col. 2069; Nutting: ibid., col. 2070; Mott-
Radclyffe: ibid., col. 2084; Morgan Price (Labour): ibid., col. 2090-1; Lord John Hope (Conservative): ibid., 
col. 2098; Lipson: ibid., col. 2107; Noel-Baker: ibid., col. 2127. 
31 Hennessy (1996).  John Darwin, for example, has explored these issues (Darwin (1988), pp. 126-66; 
(1991), pp. 1-9, 56-84).  See also John Baylis for a typical account of the pragmatism of British officials 
and Kevin Ruane who contextualises NATO’s formation with the failure of European defence initiatives 
in the face of Soviet advancement (Baylis (1993); Ruane (2000)). 
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genealogically, the organisation was able to become part of the narrative of British history 
through social discursive practices whereby it was linked to the eternal geopolitical tropes of the 
Island Race. 
2.2. Beyond Cold War politics: the Soviet Union as threat to the Island Race 
Complementing the ‘linking’ of British identity and NATO was the ‘differentiation’ drawn 
between them and the Soviet Union.32  This discursively drew on established notions of the 
Island Race as a typical Sea Power ranged against various Land Powers.  As I argued in chapter 
1, the oppositional qualities assigned to each during Britain’s historical conflicts with France, 
Russia and Germany constructed binary struggles between a liberal, benevolent Power with 
non-contiguous, paternalistically ruled colonies that sought to ensure the smooth flows of global 
trade and a despotic, rapacious Power with contiguous, subjugated colonies that threatened to 
disrupt global trade by interfering with Lines of Communication.  This fundamental aspect of 
Island Race identity relied upon the constitution of Land Power to epitomise and dignify its own 
qualities in alterity.   
 
By 1949, it was becoming obvious (in spite of Gallacher et al) that the Soviet Union would play 
this role.33  And the converse qualities of democratic benevolence were assigned, as we saw in 
the previous section, to the NATO alliance as a whole.  In terms of Island Race identity, this 
made discursive logic in several ways: firstly, the antipathy towards the Soviet Union confirmed 
the ontological security of several geopolitical aspects of Island Race identity (guardianship of 
global Lines of Communication in particular); secondly, it offered further confirmation of the 
good sense of joining NATO by casting the alliance partners as actors with similar interests and 
values to Britain.  In this way we can see how interlinked and co-constitutive the discursive 
processes of linking and differentiation are, for the designation of the Soviet Union as antithesis 
relied upon and secured commonality with Britain’s NATO partners.  George Kennan’s 
‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’ article demonstrates how this Othering of the Soviet Union was 
hardly peculiar to Island Race discourse and must be viewed in the context of the burgeoning 
Cold War.34  However, one must also be cognizant of the presence of the deeper roots of 
identity concepts when conducting a genealogical study and how easily this emergent context 
dovetailed with the existing tropes.  Rather than accepting and privileging the sudden influence 
of Cold War rhetoric, there is the question of the enduring influence of Island Race identity 
                                                          
32 Hansen (2006), pp. 41-6. 
33 For Britain and the early Cold War, see, for example: contributions to Richard Aldrich and Anne 
Deighton’s edited volumes (Aldrich (1992a); Deighton (1990)); and general overviews from Victor 
Rothwell , Sean Greenwood, John Young and Ritchie Ovendale (Rothwell (1982); Greenwood (2000); 
Young (1996); Ovendale (1985)); also Hennessy (2010), pp. 1-45.   
34 X (1947). See also Sean Greenwood’s analysis of ‘the other long telegram’, a communiqué sent from 
the British embassy in Moscow (in 1946) by diplomat Frank Roberts that only belatedly received the 
scholarly attention of Kennan’s (Greenwood (1990)).  
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itself and how new contexts can nourish old orders and constitute the perpetuation of 
established narratives in ontologically secure fashions. 
 
Bevin had it that Moscow was disrupting the desired post-War peace and, while Britain and 
others negotiated the formation of the United Nations, ‘country after country’ was ‘made 
absolutely subservient to Soviet Russia.’35  Churchill, whose record of ambivalence towards 
Russia is catalogued in epic form over the six volumes of his World War Two memoirs, 
epitomised the Othering of the Soviet Union in declaring that ‘there can be no assurance of 
permanent peace in Europe while Asia is on the Elbe’.36  In the argot of the times, Russia was 
Asiatic, a source of what the critiques of Orientalism describe as Eastern inscrutability.37  
Indeed, Churchill argued that  
‘we are dealing with absolutely incalculable factors in dealing with the 
present rulers of Russia.  No one knows what action they will take’.38 
Yet the strategy of Land Powers was also familiar and predictable: ‘we are confronted with a 
mighty oligarchy disposing not only of vast armies and important armaments by sea and in the 
air, but which has a theme, almost a religion, in the Communist doctrine and propaganda which 
claims its devotees in so many countries and makes them, over a large portion of the globe, the 
enemies of the lands of their birth.’39  Labour’s Morgan Price contended that Moscow was in the 
grip of a ‘fanatical religious belief in the decline of the West and in the inevitable spread of 
Communism throughout the world’ and Conservative Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe vividly 
described how what he called ‘the slave world’ was assaulting the free world with a ‘global 
strategy’ that was not ‘very difficult to understand’:  
‘The left claw rests upon China, with the almost unlimited manpower 
of the Far East.  Were these two—the industrial potential and military 
ingenuity of Germany, on the one hand, and the unlimited manpower 
of the Far East, on the other—ever to be harnessed, one to the other, 
then the outlook would indeed be bleak.’40 
 
Furthermore, this new and familiar geo-strategic context of an apparently aggressive and 
rapacious Soviet Union can be implicated co-constitutively in the mobilisation and ontological 
security of the Island Race identity concept of what Mackinder called ‘universality’ and, more 
recently, Patrick Porter ‘globalism’: the idea of a ‘world so fragile that it must be superintended 
                                                          
35 HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2011. 
36 Churchill (1948-54); HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2029. 
37 Said (1978), pp. 31-49. 
38 HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2025. 
39 Ibid., col. 2029-30. 
40 Ibid., col. 2090; ibid., col. 2086; ibid., col. 2086; ibid., col. 2086.; ibid., col. 2086-7. 
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by a benevolent liberal hegemon.’41  Thus, in debating joining NATO, the social construction of 
the threat from Moscow hinged upon and constituted the recrudescence of the idea that Britain’s 
interests were worldwide.  Although, as I suggested in chapter 1, this was part of the trappings 
of imperial power, in its mobilisation for the services of empire, this universality or globalism 
had been rendered in terms peculiar to the island geopolitics of Britain comprising global 
balances of power and oceanic space without distance.  The arguments advanced by a number of 
Members on May 12 will demonstrate the social practices of discourse which constituted the 
collective performance of global Island Race interests in the face of a limitless Soviet threat.  
 
In spite of Labour Member and noted pacifist Rhys Davies’ suggestion that ‘nothing can 
prevent a foul idea from spreading but the putting of a better idea in its place’, the Conservative 
Nutting warned that, ‘so far, the main achievement of this North Atlantic Pact has been on the 
moral and political rather than on the military plane.’42  Given that the Soviet threat—‘the 
powers of aggression and darkness’—existed ‘over a large portion of the globe’ and on ‘a 
world-wide scale’, what were called for, in Conservative Rab Butler’s words, were ‘wider and 
broader arrangements’ than just the North Atlantic Pact.43  Butler pointed out that the Treaty had 
‘achieved security only in the Western sector or, if you like to call it so, the Atlantic sector’.44  
He and others, like Mott-Radclyffe, Nutting and fellow Conservative Brigadier Anthony Head, 
urged the government to consider the Treaty’s neglect of the Eastern Mediterranean.  Butler 
wanted the pact to ‘buttress the critical position in Greece’ and ‘support the gallant 
determination of Turkey to stand up against any attack that may come her way’; Mott-Radclyffe 
argued: ‘I do not see how we can defend Western Europe while the Eastern Mediterranean 
remains insecure’; and Head was  
‘convinced that the Mediterranean, especially the Eastern 
Mediterranean, forms an intimate part of the defence of Western 
Europe.  If our position in the Eastern Mediterranean deteriorates or is 
neglected, the whole of the most elaborate and efficient defence 
structure in Western Europe will be stultified and will expose itself to 
being ripped and torn up from Mediterranean bases.’45 
 
                                                          
41 Mackinder (1907), p. 11; Porter (2015), p. 4. 
42 HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2069; ibid., col. 2071-2. 
43 Clement Davies: ibid., col. 2034; Churchill: ibid., col. 2030; Mott-Radclyffe: ibid., col. 2086; Butler: ibid., 
col. 2117. 
44 Ibid., col. 2117. 
45 Ibid., col. 2117; ibid., col. 2086; ibid., col. 2051. 
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Nutting went even further and advocated extending ‘our system of alliances […] to cover the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean’.46  He told the House that he had recently 
travelled to Australia ‘and many of the vital areas and territories that lie between that country 
and this’, an experience which—in spite of the loss of India—only confirmed the importance of 
the strategic ‘life line of the British Empire’ and ‘the need to bring the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans and the Mediterranean into a similar arrangement to the North Atlantic Pact.’47  Mott-
Radclyffe, who argued that ‘provisions similar to those contained in the Atlantic Pact must be 
negotiated with all haste to cover both the Mediterranean and the Far East’, also asserted the 
importance of Britain’s already extant architecture: ‘I do not believe the Atlantic Pact will ever 
become a really effective organisation against aggression unless it is aligned to and coordinated 
with the resources of the British Commonwealth.’48  This orgiastic frenzy of designating 
different areas as strategic frontiers reflects what Labour’s Kenneth Younger called a ‘White 
Knight’ mentality:  
‘accustomed for generations to the idea that she should have 
permanent footholds at reasonable intervals all over the world from 
which to promote her endlessly varied interests […], any gap arouses 
apprehensions, even where it is not obviously related to any 
identifiable threat.’49 
 
It was at once both imperial recidivism and something more than that.  If a novel strategic 
arrangement like NATO was to be comprehensively fitted with established Island Race identity 
concepts (not to mention the new Cold War imperative towards ‘global thinking’) then its 
plenitude was perhaps bound to be questioned by British foreign policy-makers who still 
retained a sizable empire and Commonwealth whose conceptual foundations were predicated on 
the idea of distanceless oceanic space which was both threat and opportunity.50  Apart from that 
from the far Left, this was the only real questioning of the organisation: whether it was truly 
global enough to suit the universal Island Race, for whom the whole world had been ‘their 
strategically relevant region’.51 
2.3. Conclusion 
The joining of NATO, which was supported by a vast majority of Members, was discursively 
represented in terms that cemented British ontological security through mobilisations of Island 
                                                          
46 Ibid., col. 2071. 
47 Ibid., col. 2073. 
48 Ibid., col. 2087. 
49 Younger (1964), p. 63. 
50 Bell (2007), p. 84; Gray (1994), p. 13; Hardt & Negri (2000), pp. xii-xiii; Kern (1983), pp. 131-80, 211-40; 
Schmitt (1942), p. 48. 
51 Walton (2007), p. 33. 
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Race identity tropes.  The emergent context of waning British power and the advent of a more 
assertive US was defined according to the foundational identity concept of Greater Britain in 
which Britain’s cultural legacy, especially in North America, effectively perpetuated its own 
power and influence.  Britain claimed geo-historical ownership of the ‘western values’ at the 
heart of NATO and, as such, the alliance became an extension of a nebulous, British cultural 
sphere.  This was ranged against its supposed obverse as the traditional global dichotomy of Sea 
Power versus Land Power was given a new context, establishing the Soviet Union as the 
antithesis of Island Race geopolitics.  Furthermore, the Soviet threat which had prompted the 
inception of NATO was immediately conceptualised in parliament as being global in scale.  
Thusly the established Island Race concept of Britain needing to have global reach was 
discursively linked to a worldwide threat emanating from Moscow.  The imperial Lines of 
Communication also retained their contemporary utility as this new context was mediated via 
the traditional identity concepts that had originally given them importance; a fait accompli 
whose fruit would be borne in spectacular fashion in Egypt seven years later.   
 
Britain still possessed a large empire at this time—Harold Macmillan’s (Conservative Prime 
Minister: 1957-63) ‘wind of change’ speech was ten years away—so one might say that such 
discourse was inevitable from politicians representing a Great Power, albeit one being rapidly 
overtaken by the US and the Soviet Union.52  Yet there was almost no explicit mention of the 
Empire during the course of the debate on joining NATO.  Of course the Empire and Britain 
had arguably, by this point, been so conceptually conflated that the mention of one would 
constitute the other anyway, but what we can see is that this debate was not about the Empire 
per se, it was about the continuing search for British ontological security through the 
negotiation of the multiple meanings of the Island Race.53  It was about the co-constitutive 
fitting of Island Race identity concepts with contemporaneous contexts and hints at the ways in 
which Island Race identity, although forged during empire, constituted more (or less) than just 
an imperial identity.  This is the strength of a genealogical approach, especially in the situation 
that Britain was (and, to some degree still is) in: becoming post-imperial.  It allows a 
conceptualisation of identity that won’t halt and make a volte face at an arbitrary junction of 
history.  In this way we can begin to see how Island Race identity lived on, even increasingly 
without the empire because of social discursive practices and its concomitant status as bearer of 
ontological security in unsettling times.    
                                                          
52 See Butler (1993) for a contextualisation of Macmillan’s speech. 
53 Doty (1996), p. 130. 
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3. The Suez Crisis, 1956 
3.1. The Suez Crisis and the Island Race: party (geo)politics and ontological security 
The main debates on how to respond to the events in Egypt in the summer of 1956 (2 August; 
12 and 13 September) can be conceptualised as comprising the negotiation of British foreign 
policy identity in a new and unexpected context.  Unlike in the NATO debate from the previous 
section, the Suez Crisis was immediately established as being threatening to Britain; when, at 
the end of July, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, which had 
previously been in private hands and guaranteed by the British, Conservative Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden and the House unambiguously condemned his actions.54  The affair dragged on 
throughout the late summer and autumn with Britain and France eventually invading on the 
pretext of restraining Israel, with whom the Europeans had been covertly colluding.  Without 
American support, Eden signed a unilateral ceasefire in November and resigned as Prime 
Minister and MP the following year.55 
 
Furthermore, there was an added layer to the debates over the representations of the Crisis in its 
earliest days and the potential British remedial policy: party politics.  The two major parties in 
Westminster, Conservative and Labour, embodied subtly yet distinctly different 
conceptualisations of Britain’s international identity.56  Issues such as NATO (and many others, 
especially related explicitly to the Cold War) revealed broad consensus on plenty of 
international questions, opposition to which was usually confined to the far Left of British 
politics and the major figures from both parties of the first post-War decade—including 
Churchill, Bevin, Eden, Butler, Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Sir Stafford Cripps and Hugh 
Dalton—had all worked together, usually harmoniously, in the wartime coalition government 
fighting an enemy repugnant to all.  Notwithstanding the continued reverence for Churchill, 
Bevin was and remains a uniquely popular Foreign Secretary (and Minister of Labour) in 
Conservative as much as Labour circles.57  Yet the post-appeasement consensus around the 
Second World War, NATO and the very early Cold War masked the differences in Conservative 
and Labour conceptions of Britain’s international identity.  Broadly, the Conservatives were the 
party of empire and, even with the loss of India and the increasingly anti-colonial atmosphere of 
the UN, often openly so.  Although it was Bevin who echoed Churchill’s infamous ‘I have not 
                                                          
54 HC Deb 02 August 1956, vol. 557, col. 1602-43. 
55 See Keith Kyle’s ‘definitive’ account of the Crisis (Kyle (1991)). 
56 The once powerful Liberal Party was by now of marginal significance having returned only six MPs in 
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become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’ 
remark, the Labour Party was steeped in anti-colonial prejudice, its very formation touched by 
ideas of international socialism and the emancipation of oppressed peoples the world over.58  
The consequences of this were profound for the divisive debates over the Suez Crisis and reveal, 
in contrast to the previous section, how partisan politics and differences in interpretations of 
Island Race identity could be foregrounded in debating an issue such as Suez.   
 
At the most basic level, Labour Members argued that Eden’s government remained in the thrall 
of an outdated imperial worldview when the greatness of Britain could be ensured via the 
international norms of the UN; Conservatives accused Labour of weakness and of falling prey 
to (their own, historic) crime of appeasement.  Crucially, what will be seen is how both parties 
mobilised established Island Race identity tropes in making their opposing arguments about 
how to respond to the Egyptian occupation and nationalisation of the Canal Zone.  Divisive 
party politics and the ruinous consequences for the duplicitous Eden—a scion of British foreign 
policy and politics in general for three decades—have obscured the significance of these debates 
for the unfolding history of British foreign policy at a crucial moment in its development.   
 
The section is divided into two parts.  First I will analyse discourse concerning Britain’s role in 
the Crisis and the proposed response, highlighting how ontological security-seeking mobilised 
Island Race identity tropes.  As I have already hinted, many Conservative Members (with Eden, 
at this stage, circumspect) argued for an unrestrained British riposte to the occupation and, in 
the process, actuated the Island Race trope of Britain being a Power of international significance 
that needed to be capable of global reach.  This was complemented by a thorough 
internationalisation of the Crisis in which it was argued that the occupation of the Canal would 
have profoundest effects on global patterns of liberal trade, thereby conflating British interests 
and values with global ones.  Labour Members upheld the significance of the Crisis in much the 
same terms but argued that Britain’s normative position was as an upholder of international 
legality and that the response should be led by the UN.  Secondly, I will focus on the discursive 
construction of a scripting of world politics that was ontologically secure for British foreign 
policy-makers because of the co-constitutive mobilisation of established Island Race identity 
tropes.  This hinged upon the reification of the Western metacommunity as signified by NATO 
(in spite of American intransigence), the significance of the old, imperial Lines of 
Communication as existential markers for this construct and the concomitant narrative of Soviet 
attempts to expand its disruptive, Land-based empire into the Middle East. 
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3.2. Empire or universalism? Lines of Communication and the internationalisation 
of the Suez Crisis 
Imperialism had been internationally discredited since at least President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen 
Points’ speech at the close of World War One and the UN Charter, which British officials had 
been influential in drafting, sounded a further death knell for the concept.59  Yet when Eden 
succeeded the ailing Churchill as Prime Minister in 1955, Britain was still heavily involved in 
the Middle East.  Egypt’s status within the late-British Empire was ambiguous as it processed 
through the usual succession of fashionable nomenclatures from ‘protectorate’ to ‘independent 
republic guaranteed by defence treaty’.  By the mid-1950s, imperialism scarcely spoke its name 
in the Commons like it once had and British troops withdrew from the Suez Canal Zone, their 
only remaining base in Egypt, on 13 June 1956.  Within six weeks, the Canal had been 
nationalised and occupied by Egyptian troops.   
 
The threat of disruption to Canal transit was immediately prioritised as the most significantly 
threatening aspect of Nasser’s actions.  As I argued in chapter 1, the route between Britain and 
India and the Far East via strategic points such as Gibraltar, Suez, Aden and the Malacca Straits 
was invested with supreme importance in the constitution of imperial Island Race concepts.  As 
will be shown below, within the new context of an independent India, the imperial Lines of 
Communication nonetheless retained their conceptual importance for British MPs.  They were 
more than simply functional transit routes; they were the symbolic edifice on which the 
maritime empire of a small, insular country could maintain its global power and influence over 
disparate, non-contiguous colonies.  Furthermore, they were vital in geopolitical ontological 
security terms in the ways that they scripted a world in which Britain’s maritime narrative of 
global politics was suggestive of successful foreign policy action.  Their importance connoted 
how Britain’s oceanic empire was not only relevant but materially and structurally vital for the 
smooth running of international trade.  Yet the contemporary status of imperialism as both 
conceptually passé and materially and territorially waning for Britain impelled the recasting of 
the Lines of Communication and Island Race claims to universality if they were to retain 
contextual meaning in terms of British ontological security.60    
 
To this end Eden internationalised the Crisis, depicting it as the concern of any state in the 
world which prioritised patterns of liberal trade; as he warned US President Eisenhower by 
telegram on July 27, it was a threat to the entire ‘free world’.61  The importance of this must be 
understood beyond simply the understandable desperation to enlist American support for any 
response to Nasser.  This was of course regarded as crucial and the arguments of Labour 
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Members went further and urged a truly international response; but one must also consider the 
important (and neglected) place of Island Race ontological security-seeking and the genealogy 
of the Island Race identity tropes of universality and Lines of Communication in the emergent 
and discursive context of the Suez Crisis itself. 
 
Eden described how Nasser’s actions affected ‘the rights and interests of many nations’; an 
‘international problem’ that was causing ‘anger and alarm’, ‘not only here but among the 
governments and peoples of the democratic world’.62  At stake was ‘the industrial life of 
Western Europe’, as well as ‘Australia, India, Ceylon and a large part of South East Asia’, 
whose prosperity ‘literally depends upon the continuing free navigation of the Canal as one of 
the great international waterways of the world.’63  Later, he commented: ‘the operation, the 
maintenance and the freedom of navigation through the Canal touch the lives and the prosperity 
of everyone in these islands’ and added that this was true also ‘in Western Europe as a whole, 
and in many eastern lands.’64  The consequences of inaction would, he argued, be ‘that the 
standard of life in Western Europe and many lands in Asia would be at Colonel Nasser's 
mercy.’65  The Egyptian President had taken away the ‘international character from the most 
important waterway in the world’, ‘on which the livelihood of so many nations depends’.66  
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd echoed this sentiment: 
‘This is a world interest.  It is not a case just of the United Kingdom 
and France against Egypt, or of Europe against Asia. It is a truly 
international problem.’67 
A nexus was thus established between these geopolitical renderings of the threat to a world 
scripted according to familiar British narratives and the desired policy of the Conservatives 
which relied upon ontologically secure readings of Island Race identity: Britain as a Power with 
global reach. 
 
Accordingly, the Conservative discourse comprised imperatives to act through the construction 
of the Canal’s global importance and reiterations of Island Race universal geopolitical identity.  
The former were typified by the above remarks of Eden and Lloyd and those of backbenchers 
like Mott-Radclyffe: ‘If the Suez Canal is not a vital international waterway, it is not anything at 
all […] it is in fact the lifeline of our country, of a large part of Europe and also of much of 
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Asia.’68  The latter took the form of often explicit appeals for Britain not to abandon its 
traditional wide-ranging, geographical reach.  Sir James Hutchison, for example, recounted his 
own experiences in defending the Canal in the First World War from Turkey and others’ in the 
Second World War from Germany.  He concluded: ‘Having fought in two wars to stop the 
Canal from falling into unfriendly hands, I am not going to stand by and see just that thing 
happen today.’69  Kenneth Pickthorn was similarly incredulous:  
‘Those whom I knew, in the last generation or two, would have hardly 
believed that the British House of Commons would speak as though 
Britain's frontiers were only Britain's shores.  They would say that the 
British House of Commons must be aware that arbitrary interference 
with international highways puts us into a state of self-defence.  They 
would not believe it possible that any other view could be held.  The 
frontiers of our country, which can feed only half its people, are not 
only the three-mile limit.’70 
 
That there was an imperative to act to free the Canal from Nasser was largely undisputed by the 
Labour benches.  Party Leader Hugh Gaitskell described Suez as ‘an international waterway of 
immense importance to the whole of the rest of the world’, whose seizure was ‘bound to be a 
matter of international concern’.71  Yet, as Brent Steele argues, ontological security concerns 
‘knowing both what one is doing and why one is doing it’ and the Labour interpretation of 
Island Race identity in practical and contextual terms was singularly different from that of the 
government with Gaitskell pointing out that Suez was ‘not our affair alone’ and arguing that ‘it 
would be ridiculous to treat ourselves as though we were the only Power involved.’72  By the 
September 12/13 debates, many Labour Members were accusing Eden and Lloyd of imperialism 
by another name and the Conservatives who urged unilateralism as being parochial irredentists.  
At the more benign end was Tony Benn’s depiction of the Conservatives as ‘empire-builders’; 
more flavoursome were ‘old Blimps’, ‘dinosaurs and Teddy Boys’, ‘warmed-up Neo-Disraelian 
imperial grandeur’, ‘a dirty little colonial war’, ‘the attitude of the Light Brigade’ and William 
Warbey’s memorable epithet: ‘the taint of the carrion of Imperialism and of the dead meat of the 
dinosaur.’73  This was more than just teasing.  Through their depictions of Conservative policies 
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‘from the wrong century’—as Konni Zilliacus put it—the Labour benches were seeking 
discursive ownership of British identity concepts in the present.74   
 
Crucial to this was Labour Members’ advancement of the importance of Britain’s taking a lead 
in the (preferably UN-brokered) resolution of the Crisis.  In so doing, they were discursively 
fitting the established identity tropes of British pivotal exceptionalism and leadership with the 
new context of waning actual power and the popularity of the UN with the British Left.  By 
condensing the meanings of the UN with these ontological secure notions of Island Race 
identity Labour’s favoured policy was routinized in the unfolding narrative of British foreign 
policy history.  Zilliacus was exemplary in this regard as he explicitly linked the two ideas, 
arguing that Britain ‘could be the leaders of all mankind if the political genius of the British 
people, which has shown itself in the Mother of Parliaments and in the free Commonwealth, 
would also show itself through the United Nations in working for the development of the United 
Nations into a system of world government based on the equal rights of all nations.’75  His 
Leader, Gaitskell, had it that, although ‘the United Nations is imperfect and not yet the world 
authority which [the Labour Party] would like to see it become’, Britain had the power and 
ability ‘to create that world authority’ and ‘set an example to the world.’76  As Benn put it, 
Labour believed in ‘internationalisation’.77   
 
Waged by the two groups of MPs, this was a discursive battle over the constitution of Island 
Race identity in the context of the Suez Crisis in which both sides sought to elucidate the most 
ontologically secure rendering of the events and the proposed response by co-constitutively 
fitting them around established, British geopolitical tropes.  Crucially, in spite of the differences 
and the mutual antagonism, the posture of the Conservatives who wanted an unrestrained 
British response in Egypt and Labour Members who favoured an international solution both 
reified the traditional identity concept of the Island Race as an exceptional actor in world 
history.  In either sense, Britain was a leader with a secure identity based around the geopolitical 
concepts associated with, but not exclusive to, its imperial era.  This, in turn, was a crucial 
aspect of Island Race identity in which the remarkable little island that had spawned a great and 
benevolent empire had a natural gift for leadership because of its benevolent, maritime values 
and advantageous geopolitical poise. 
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3.3. Constructing a threat to the Western metacommunity: the Island Race, NATO 
and the Suez Crisis 
As I have already argued, the Suez Crisis was spatially depicted as threatening Lines of 
Communication, the maintenance of which had been an important component of the geopolitical 
identity of the imperial Island Race.  Although the Far East colonies (Hong Kong, Malaya, 
Singapore) remained, the overwhelming strategic justification for the Lines of Communication, 
especially the Suez route, had always been India, independent now for the best part of a decade.  
This imperilled their utility in the discourse around Suez.  What can be seen, however, is the 
ways in which the relevance of the Lines of Communication was ‘updated’ so that they were 
rendered as strategically important for the Western world as a whole, fixing Island Race identity 
as coterminous with the new contextual environment.  Furthermore we see how, genealogically, 
this was a continuation of the practice detailed in the first half of this chapter in which British 
identity was cast as culturally and strategically congruent with a Western community centred on 
the Atlantic through discursive processes linking British values and interests with NATO.  In 
the Suez debates, this conflation continued.  Although many Members—not least Eden 
himself—explicitly warned of the threat to British livelihoods, in the main the prospect of 
disrupted Suez traffic was placed squarely alongside the threat to the prosperity of the West as 
whole.78  Thus Island Race Lines of Communication were linked to the contemporary concept 
of shared Western interests which, as we saw earlier, had already been linked to Island Race 
identity during the NATO debates.  Indeed, at the close of Eden’s address on September 13, he 
described the nationalisation as ‘an assault on the Western Powers, on their economy, on their 
position in the world’, echoing Younger’s characterisation of ‘an act of calculated hostility 
towards the West’ from the previous day.79   
 
Moreover, this threat to the West constructed in the Suez debates also hinged upon American 
intransigence over the defence of the Middle East.  The American role in the Crisis has come to 
be afforded great importance as it was they who put forth the UN cease-fire Resolution in 
November which caused Eden’s humiliating reversal; at this stage, prior to Britain’s military 
involvement in Egypt, the lack of support from Washington was cast (although not by the front 
benches) as threatening Western solidarity.  The discursive constitution of this was complex and 
ambiguous.  In the first place, the apparent lack of interest in the region affirmed supposed 
British expertise on the Middle East (Anthony Verrier commented that foreign policy expert 
Eden saw it as ‘his Middle East’).80  Head, for example, had remarked in the debate on NATO 
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that ‘the Americans must find it very hard to believe that as far as defence is concerned, modern 
strategy, aircraft and weapons make the Middle West and the Middle East part of the same 
defensive system.’81  Yet, even seven years later, Labour’s Denis Healey was wont to reflect 
that events leading up to the Suez Crisis provided ‘the first opportunity we had had for a long 
time to interest the United States in the problems of the Middle East’.82  Conservative Major 
Patrick Wall, who was ‘very pro-American’, nonetheless pronounced that ‘American policy in 
the Middle East since the end of the war has been wrong in almost everything it has done’.83     
 
Yet the fact Britain couldn’t count on the US in this instance was mobilised as proof of the 
importance of NATO and Western solidarity.84  This decoupling of the US from sentiment 
towards NATO that I hinted at early on this chapter shows how the alliance, so often confused 
with ‘the special relationship’, constitutively relied on more than just Britain’s pursuance of a 
strong relationship with America.  Indeed, genealogically this ought to be seen in the light of the 
opening to this chapter in which NATO was constituted as the bearer of Island Race values and 
interests.  That it was placed under threat by British representations of events in Egypt only led 
to more urgent mobilisations of it as a discursive marker of ontological security particularly in 
the discourse of Conservatives who sought to uphold the Island Race concept of universalism 
without seeming nakedly imperialist.  In other words: if the threat was conceived as towards 
something more than just Britain, the proposed response (implicitly involving the rest of this 
metacommunity) could not be the unilateral imperial act of which Labour accused them of 
favouring; Britain would be acting in the interests of a greater cause.   
 
Typically, this was also linked to a Soviet threat that, in the light of the previous arguments of 
this chapter on NATO, was, by now, thoroughly embedded in British conceptions of 
geopolitical ontological security.  A warning from Labour’s Frederick Bellenger demonstrates 
this point:   
‘the pillars of Western Union, Western defence, Western 
understanding and the democratic way of life will be endangered.  
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That will do only the Communists good, and certainly not 
ourselves.’85 
The hidden hand of Moscow served as the deus ex machina of these debates, demonstrating 
how thoroughly British identity had incorporated the Western discourse of the Cold War.  Yet 
also in evidence are the traces of Island Race identity and its specific mobilisation of Land 
Powers as the constitutive threat to a benevolent, liberal and maritime order: 
‘Nasser has been supported all along by Russia, and Russia's policy 
today is no different from her policy under the Tsars. The imperial 
policy of the Tsars is today reproduced in the Communist Kremlin.  
[…] In the Middle East it is to deny Britain a waterway to the 
remainder of the Southern Hemisphere and to deny Britain access to 
the oil deposits in those countries on which we so much depend for 
our industrial and military potential.’86 
Inaction would, many agreed, merely recreate another malevolent Land Power in the Middle 
East.  Thus Members assigned to Nasser’s hypothetical future empire the familiar, antithetical 
qualities used to describe the Soviet Union and its antecedents.87  Wall, for example, described a 
bloc ripe for ‘Communist domination’, ‘stretch[ing] from Casablanca to the Caspian’ which 
‘might well attract India’.88  His colleague, Sir Victor Raikes urged the government to ‘prevent a 
situation which, in a few years’ time, may mean that a triumphant Egypt, having got away with 
this, having increased her power with Russian aid throughout the Arab world, with Russian 
weapons and Russian prestige backing her, will sweep Israel to the sea, as Egypt has sworn to 
do, and cast out, perhaps to death, another million Europeans.’89 
 
These characterisations of the Soviet Union and Nasser’s caliphate-in-waiting as rapacious, 
contiguous land empires provided ontological security for the Members in their depictions of a 
geopolitical space that fixed Britain in a subject-position of relevance as the singular eternal 
opponent embodying antithetical qualities.  Even those who labelled the Conservatives as 
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empire-builders or worse cast Britain as the real or potential antithesis to Moscow/Cairo: 
freedom-loving, maritime and, although exceptional, part of a democratic metacommunity 
whose values were thoroughly British.  As Hadfield-Amkhan puts it: ‘moments of crisis 
involving war, allies, threats and opportunities cannot be decided solely by referring to a generic 
national interest or material balance sheet, but are more likely to be informed by the national 
narrative, in which national selfness is determined neither by strategy nor tactics but draws on 
culturally derived, existential themes in which the very definition of the state and its ultimate 
purpose is constituted.’90  Just as in the much rehearsed Self/Other constitution, we see 
something like a threat/opportunity nexus when analysing the debates around the Suez Crisis in 
which the threat and the opportunity for the reiteration of national identity concepts exist in a 
co-constitutive relationship.  This takes us further than Booth’s ‘strategy and ethnocentrism’ 
thesis in which ‘[n]ations see themselves as the centre of the universe’ and ‘tend to worry about 
all manner of threats because they implicitly or explicitly see behaviour elsewhere being 
directed towards themselves.’91  While this national egotism must be admitted—especially in 
the case of Britain and its self-professed exceptional history—a premium must also be placed 
upon the constitution of concepts of identity and their reiteration in novel contexts to seek 
ontological security. 
4. Conclusion: the enduring Island Race 
This chapter has focussed on two moments in British foreign policy from the middle of the 
twentieth century: the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Suez Crisis.  In their 
different ways, these two events epitomised the changing status of Britain at the time, from 
preeminent imperial power to something else.  Yet, as I have shown, the ways in which they 
were debated in parliament co-constituted the established Island Race concepts of identity that 
the empire had been discursively based on.  This is not to say that the MPs at the time were 
necessarily and only subject to a vapid revanchism; rather that the contexts of the two issues 
were mediated through established Island Race tropes and vice versa.  More specifically, we 
saw how NATO was represented as a continuation of Greater Britain in which Britain was the 
implicit leader of a group of like-minded states driven by values which originated in Britain 
itself.  The Suez debates were more complex and partisan yet constituted similar reifications of 
Island Race universality and exceptionalism in the battles over who held the key to resolving the 
Crisis and therefore understood the true nature of ontologically secure British identity.  In both 
cases, the Soviet Union was cast as the antithesis of liberal, maritime trade-loving Britain and its 
Western, ‘free’ allies, thus confirming the relevance of Island Race identity in its new Cold War 
context. 
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NATO, as I argued earlier, has become a barely questioned part of British security architecture.  
With the end of the Cold War, a debate has proliferated amongst IR scholars about the 
endurance of the organisation; with some rightfully arguing that its continued existence proves 
the paucity of realist characterisations.  Instead, the likes of Thomas Risse-Kappen, Michael 
John Williams and Michael C. Williams and Iver Neumann suggest that NATO properly viewed 
is a ‘security community’ of values whose perpetuation (and, indeed, expansion) is the 
cumulation of a shared history of liberal democratic norms.92  Useful and welcome as they are, 
these accounts tend to focus on NATO at the institutional level; what this study demonstrates is 
the efficacy of locating the protraction of the alliance at the level of one its constituent national 
parts in which it is condensed with ontologically secure meanings gleaned from a particularist 
set of identity tropes.  Genealogically we can also see how NATO was co-constitutively 
incorporated into the ever-emergent Island Race identity so that it was not simply one moment 
in British history but that it became part of that history, given relevance in a historical light 
through the same Island Race tropes that mediated the present circumstances of the Cold War.  
 
The typical characterisations of Suez as beginning, end and lesson temporalise it in specific 
ways that tend to brook an elision of considerations of continuities in an evolving national 
identity.  Considered another way, Eden’s duplicitous collusion with France and Israel and the 
subsequent, nationwide depression that Thatcher described, mark out Suez as an event to be 
somehow foreclosed.  This sense is only heightened by the memoirs of those involved—
including Lloyd’s, in which he memorably tells the reader that he accepts ‘no blame for 
Mediterranean geography’—whose self-justificatory tones render a cadaverous Suez as 
something whose meaning is to be fought over posthumously as a singular, rapturous event.93  
The tendency to personalise crises such as these (the same can be said, for example, of the so-
called ‘Blair wars’) and focus on the spleens of the participants or Westminster decision-making 
processes can obscure the larger histories of identity discourse.94  By taking the genealogical, 
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discursive analytical approach advanced by this thesis, we can elide the tendency to restrictively 
view the Suez Crisis as either end or beginning and begin to understand the continuities at work 
in the history of Island Race identity and also the emergent changes as it co-constitutively met, 
interacted with and mediated novel, unexpected contexts. 
 
Even when studying the tortuous Commons debates of late summer 1956, one might be tempted 
to say that traditional notions of Britain’s international identity had been shattered by Suez.  
Yet, when pursuing a genealogical approach and by taking seriously the persistence of 
sedimented geopolitical tropes and the particular role of parliamentary debate in upholding these 
notions, we can see how Britain’s Island Race identity survived the Crisis.  Both Labour and 
Conservative Members, while advocating wildly different policies internationalised the issue, 
cast Nasser and the Soviet Union as implacable enemies and reiterated Britain’s exceptional 
geo-history.  Britain’s pivotal, geopolitical commission as defender of Lines of Communication 
for the benefit of the Western world should be seen in the context of older, historic Island Race 
tropes as well as the recent constitutive absorption of NATO.  Thus, when viewed alongside one 
another, the signing of the North Atlantic Pact and the Suez Crisis are shown to be decisive 
moments in the genealogy of the Island Race but not because they precipitated any great re-
think of Britain’s identity.  Indeed, this is the fundamental ambiguity that characterises 
ontological security-seeking for its social-discursive practices discipline any ‘crisis’ into a 
mediated performance of a situated world that is understood by foreign policy-makers.  In the 
process of narrating and debating both the positive development of NATO and the negative of 
Suez Island Race identity tropes remained fixed as co-ordinates of British foreign policy even as 
they were co-constitutively adapted to the new contexts.  
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chapter 4 
The insularity/universality conundrum: the Island Race 
negotiates European integration, 1960-3 
1. Introduction 
The analytical focus of this chapter is how Island Race identity tropes were mobilised in the 
context of British MPs debating whether to seek entry into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in the early 1960s.  Of particular concern will be two of the identity tropes that I outlined 
in chapter 1: insularity and universality.  My conceptualisation of them has them in a co-
constitutive relationship; that is, the discursive relevance of one is reliant on that of the other 
and vice versa.  Put in very simple terms, imperial Island Race identity was predicated upon 
Britain having global reach and an active presence around the world, a position allowed by its 
partial relationship with continental Europe.  Yet the shrinking of the empire had taken on a new 
impetus in the late 1950s with the granting of independence to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1956), 
Malaya and the Gold Coast (both 1957).  Contemporaneously, six western European states 
signed the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC.   
 
How the co-constitutive identity tropes of insularity and universality were reconciled in these 
novel contexts is important for a genealogy of British identity and foreign policy, not least 
because of the ways in which Britain’s stance towards Europe continues to be characterised by 
highly charged political debates.  By examining the first discursive encounters between Britain 
and a converging Europe and how British foreign policy-makers sought ontological security, 
new light can be shed on the current constitution of ‘Europe’ as an issue in British politics.  
After introducing the topic and the background I will then analyse several debates from 1960 
and 1961 in which Members discussed whether to apply or not to join the EEC.  I will focus on 
the discursive fixing of subject positions reliant on Island Race identity tropes and then do the 
same concerning a debate in 1963 after France had blocked British entry, showing how 
established identity concepts were mobilised as Members sought ontological security in two 
contrasting and unsettling contexts.  What will be brought out in particular is the manifold and 
often conflictual meanings of insularity and universality and how they failed to necessarily offer 
clear policy proscriptions yet continued to be relied upon because of how they connoted 
ontological security on Britain in this novel context. 
74 
 
 
 
1.1 Britain and a uniting Europe: discursive encounters and Island Race identity 
Such has been the enduring force of the idea that insularity from Europe and universality can 
only exist in symbiosis with one another and Britain cannot be both at the centre of Europe and 
maintain global links that Tony Blair’s 1998 assertion of the falsity of having to make a choice 
between Europe and the US was not only regarded as novel but an elision.1  John Major, 
presiding over a party tearing itself up over Europe (out of which Blair, incidentally, was 
making great political capital), told the Conservative conference in 1996:  
‘We have links and influence on every continent.  We have given birth 
to a whole family of nations.  I never forget that as I contemplate our 
future role in Europe.’2 
And Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan recorded in his diaries contemporaneously 
to the debates of this chapter his anguish at the ‘grim choice’ of being ‘caught between a hostile 
(or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful, powerful ‘Empire of Charlemagne’—
now under French but later bound to come under German control’ or ‘abandoning a) the 
[European Free Trade Association (EFTA)] Seven b) British agriculture c) the 
Commonwealth.’3   
 
Europe in British discourse was, and remains, a multifaceted construction, loaded with the 
weight of its historical renderings and subject to extremes of view and many shades in between.  
I have argued that the concepts of Island Race identity were based upon a specific scripting of 
Europe and Britain’s relationship to it within which British engagement with the rest of the 
world was possible only through disengagement with its proximal continent, thus allowing a 
poise of insularity from Europe and a global outlook.  Therefore, Europe is crucial to the 
discursive structure of Island Race identity, as a site of partial British involvement.  The 
endlessly warring European system was represented as a maw into which Britain could be 
sucked, compromising its involvements farther afield.  This, in turn, constructed it as a space 
that needed strategic management; hence the partial British involvement in Europe that took the 
form of maintaining a continental Balance of Power through selected alliances and limited 
engagements in order to ensure that no one Power or group of Powers could threaten British 
sovereignty and prevent it from realising its global ambitions.  This necessitated a sustained 
process of Othering in which British geo-history was dignified against a supposed Continental 
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rival.  Rather than just xenophobic posturing, this was and is about the fixing of Britain in a 
subject position as an island, with all the established connotations condensed in Island Race 
identity and, furthermore, should not obscure the evident pro-European sentiment that was rife 
at the time of these debates.4 
 
Developments in Europe and elsewhere in the 1950s problematised the plenitude of the 
insularity/universality nexus of Island Race geopolitical identity and, as will be seen, affected 
the ways in which ontological security was sought by British foreign policy-makers when faced 
with the prospect of integration with the rest of Europe.  In a sense, the nominal defence of 
Belgium and Poland and the checking of German continental domination in the World Wars 
were all of a piece with historic Balance of Power reasoning.  But the Second World War and 
atomic weapons, let alone air power, had arguably raised the stakes of war in Europe and the 
British continental commitment was far larger and more ruinous than anything before; as 
Kennedy put it ‘the ‘wooden walls’ of the island nation had at last been breached.’5  Could 
Britain even contemplate insularity from the rest of Europe in this new environment?  Certainly 
Attlee had thought not, as he explained to the Commons in 1946: 
‘We are now part of the Continent.  We can be reached by attack from 
the Continent.  While in the past we always had a long breathing space 
on which we could depend, that breathing space is most unlikely to be 
available should any war arise in the future.’6 
Similarly, Bevin argued several years later that Britain could not ‘preserve peace’ by ‘stand[ing] 
outside Europe and regard[ing] her problems as quite separate from those of her European 
neighbours.’7   
 
Furthermore, the American commitment during and after World War Two was on an 
unprecedented level and nakedly geopolitically ambitious vis-à-vis Communism in Europe.  
These factors, along with Britain’s waning empire, its subsumption into the NATO defence 
system (although Macmillan retained, to a degree, British nuclear independence) and the 
American snubbing over Suez, all combined with the sentimental wartime rhetoric of the likes 
of Churchill and Eden regarding Europe (especially France) to constitute a discursive context 
                                                          
4 On resurrecting the British pro-European tradition see Daddow (2004), pp. 9-18.  Also, Martin 
Marcussen and colleagues contextualise Britain’s European identity with those of France and Germany; 
and Justin Gibbins presents a genealogy of the same thing in relation to events such as the 1975 
referendum and the Lisbon and Maastricht Treaties (Marcussen et al (1999); Gibbins (2014)).   
5 Kennedy (1976), p. 283. 
6 HC Deb 12 November 1946, vol. 430, col. 40. 
7 HC Deb 22 January 1948, vol. 446, col. 397. 
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that thoroughly problematised the symbiotic Island Race identity tropes of insularity and 
universality.8   
 
From the earliest sessions of parliament after VE Day in 1945, Members from all sides of the 
House exclaimed the need for unity in Europe.  However, British reactions to the Schuman 
Declaration of 1950 and the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the 
following year were typically ambivalent and reflected the historic co-constitution of insularity 
from Europe and universality.  Churchill exemplified this and, upon the announcement of the 
Schuman Declaration (at which time he was Leader of the Opposition), he told the House that 
he was ‘deeply moved’ by this ‘historic event’ and ‘regretted’ the Attlee government’s decision 
not to attend the discussions, for ‘the absence of Britain deranges the balance of Europe.’9  Yet 
he declared: ‘I cannot conceive that Britain would be an ordinary member of a Federal Union 
limited to Europe in any period which can at present be foreseen.’10  This was at the height of 
his influential ‘three circles’ phase, upon which he expounded to the House: ‘First, there is the 
Empire and Commonwealth; secondly, the fraternal association of the English-speaking world; 
and thirdly, not in rank or status but in order, the revival of united Europe as a vast factor in the 
preserving of what is left of the civilisation and culture of the free world.’11   
 
European unity, it was agreed by virtually all Members, was a thoroughly good thing but British 
involvement threatened to imperil the worldwide interests of the Island Race by nulling the 
dual-concept of insularity and universality.  In spite of the partisanship over things like Britain’s 
non-involvement in the post-Schuman discussions, there was agreement between the front 
benches on this issue; Attlee’s and Bevin’s proclamations of the glory of a united Europe and 
the realities of interdependence were almost immediately appended with an explanation that 
Britain had to consider the balance of European forces and had concerns that went far wider 
than its nearest continent.12  Having spurned the Schuman discussions and then the Treaty of 
                                                          
8 See Margaret Gowing and Hennessy for accounts of Britain’s attempts to retain nuclear independence, 
the latter of which focusses on Macmillan (Gowing (1974), pp. 273-348; Hennessy (2010), pp. 61-74).  
Churchill had proposed a full Franco-British Union during the War and Eden announced in an address to 
the French people in 1942 that the ‘full restoration of France as a Great Power is not only a declared war 
aim and the fulfilment of a pledge made to a sister nation, but also a practical necessity, if post-war 
reconstruction is to be undertaken within the framework of that traditional civilization which is our 
common heritage’ (Churchill (1949), pp. 180-9; Eden (1965), p. 347).   
9 HC Deb 27 June 1950, vol. 476, col. 2154; ibid., col. 2154; ibid., col. 2153; ibid., col. 2153. 
10 Ibid., col. 2157.  Emphasis added. 
11 Ibid., col. 2155. 
12 Bevin said in 1948: ‘No one disputes the idea of European unity.  That is not the issue.  The issue is 
whether European unity cannot be achieved without the domination and control of one Great Power’ 
(HC Deb 22 January 1948, vol. 446, col. 388).  See also, for example, Attlee: HC Deb 23 January 1948, vol. 
446, col. 615; HC Deb 05 May 1948, vol. 450, col. 1315; Bevin: HC Deb 15 September 1948, vol. 456, col. 
106. 
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Rome in 1957, Britain founded EFTA in early 1960 with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden and Switzerland, forming a customs union which—unlike the EEC—wouldn’t trade in 
agricultural goods and lacked an external tariff, crucially allowing Britain preferential trade 
deals with its Commonwealth partners.  In this sense, EFTA could be seen as being more 
complementary with Island Race identity concepts in the way that it did not compromise the 
notion of universal, global trading, as represented by the Commonwealth.   
 
In sum, discourse on Europe, European integration and Britain’s relationship with Europe was 
heavily loaded with historic, sometimes contradictory concepts by the time the Conservative 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd hinted to the House on July 25 1960 that Macmillan’s 
government might seek to open accession talks with the EEC and then asked for its approval the 
following year.  This had profound effects on the ways in which Island Race identity tropes 
were mobilised by British MPs seeking ontological security in debating this issue. 
2. The 1960/1 debates on joining the EEC 
The debates focussed on in this section can be conceptualised as attempts to reconcile the Island 
Race identity tropes of insularity and universality with a uniting Europe.  Not marked by the 
partisan divisions over Suez, the remarks in the Commons were more individualistic, reflecting 
the concerns of the Members themselves which were sometimes parochial (particularly around 
British agriculture) and at other times on a grand scale.  From amongst these I have identified 
three main ways in which Members discursively linked Island Race identity to the emergent 
context of European integration with or without Britain.  Firstly, there is Balance of Power 
reasoning which preserved both (partial) insularity from Europe and a universal aspect; 
secondly, some Members suggested that Britain might lead Europe from within, a posture which 
compromised both insularity and universality yet was in keeping with the general Island Race 
identity concept of Britain’s unique geo-history impelling a leadership role; thirdly, the idea of 
Britain as a bridge between Europe and, variously, the Commonwealth, the US, the Eastern 
Bloc, Africa and/or Asia.   
 
All three positions (with the exception, generally, of the second) tended to be characterised by a 
lack of consensus around whether they could best be achieved from within or without the EEC.  
So nebulous were they that they were essentially devoid of meaning in collective policy terms 
and Members with divergent views could discursively link British insularity and/or universality 
to a given policy only for an opponent to cite the very same trope in support of the opposing 
policy.  Similarly notable is how, after French President Charles de Gaulle had vetoed Britain’s 
membership in 1963, a greater degree of unity prevailed, with Members more unified in their 
mobilisations of Island Race identity; this will be demonstrated in the second section of this 
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chapter.  What this begins to demonstrate is the discursive ontological force of the co-
constitutive Island Race identity concepts of insularity and universality regarding Europe.  Even 
though Britain would not succeed in joining what was by then the European Communities (EC) 
for another decade or so, these particular Island Race identity tropes remained resistant as 
markers of British ontological security, the eventual accession having, once again, to be 
negotiated in the Commons according to their discursive practices. 
 
The full consequences of this, over the ensuing five decades, are too great to be chronicled in 
this thesis but, by examining the first interactions of Island Race identity discourse and 
European integration, we can perhaps gain a greater understanding of the often difficult 
relationship between Britain and the rest of Europe.  Furthermore, we can better problematize 
some of the unsatisfactory truisms which suggest that Britain’s difficulties with the EU can be 
explained away by reductionist and over-simplistic theories such as an obsession with the 
transatlantic ‘special relationship’, xenophobia, or the jealous guarding of island sovereignty.  
Perhaps all these notions have their place, but that is within long-term discursive processes of 
ontological security-seeking through successive mobilisations of Island Race geopolitical 
identity. 
2.1. Balancing Europe: retaining insularity and universality 
The concept of Britain as a balancer of Europe relied on the construction of both an unbalanced 
Europe and a Britain that possessed certain attributes that would allow it to create equilibrium.  
The first prerequisite of disequilibrium was rendered in the 1960/1 debates in several ways: the 
eternal Franco-German rivalry and the threat from the Soviet Union.13  The British ability to 
achieve a European balance was discursively linked to Britain’s proximal but insular position—
thereby also presenting a fait accompli—and Britain’s particular, historical genius for achieving 
such a balance.  These two constitutions are intimately linked, for it is through the historical 
processes of Othering and involvement that—in the manner of Chinua Achebe’s colonialist-
native relationship—British foreign policy-makers could ‘know’ their European counterparts 
intimately enough to influence them.14  In other words: the insularity of the Island Race 
provided the perfect distance from which to observe, understand and manage the rest of Europe. 
 
                                                          
13 Lloyd: HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1109; Harold Wilson: ibid., col. 1119; ibid., col. 1123; ibid., 
col. 1126-7; Sir Anthony Hurd (Conservative): ibid., col. 1128; HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 
1736; Bellenger: HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1136-7; Ronald Russell (Conservative): ibid., col. 
1145; Robin Turton (Conservative): ibid., col. 1155; Richard Winterbottom (Labour): ibid., col. 1183; 
Macmillan: HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1482-3; ibid., col. 1492; Sir Derek Walker-Smith 
(Conservative): ibid., col. 1507-8; Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (Labour): ibid., col. 1577. 
14 Achebe (1975), p. 5. 
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However, this was complicated by the constant articulations of the desirability of a united 
Europe and that Britain was a part of Europe.  To reiterate: the insular discursive posture as 
balancer of European forces allowed Britain as the Island Race to construct a world in which it 
naturally sought interests further afield (universality).  The lack of one compromised the other 
according to the geopolitical logic of Island Race discourse.  Yet Britain’s intimacy with Europe 
had been reified into a truism since the Second World War and the traces of solidarity with the 
continent had proved resistant to erasure, particularly on the front benches.  Lloyd, for example, 
was unequivocal as he announced: 
‘I want to make certain points absolutely clear: we in Britain regard 
ourselves as part of Europe.  By history, by tradition, by civilisation, 
by sentiment, by geography, we are part of Europe.  [… T]he fact that 
the English Channel had not been crossed successfully in war as often 
as had some other physical barriers in Europe did not disqualify us 
from European status.  The fact that our Queen is Head of the 
Commonwealth and that we are a member of that association does not 
disqualify us from European status.  […I]f Britain were to be regarded 
as outside Europe we could not fulfil our complete role in the world.  
Nor do I believe that Europe would be complete without us.’15 
This was disputed several times in the 1960 debate, causing Lloyd on one occasion to intervene 
and reiterate his point.16  Labour’s Denis Healey pointed to a ‘fundamental difference in mental 
habits’ between Britons and Europeans and Conservative John Farr distinguished between 
Europeans and the ‘kith and kin’ of the Commonwealth, the latter of which ought always to be 
favoured.17  For Labour Member Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, joining the EEC was a proposal 
‘alien to the mind of this country’, ‘a departure from the course which this country has followed 
in the past’ and represented, ‘in the long run, the giving up of the independence and identity of 
this country in order to merge it with Europe.’18 
 
On one hand, Lloyd was linking the aspiration of Britain retaining an important role in the 
world with the facts of Britain’s proximity with Europe; Healey et al, by contrast, sought to 
draw a clear distinction between Britain and the continent.  Macmillan in 1961 attempted to 
                                                          
15 HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1099.  See also Gilbert Longden (Conservative): ibid., col. 1186; 
Reginald Maudling (Conservative, President of the Board of Trade): ibid., col. 1207-8; Manny Shinwell 
(Labour): HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1733. 
16 During a speech by Bellenger, he said: ‘I must get this clear.  […] I was speaking of the suggestion that 
we in this country, the United Kingdom, were not part of Europe at all.  […] I was talking of the idea that 
this island—because it is an island off the coast of Europe—should not be regarded as part of Europe’ 
(HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1133). 
17 Ibid., col. 1203; HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1594-5. 
18 Ibid., col. 1579; ibid., col. 1571; ibid., col. 1571. 
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mediate between these positions by drawing on the classic balance of power poise: ‘there is a 
long tradition of isolation’ in Britain yet ‘in every period when the world has been in danger of 
tyrants or aggression, Britain has abandoned isolationism.’19  That a European balance was 
desirable was undisputed, as was the idea that Britain was crucial in achieving it.  What was 
debatable was whether Britain would be best placed to enact its balancing role inside or outside 
the EEC.  In either case it was, as Macmillan put it, ‘a duty’ of Britain (as it was all European 
countries) ‘to seek some means of resolving the causes of potential division’ on the continent.20  
However, for Britain to actually join the EEC would, in Shadow Chancellor Harold Wilson’s 
words, ‘destroy the whole balance’ of the Treaty of Rome even though an end to a ‘thousand 
years of Franco-German bloodshed’ was to be welcomed.21  Conservative Sir Anthony Hurd 
referred to how Britain’s ‘special contribution […] to world affairs’ had been achieved by 
‘standing on the touchline of the Continent of Europe rather than being right in the centre of 
political entity in Europe itself.’22  And in a speech which Maurice Macmillan said brought to 
mind ‘Burke or Disraeli’ and was much referred to in the ensuing debate and in future 
discussions on Europe, Sir Derek Walker-Smith outlined   
‘our history and institutions and […] that special and separate position 
which time and the toil of our forefathers have built up for us.  To 
refer to our special and separate position is not to take a narrow or 
parochial view.  It is from that special and separate position that 
Britain has served the interests of Europe and of the world over the 
centuries and has contributed mightily to their well-being.  It is on the 
basis of that special and separate position that our greatness has 
rested.’23 
 
Thus, for some Members who opposed and some who supported accession, the crucial arbiter of 
ontological security was the Island Race concept of a Britain insular from Europe maintaining 
the balance of power.  The fact that it discursively retained both insularity and universality 
explains its appeal but, unlike the linking of NATO with the concepts of Greater Britain, it 
failed to offer a consensual policy direction in terms of the EEC. 
2.2. Between Europe and the world: the Island Race as a bridge 
The discursive battle over British identity and ontological security in the context of the EEC 
concerned not simply the posture of Britain towards the rest of the continent.  As we have seen, 
                                                          
19 Ibid., col. 1482. 
20 Ibid., col. 1482. 
21 HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1120; ibid., col. 1123. 
22 Ibid., col. 1128. 
23 HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1719; HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1512. 
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insularity had as its referent object continental Europe exclusively and was co-constitutive with 
the concept of universality towards the rest of the world.  Therefore, in the 1960/1 debates, 
Britain’s potential membership of the EEC was weighed against the possible implications for 
Britain as a global actor.  Where previously there had been an easy ‘fit’ between notions of 
universality and the empire itself, excepting the Commonwealth it was far from clear how 
Britain could remain a global actor and the proliferation of different schemes in these debates 
for Britain to ‘bridge’ with various parts of the world demonstrates this.  This idea of Britain as 
a bridge is genealogically significant because of the novel ways in which Island Race 
geopolitical tropes were mobilised to seek ontological security in this new context.  The 
proposition rendered Britain as a unique actor in world politics in a geopolitical situation that 
was pivotal in allowing it privileged influence with many other states and areas.  The fact that it 
was proffered in such variegated forms and without consistent links to policy proscription hints 
at the entropy inherent in the reaction to the EEC and shows how the tropes of Island Race 
identity, although shared and widely used in elucidating ontological security, do not always and 
necessarily actuate particular foreign policy roles.   
 
To give a flavour of this, Hurd argued that Britain could be a bridge between the EEC and the 
Commonwealth but was unconcerned about whether accession was actually achieved as a result 
of Macmillan’s negotiations; his colleague Robin Turton made the same point about Britain 
bridging Europe and the Commonwealth but argued this would best be achieved outside the 
EEC.24  A bon mot of particularly Labour Members was Britain as a ‘bridge between East and 
West’; alternatively (or in tandem), Britain could bridge Europe with the Commonwealth, Asia, 
Africa, the US, the West or any combination of the above.25  Typically, there was scant 
agreement about whether bridging could be most effective within or without the EEC.  Deputy 
Leader of the Labour Party George Brown and Wilson both favoured Britain bridging the West 
and Eastern Europe; the former arguing that Britain could best achieve this from within the 
EEC, the latter unsure.26   
    
Where there was greater consensus was over Britain as a pivotal part of a Western 
metacommunity, although this too offered little by way of a clear policy direction.  Wilson 
asserted Britain’s ‘very important role […] in easing tension between East and West’ and Hurd, 
Labour’s Frederick Bellenger and Conservative Ronald Russell immediately followed him with 
                                                          
24 HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1741; HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1159. 
25 See, for example, William Blyton (Labour): HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1533; George Brown 
(Deputy Leader of the Labour Party): HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1757; Viscount 
Hinchingbrooke (Conservative): HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1543; Russell: HC Deb 25 July 
1960, vol. 627, col. 1145; Turton: ibid., col. 1159; Wilson: ibid., col. 1118; ibid., col. 1126. 
26 HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1757; HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1118-9. 
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similar points.27  Later, and the following year, this was an important aspect in the speeches of 
particularly Harold Macmillan, Labour’s Richard Winterbottom, Walker-Smith, Healey, and 
Conservatives Reginald Maudling and Peter Smithers.28 
2.3. Leading Europe: traditions of leadership and exceptional British geo-history 
The third position evident in the speeches of Members in 1960/1 is related to both balancing and 
bridging and is also significant for the ensuing and ongoing debates concerning Britain in 
Europe.  That Britain might be a leader of Europe had been suggested in much rhetoric on 
Britain as the saviour of the continent in World War Two, a rendering intimately associated 
with islandness.29  Rab Butler, for example, who would later serve as Foreign Secretary, 
described Britain’s ‘age-long tradition of leadership’ in the late 1940s, reflecting the established 
Island Race identity trope of an exceptional Power that naturally leads other states.30  The 
importance of a geopolitically imperialist mindset is manifestly obvious in remarks such as this 
but Europeans, by and large, had not been part of the British Empire and yet, as I argued earlier, 
this European Othering cannot be conceived as a complete disengagement (discursive or 
otherwise); fundamental to drawing differentiation is always an inherent ‘knowing’.31  Thus the 
discourse of prospective British leadership in Europe was loaded with Britain’s ‘knowledge’ of 
the continent (related to which, Churchill’s infamous part in dividing up the continent with 
Stalin was exemplary), it’s proximal, insular position and the ‘tradition’ of leadership more 
generally; all important Island Race identity concepts that conveyed ontological security.32 
 
Britain’s exceptionalism with regards Europe (either as a European country or something else) 
was reiterated on a number of occasions during the debates.  Two particular ontologically secure 
subject positions were fixed in elucidating this notion: firstly, that of Europe being ‘incomplete’ 
without some British involvement; secondly, British intellectual ownership of the idea of 
European union.  Both of these were important components in the contemporary debate insofar 
as they allowed speakers to contextualise European union within the exceptional and 
ontologically secure geo-history of the Island Race.  Typically, Members making congruent 
points on these matters didn’t necessarily agree on whether Britain ought to seek accession or 
not.  
 
                                                          
27 Wilson: ibid., col. 1118; Hurd: ibid., col. 1127; Bellenger: ibid., col. 1136; Russell: ibid., col. 1145. 
28 Macmillan: HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1482-3; ibid., col. 1492; Winterbottom: HC Deb 25 
July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1182-3; Walker-Smith: HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1507-8; Healey: HC 
Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1206; Maudling: ibid., col. 1207-8; Smithers: HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 
645, col. 1559. 
29 See, for example: HC Deb 30 October 1945, vol. 415, col. 249-66.  
30 HC Deb 04 May 1948, vol. 450, col. 1133. 
31 Hansen (2006), pp. 41-6. 
32 Churchill (1954), pp. 198-204. 
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Even EEC-enthusiasts like Lloyd made the point that Britain was no normal European country.  
Having argued that Britain was European ‘by history, by tradition, by civilisation, by sentiment, 
by geography’, he went on to explain that a united Europe would not ‘be complete without us.’33  
Wilson simply argued that ‘Europe is looking to Britain for a lead’ and his colleague, Fred 
Mulley, bullishly suggested that Britain needed to ‘throw a brick through the window of the 
glasshouse’ of the EEC and was ‘the only member country’ of EFTA capable of doing so.34  
Although making opposing points, several other Labour Members drew on Britain’s roles in the 
World Wars, exemplifying the presence and glorification of recent Island Race history in British 
European discourse.  Winterbottom, who urged the government to speed up and deepen their 
engagement with the EEC, recalled Britain’s paternal undertaking defending Belgium and 
Poland and suggested that ‘we should grasp the principle that we fought for in those days and 
apply it to economic and political affairs today as we assess the priorities which should apply 
for Britain and our relationships with Europe.’35  Ungoed-Thomas contended that the EEC had 
been formed ‘by countries defeated in the last war, countries disappointed in their own state, 
countries finding themselves inadequate for their own protection and for their purpose, and, 
therefore, having to form a new union in order to provide themselves with a sense of security 
and confidence that they lack.’  He continued: 
‘We ourselves have not had that experience; we ourselves have not 
had that need.  We are not now, perhaps, the great political Power that 
we once were, but I believe us to be a tremendously important 
political Power.  And our political power is not just the power of this 
country standing on its own; it is the political power of this country, 
and the influence that this country has by reason of being the founder 
and a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’36 
Both men placed Britain in an exceptional subject-position regarding Europe, drawing on the 
discourse of recent historical experience to mark out the difference between the Island Race and 
the continent, seeking ontological security through the linkage of British geo-history with the 
contemporary context.   
 
For Labour’s Harry Hynd, this glorified position of Britain amongst the states of Europe meant 
that EFTA was not sufficient: ‘we should not be satisfied with being a team in the second 
division of the European league; we should aim to be in the first division of the European league 
                                                          
33 HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1099. 
34 Ibid., col. 1112; ibid., col. 1152. 
35 Ibid., col. 1183. 
36 HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1575. 
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and to do all we can to get full membership of the Common Market.’37  His colleague, Charles 
Pannell, although warning that ‘we are not naturally the overlords of the world’, recounted a 
glorious reading of Island Race history, from the ‘colonial aberration’ of the period between the 
Elizabeths (nevertheless ‘a period in which we grew up, we spawned our kind over all the five 
continents, and fertilised the world with money’) to ‘the English century, the nineteenth 
century’ when Britain ‘gave the world the picture of the first great industrial revolution’.38  
Having ‘allowed our Commonwealth to come to adult status as a body of self-governing 
nations’ Britain would, he said, go ‘back to where we started: in Europe.’39  Joining the EEC 
would be     
‘the next great step in our island history.  It is not a matter of presiding 
over the break-up of the Commonwealth; it is the ushering in of a new 
sense of national greatness.’40 
Maurice Macmillan, also supportive of accession (although more cautiously than Pannell), 
agreed that Britain had ‘a great deal to offer Europe’ and vice versa and also suggested that ‘we 
should look at history’.  His reading marked out a clear difference between Britain and the rest 
of the continent: ‘we have not gained from Europe our legal system, our constitution, our 
monarchy, our common law, our Parliamentary democracy’.  What Britain had gained—
specifically the colonies gleaned from France and Germany after, respectively, the Treaty of 
Utrecht and World War I—were, Macmillan argued, the results of British leadership in 
Europe.41 
 
Britain as the natural leader of the continent was, it must be said, not a universally held 
conception.42  This is hardly surprising, given the historical constitution of Britain as a place 
apart from the rest of Europe.  Yet we also see how, even when criticising the government’s 
apparently ambivalent and arrogant stance on EEC accession, Members still marked out Britain 
as having a unique role to play regarding the continent.  Avid pro-European Roy Jenkins, for 
example, who would go on to serve as the President of the European Commission, attacked the 
‘pharisaical’ tendencies of the House and described an attitude of ‘new imperialism’ marked by 
‘illusions of grandeur’ and a ‘belief that nations all over the world are waiting to be led by us’ 
but still contended that other countries wanted ‘to obtain as much help from us as possible.’43  
                                                          
37 Ibid., col. 1560. 
38 HC Deb 03 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1716; ibid., col. 1717; ibid., col. 1717; ibid., col. 1717. 
39 Ibid., col. 1716. 
40 Ibid., col. 1717. 
41 Ibid., col. 1723. 
42 See, for example, John Hynd (Labour): HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1161; Austen Albu (Labour): 
ibid., col. 1194. 
43 HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1589; ibid., col. 1589; ibid., col. 1590; ibid., col. 1589; ibid., col. 
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And when Wilson mocked the President of the Board of Trade, Maudling, rendering him as ‘a 
seedy sandwich-board man outside a Paris restaurant failing to see that the shutters have been 
put up and standing there while the whole of Europe passes him by’, he was criticising 
perceived inaction on the government’s part rather than offering an alternative interpretation of 
Britain’s foreign policy identity.  Indeed it was in the very same passage of speech that he 
argued ‘Europe is looking to Britain for a lead’, a point, as we have seen, on which many 
Members agreed.44  The fixing of Britain in a subject position in which it was exceptional and 
particular relative to the rest of Europe drew on established Island Race identity and transcended 
the individual and party politics of individual Members as a discursive instrument of ontological 
security-seeking. 
 
The summoning of exceptional figures from British history and their attitudes to Europe also 
played an important part in these debates, adding respected and authorial voices to the 
discourse.  Invocations of the likes of Churchill and Bevin (with regards to the former, Garton 
Ash remarked: ‘All British foreign policy since 1940 is footnotes’ to him) glorified and 
dignified historical British geopolitics and contributed to discursive ownership of the European 
project from amongst Members across the spectrum of enthusiasm towards the EEC.45  In his 
opening remarks in the 1961 debate, Macmillan reminded the House that Europe had been a part 
of Churchill’s ‘three circles’ scheme.  ‘Of course’, the Prime Minister said, ‘he was right in his 
analysis, but ever since then we have been, in one way or another, trying to find a practical 
solution to the problem of their interconnection.’46  Like Pannell’s suggestion that accession 
would be ‘the next great step in our island history’, Macmillan was rendering a benign, 
sequential geo-history in progress where Members had the opportunity to carry on the work of 
great predecessors.47   
 
Labour’s Arthur Woodburn went further than the Prime Minister and asserted that it was Britain 
under Churchill that had ‘inspired the move towards the Common Market’ and went on to 
establish an agonistic struggle between competing Churchillian and Gaullist visions of Europe, 
presaging the reaction of many Members to the French veto eighteen months later.48  Woodburn 
continued by paraphrasing, as did Major forty years later in the comparable context of the 
Maastricht debates, Bevin’s characterisation of his European policy as ‘to be able to take a 
ticket at Victoria station and go anywhere I damn well please’.49  He drew further historical 
                                                          
44 HC Deb 25 July 1960, vol. 627, col. 1112. 
45 Garton Ash (2010). 
46 HC Deb 02 August 1961, vol. 645, col. 1480-1. 
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inspiration from the uniting of the English and Scottish crowns, using the United Kingdom as a 
paradigm against which to measure Europe unity.50  In his eventful speech, Pannell also quoted 
the former Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary, Aneurin “Nye” Bevan, a revered figure within 
and beyond Labour circles for his role in the genesis of the National Health Service; and Mulley 
referred to the Battle of Britain which, like the NHS, was already coming to be central to the 
British national myth.51  Finally, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan 
Sandys and fellow Conservative John Harvey drew on Churchill’s 1946 speech at the University 
of Zürich in which he had called for a ‘United States of Europe’.52  Sandys argued that, ‘from 
that moment, European unity ceased to be just a dream and was accepted by practical men as a 
realisable objective’; Harvey pointed out that Churchill had ‘time and time again sought to 
enunciate that there need be no conflict between our interests in Europe and our interests in the 
Commonwealth.’53 
 
The presence of these august voices in the debates conveyed authority on the speakers and the 
geopolitical tropes they advanced were leant ontologically security as a result.  Furthermore, 
they are all associated with a dignified rendering of British history, punctuated by the acts of 
exceptional men.  The continuities these provide contribute to the furtherance of Island Race 
concepts by fixing Britain as a unique actor in global politics, a fundamental facet of the 
original and enduring conception of the importance of Britain’s islandness.  A majority of over 
a hundred MPs voted on August 3rd to begin negotiations with the EEC but within two years 
the process was aborted.  In the following section we will see how Members discussed this news 
and framed Britain’s relations with the rest of Europe in a very different context.  
3. After the flood: de Gaulle’s veto and the eternal Island Race 
At the end of January 1963, the discussions over British accession to the EEC were halted when 
French President Charles de Gaulle invoked his country’s veto and denied Britain’s 
membership.  De Gaulle would tell a press conference, several days after the debates herein 
discussed, that 
‘England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, 
markets and food supply to very diverse and often very distant 
countries.  Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, and 
only slightly agricultural.  It has, throughout its work, very marked 
and original customs and traditions.  In short, the nature, structure and 
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economic context of England differ profoundly from those of the other 
States of the Continent.’54 
This turn of events had been prophesied by several Members in 1960 and 1961.  Labour’s John 
Hynd and Austen Albu, for example, warned the government that Britain needed Europe more 
than the obverse and that it ought not to approach negotiations trying to take a lead on the 
continent.55  Wilson said that some in Europe regarded Britain as a ‘Trojan Horse’ bent on the 
destruction of the Community ‘from within’, Woodburn noted de Gaulle’s scepticism about 
British membership and Labour’s Fred Blackburn remarked in 1963 that ‘the warning was fully 
given.’56   
 
In spite of the persistent entreaties to Britain and Europe being indivisible, there was, as we 
have seen, a skein of Europe’s Otherness inflecting the discourse of 1960/1 and the 
parliamentary reaction in 1963 hinged on a recrudescence of this established dichotomy, 
particularly regarding France.57  Crucially, as I argued earlier, this was thoroughly reliant not 
simply on a habit of xenophobia but on time-honoured notions of Britain’s islandness relative to 
its continental neighbours.  Furthermore, Britain’s proposed entry had been discussed in terms 
very much congruent with Island Race identity, nowhere more so than when Macmillan had 
voiced his doubts about the presence of ‘little Europeans’ ‘among the leading men or the 
Governments of Europe’ who believed in the ‘Medieval dreams’ of isolating Europe from the 
world and looking ‘inwards only upon itself’.  He asked the Commons: ‘is it not the duty of this 
country, with its world-wide ties, to lend its weight to the majority of Europeans who see the 
true prospective of events?’58  The very prospect of British accession had been discursively 
linked to the same Island Race identity tropes that de Gaulle explicitly rejected. 
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On the 11th and 12th of February, MPs debated the repercussions of the breakdown of the 
negotiations.  The context was dramatically different from 1960/1: then Britain’s accession had 
been a prospect (desirable to some, not to others); by 1963 it was out of the question.  The 
tropes of Island Race identity that had been debated, with little consensus in terms of policy 
implications, were in evidence perhaps in even greater force in 1963 as an often angry House 
reacted to de Gaulle’s veto.  What the 1963 debate shows above all and especially when viewed 
in the context of its 1960 and 1961 counterparts is the resilience of Island Race identity as a set 
of, albeit nebulous, organising concepts for British foreign policy discourse.  Having staked so 
much on accession to the EEC, British MPs sought ontological security in familiar Island Race 
themes, often the very same ones that had been invoked in arguing for membership in the first 
place.  This was done in order to elucidate a secure place in the world after a policy failure.  We 
will see how de Gaulle’s veto was represented as a French misreading of the purpose of 
European integration as Members outlined the pre-eminence of the Island Race vision of the 
continent as a liberal, trading, outward-looking bridgehead of NATO and bulwark against 
Communism.  Members also, as they had in 1960/1, repeated their enthusiasm for the 
Commonwealth and reiterated the importance of the solidarity of the Western World, something 
that French actions were now said to be threatening.  Furthermore, we will see how the social 
discursive practice of ontological security-seeking can render an apparent ‘crisis’ as an 
opportunity. 
3.1. Othering France: French geopolitics versus the Island Race 
The contrast between the discourse concerning Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe in 
1960/1 and eighteen months later is striking.  Where there had been ambiguity over how the 
identity tropes of Island Race identity fitted (if at all) with European integration, by 1963 there 
was a more general consensus around the new context.  British geopolitics, it was agreed by 
virtually all the speakers, was the antithesis of that of a French-led EEC.  The remarks that 
Conservative Viscount Hinchingbrooke had made to great approval in the 1961 debate—that he 
preferred the ‘small, quick-moving, resilient, resourceful, trading’ ‘“small ship” philosophy […] 
that defeated Napoléon and defeated the King of Spain’ to the ‘vast industrial machines’ of the 
US, the Soviet Union and, potentially, the EEC—came to epitomise the discursive reaction to de 
Gaulle’s veto.59  There had ‘always been’, Macmillan said in introducing the 1963 debate, ‘two 
ways of looking at European unity’: there were those on the continent who took ‘the narrow 
view’ of ‘a united Europe as a restricted or autarchic community’ and there was Britain with its 
‘tradition of outward-looking development’.60  ‘If the French Government object to us as an 
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island, it is also as an island that we bring this rich heritage to the world.’61  The Labour shadow 
cabinet was typically critical of the government’s handling of the negotiations but upheld 
precisely the same dichotomy as the Prime Minister.  Wilson, their leader-in-waiting following 
Gaitskell’s death in January, juxtaposed ‘restrictive and protectionist and inward-looking’ 
continental practices with Britain’s predilection for ‘constantly looking outward to wider 
horizons’; and Liberal Jeremy Thorpe decried the French vision for Europe as ‘the very 
antithesis of the spirit and philosophy of the Community’ and the beginnings of ‘Franco-
German domination’.62  Even Francophile Conservative Sir Hamilton Kerr, chair of the all-party 
Anglo-French Committee, concurred that Britons tended to view de Gaulle’s vision for Europe 
as ‘too small.’63   
 
This was not simply a xenophobic British élite Othering its historic French rival.  In political 
terms, this was about fixing Britain in an ontologically secure subject position relative to Europe 
in the micro-level context of a policy setback and, at the macro-level, of a general waning of 
previously understood British power.  It is precisely in situations such as these that established 
identity concepts can come to the fore.  In this case, in the remarks above and elsewhere, we see 
a recrudescence of classic Island Race identity tropes in which maritime Britain is discursively 
pitted against lumpen, continental Europe which, so said Labour’s Richard Marsh, had 
‘fundamental attitudes’ which Britain had ‘no possibility’ of ever changing.64  Furthermore and 
according to Robert Mathew—a strong supporter of Macmillan and accession—Britons were 
‘the better Europeans’, favouring ‘a gradual step-by-step move forward towards a genuine 
liberal European unity’ in contrast to de Gaulle who ‘believes in a Europe which belongs to a 
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past age, which is narrow, nationalistic, and nineteenth century.’65  Rather than a complete 
disengagement from Europe, the comments of Mathew and others show how Island Race 
identity required a continued discursive encounter with its traditional Other, allowing its 
concepts to interact and be sustained and dignified by the new context of de Gaulle, France and 
French geopolitics (interchangeable in much of the discourse).66  In the process, the negated 
policy was represented not as a setback if it only confirmed the fortitude of the pre-existing 
identity.   
 
Genealogically, we saw in the previous chapter how the discourse of British power and 
prosperity had begun to be geopolitically expanded to comprise an enlarged area of security and 
interests coterminous with the ‘Western world’ into which had been discursively condensed 
established tropes of Island Race identity.67  The importance of this vis-à-vis Communism in 
Europe was a constant concern of Macmillan’s government, what with the seemingly permanent 
condition of crisis in Berlin and the Prime Minister’s closeness with President Kennedy.  The 
global, existential nature of the Cold War, as well as Britain’s own proclivity for universalism 
meant that de Gaulle’s rejection could be represented as threatening the Western alliance and 
also the peace of the world.  Both Macmillan and Wilson devoted significant energy to this in 
their addresses.  The Prime Minister argued that ‘on the strength and unity of the Western 
Alliance depends the peace of the world’; ‘anything that threatens the Western Alliance, and 
particularly its organisation in NATO, must be a source of deep alarm’.68  Contemporaneously 
to these debates, de Gaulle was in the throes of strengthening France’s independent nuclear 
deterrent.  Unhappy with what he perceived as the US-UK dominance of NATO, he withdrew 
France’s Mediterranean fleet from its control, the first serious rupture for the organisation.  
Macmillan suggested that these French vacillations had ‘left a serious gap’ in the defences of 
the West and Thorpe worried that an EEC without Britain in this context would constitute a 
dangerous ‘third force’ in the world.69  Wilson agreed, urging that the Western Alliance not be 
‘further endangered’ and that ‘we must base our stand fairly and squarely on NATO’; and 
Maudling, now Chancellor, contended: ‘the whole logic of history means that we must see 
developing in the long run a united Europe within an Atlantic Community, and as science 
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compresses our globe more and more, and as the Chinese millions storm across the Eastern 
world, more and more the world will see the folly of Europe being disunited.’70   
 
This was co-constitutive with a subtle alteration in the geopolitical composition of the West in 
the discourse of MPs.  When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, as we saw in chapter 3, there 
was little apparent compunction in the Commons with the admittance of European nations into 
its construct.  Even though much of the discourse hinged upon the elucidation of supposedly 
Anglo-Saxon values, this ‘common heritage’ also admitted ‘like-minded’ (democratic and/or 
civilised) nations like France, and the Benelux and Scandinavian states.  Greater Britain, the 
ancestor of NATO and the West in British discourse, had been an exclusive, racio-cultural 
construction based on the English language, Anglo-Saxondom and British values.71  Its 
discourse had never admitted the possibility of these values fully being taken up by people who 
were not British or the descendants of Britons.  Even those such as high-ranking Indian civil 
servants who had been thoroughly Anglicised were still seen as the recipients of British values 
rather than actually possessing them in the way that British rajas were.  The values that the idea 
of Greater Britain supposedly imputed to the rest of the world were transmitted to Others in a 
patrimonial sense.   
 
While Macmillan, Wilson and Maudling were more circumspect as frontbench politicians, some 
backbenchers thus aimed to distinguish France from an Anglo-Saxon West, discursively linking 
de Gaulle’s veto with British insularity from Europe (in a positive sense) and co-constitutively 
dignifying the Atlantic community as an ontologically secure site for Britain.  Conservative Sir 
Cyril Osborne, for example, said he would prefer Britain as ‘a poor relation of America’ than 
existing ‘on sufferance at the pleasure of General de Gaulle, for I believe there can be neither 
prosperity nor peace for the free world if the English-speaking peoples are permanently 
divided.’72  Although Kerr felt himself ‘a citizen of the Atlantic Community’ given that the US 
‘derive their system of Government from the French political philosophers of the eighteenth 
century’ and ‘her civilisation from Europe’, in general there was a discursive decoupling of 
France and the supposed Gaullist vision of the continent from the West and NATO.73  This 
more exclusive West was prioritised over relations with the rest of Europe and the Atlantic 
Community was linked to those Island Race qualities at which de Gaulle had apparently 
baulked.  Labour’s Patrick Gordon Walker, for example, told the House to ‘raise our eyes from 
Europe’ and seek ‘to create an Atlantic community within which we can get an association with 
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Europe, and then […] find the closest possible relationships with the Community and the rest of 
Europe.’74  For it was the Atlantic community that was ‘outward-looking’ and therefore a better 
‘fit’ with Island Race identity.75  As Sandys put it, ‘the cornerstone of our European policy’ was 
not Europe itself but NATO, presaging a persistent refrain of Thatcher in which there was an 
emergent discursive ordering prioritising NATO over Europe in terms of British security.76 
   
In the immediate aftermath of de Gaulle’s veto, British MPs prioritised both this exclusive 
Western world and their own Commonwealth over relations with the rest of Europe.  This 
stance retained the classic poise of insularity from Europe, universality and presence within a 
metacommunity of Anglo-Saxon values.  In 1960/1 Members had agonised over the 
implications of EC membership for the Commonwealth, whose preferential trading agreements 
would have been threatened by the European common market.  Rejected by Europe, the 
Commonwealth assumed a position of importance in this new discursive configuration as a 
unique body which, like the Western world, preserved universality and the vague, historical 
ideas of a community of values.  A downbeat Macmillan (who tended to favour Atlanticism) 
was pessimistic about the Commonwealth as a proxy for what might have been achieved in the 
EEC.77  Yet others were far more sanguine about the association, condensing it with 
ontologically secure renderings of Island Race identity.  Labour’s John Dugdale, for instance, 
typified this as he catalogued the advantages of the Commonwealth.  His Greater Britain redux 
had scalar advantages which, he said, dwarfed even the Soviet Union; a ‘tremendous amount of 
good will’; the ‘priceless gift of having the same language’; a ‘great similarity in law’; and a 
‘general liking for democracy’.78  His colleague Blackburn described an ‘association of free 
peoples, unique in the history of the world, […] one of the greatest forces for peace in the 
world, and I should hate anything to happen which would reduce the effectiveness of the 
Commonwealth.’79  Strategically, Gordon Walker spoke of the ‘unique bridges between the 
continents’ inherent in the Commonwealth.80  Even the vehemently anti-empire Michael Foot 
announced that EEC accession would have been ‘greatly injurious to the Commonwealth’, 
depriving Britain of influence and independence in foreign policy; he ended his speech by 
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suggesting that the House ‘thank President de Gaulle for doing for us what the British 
Government had not the courage and energy to do for themselves.’81  In the characterisations of 
these Members an ontologically secure subject position for Britain was fixed in membership of 
the Commonwealth as it was discursively linked to Island Race identity and juxtaposed against 
a hostile Europe.  Several years later the demands of increasingly confident Commonwealth 
leaders that Britain deal more robustly with Rhodesian minority rule would prove to be a thorn 
in Prime Minister Wilson’s side; for now, the organisation was part of a satisfactory, discursive 
solution to the problematic situation with Europe, allowing an elucidation of an influential, 
beneficent, outward-looking polity in keeping with established Island Race tropes. 
3.2. Exceptional history and a glorious future outside Europe 
As I argued in chapter 1, Island Race identity is predicated on glorious readings of its own 
exceptional geo-history.  Accordingly, in the 1963 debates, Britain’s eternal geopolitics was 
fixed in an ontologically secure subject position in which it would carry the country forward to 
a prosperous future in spite of the recent setback.  These renderings situated Britain’s past as a 
continuing, paternal influence on current and future foreign policy success.  Wilson, for 
example, recalled how membership of the EEC had been represented during the discussions: ‘if 
we did not achieve such an expansion the only choice was between being a backwater inside 
Europe or a backwater outside Europe’.  But, he continued, ‘our future lies now clearly in our 
own hands, on our sense of purpose, of dynamism, of self-discipline’; Britain just had to 
reassert ‘our national strength and our national independence’ and recover its ‘lost dynamic’.82  
Five years later when announcing, as Prime Minister, the withdrawal of British troops from East 
of Suez, he was wont to make a similar point in a speech at the Guildhall: ‘Britain has also 
achieved her independence.’83  Similarly, Walker-Smith recalled his provocative 1961 speech 
and reminded Members that Britain’s position as a small island with a ‘special position’ and a 
predilection for and natural advantages in pursuing competitive, liberal trade remained 
unchanged.84  He concluded by explaining: 
‘The mission of the British people is not ended in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  Britain still stands at the heart and centre of the 
Commonwealth, with all its healthy diversity and unconscripted unity.  
There is a mission still, to give leadership without dictation and 
guidance without coercion.’85 
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Ranged against a supposedly hostile Europe, the established Island Race identity concept of 
Britain as an exceptional island standing alone (Mathew urged Britain to recapture the spirit of 
1940) was perhaps bound to come to the fore once more.86  Britain, as Blackburn reminded the 
House, had ‘either liberated or defeated’ most of the countries now in the EEC in World War 
Two and the process of ‘going with a begging bowl’ to them had been humiliating.87  ‘The 
world is our oyster’, he continued, discursively linking Britain’s past as the geopolitical saviour 
of Europe to a future of universalism.88  Turton too epitomised this in arguing how Britain’s 
interdependence was ‘not across the Channel, not across the Atlantic Ocean, but throughout the 
world’ where it had a decisive contribution to make ‘towards the peace of the world.’89  The 
discursive contours which in many ways Macmillan had established in his opening remarks (‘if 
the French Government object to us as an island, it is also as an island that we bring this rich 
heritage to the world’) became thoroughly infused with this coupling of Britain’s islandness 
with its universal heritage (which would endure) and its particular genius.90  Conservative John 
Scott, Earl of Dalkeith told the House: ‘the people of our tiny island have made a tremendous 
impact on the world solely because of their enormous strength of character, and it is on that 
character that our ability to thrive in the future depends’; and even Labour critics such as 
Shadow Chancellor James Callaghan would argue that Britain had ‘a great future as a nation’.91   
 
The poise was maintained in which insularity from Europe was balanced with a universal aspect 
on the rest of the world.  The prospects for integration with the rest of the continent looked 
bleak at least, as Kerr pointed, as long as de Gaulle lived, yet the established tropes of Island 
Race identity were in rude health and, moreover, had been thoroughly discursively linked to this 
rebuff by Europe.92  Far from precipitating a crisis in British foreign policy identity in which the 
very raison d’état of Britain was called into question and re-examined, in the Commons at least, 
the full panoply of the exceptional Island Race was paraded in regalia in a discursive snub to the 
French President.  In a country so conscious of its own history, with a parliament so self-
referential and in the habit of revering its own pageant of legendary figures, the peculiar force of 
episodes like this were bound to resonate forwards, giving further discursive force to the Island 
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Race identity tropes which informed and ontologically securitised ensuing and current debates 
on Britain and Europe.93  
4. Conclusion 
In spite of the jeremiads and the felicitations prophesying, respectively, the end of Britain’s 
engagement with Europe and the continuation of the Island Race as a global player freed from 
continental entanglements, negotiations over Britain’s accession to what was soon to become 
the European Communities (EC) were re-opened in 1967.94  On the 8th of May Labour Prime 
Minister Wilson asked the Commons for approval, Shadow Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-
Home urged the Conservative Party to support the government and the motion was carried.  The 
addresses of both men mobilised themes which, by now, were familiar in debates about Britain 
and Europe.95  The outward-looking Island Race would ensure that Europe turned its face to the 
world; Britain in Europe would further cement the solidarity of the West against Communism; 
by joining the EC Britain would be able to ensure that the Balance of Power was maintained.  
To detractors, the obverse arguments were true: the EC would constitute a new insularity, 
sundering Britain’s Commonwealth ties; Britain would move further away from the US, 
dividing the English-speaking world when it should have been uniting against Moscow; 
ensuring the continental Balance of Power was best achieved by maintaining an ‘offshore’ 
poise.  Britain, it was clear, would be joining Europe as the Island Race.  That it did so in 1973 
was by no means the end of the matter and the debate continues, as it will after the imminent 
referendum, no matter what the result.   
 
The significance of the period analysed in this chapter is not just how it demonstrates that the 
sometimes tortuous contemporary relations between Britain and the rest of the Europe have a 
history of at least five decades.  What the three debates of 1960-3 show are how and why the 
continued wrangling over Britain’s European stance is historically possible.  The discursive 
geopolitical tropes which constitute the Island Race are so sedimented that it is hard for debates, 
even fifty five years after Lloyd’s announcement, to escape them; and such are the social-
discursive practices of ontological security-seeking within a framework of malleable identity 
concepts that those with opposing views on Britain’s membership of the EU can invoke the very 
same Island Race tropes to fix Britain in subject positions that apparently reflect its national 
interest.  The point is: the continued debates about Britain and Europe are not debates about 
Britain’s identity—for the Island Race has, as we are seeing, long been of particular 
importance—they are the prolonged, emergent social practices of Members engaging in 
                                                          
93 Ovchinnikov (1981), p. 210. 
94 The so-called ‘Merger Treaty’ which united the EEC, the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) had been signed in 1965 but would not come into force until July 1967. 
95 Wilson: HC Deb 08 May 1967, vol. 746, col. 1061-97; Douglas-Home: ibid., col. 1097-1108. 
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ontological security-seeking by reiterating and adapting already established identity concepts in 
novel contexts which themselves are mediated through the particular ways of framing the world 
and its political narratives via the identity tropes themselves.  Island Race identity tropes were 
co-constitutively fitted to both of the contexts examined in this chapter and offered little clear 
policy direction in 1960/1 and only appeared to do so in 1963 when the EEC had been closed 
off to Britain.  The particularities of the insularity/universality nexus might have been forged in 
imperial times but they came to constitute the existential geopolitics of British itself and all 
debates about Europe tend to revolve around the resolution of this conundrum of how Britain 
can play a part in European affairs and retain a global posture, if at all. 
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chapter 5 
From the Heartlands of Eurasia to the South Atlantic: Thatcher 
and the reinvigoration of the Island Race 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the ways in which Island Race identity was mobilised in 
parliamentary debates around two events in the early years of Margaret Thatcher’s time as 
Conservative Prime Minister: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and 
Argentina’s of the Falkland Islands in April 1982.  It will be argued that the discourse around 
these occurrences constituted specific renderings of British history which dignified established 
Island Race identity tropes and fixed Britain in ontologically secure subject positions relative to 
these events.  The two events themselves involved Britain in quite distinct ways, yet the same 
tropes of Island Race identity were mobilised in enframing them.   
 
The chapter begins by contextualising the early years of Thatcher’s premiership and its foreign 
policy, presents the particular renditions of twentieth century history advanced by her 
government and how they co-constituted ontologically secure subject positions for Britain in 
terms of its established Island Race identity.  I then employ these conceptualisations to analyse 
the parliamentary reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, paying particular attention to 
how the event was fixed around Island Race identity tropes and renascent Cold War political 
discourse via the co-constitutive linking of the two.  It will be shown how the context of the 
Cold War and antipathy towards the Soviet Union ‘fitted’ with these tropes in a fashion more 
secure than any mediative approaches.  The Argentine invasion of the Falklands will then be 
subject to the same scrutiny, demonstrating how the parliamentary debates about Britain’s 
response reified the ‘traditions’ of Island Race identity, particularly insularity, universality and 
the global importance of British values.  Rather than simply imperial revanchism or nostalgia, 
the reaction in parliament will be shown to be an instance of social discursive practice in which 
a novel and unexpected event was narrated according to established identity tropes, thereby 
fixing Britain in a familiar subject position that rendered the government’s favoured response a 
fait accompli.    
1.1. Historical erasure and national identity: contextualising the Conservative 
government of 1979 
With the issue of Britain in the EC ‘settled’ by the affirmative result of the 1975 membership 
referendum and the British Empire all but jettisoned, it might be said that Britain’s role had 
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shrunk to that of a middle-sized, regional Power by 1979.1  While it would be misleading to 
claim that Thatcher’s Conservatives wished to reconstitute Britain as an imperial Great Power, 
analysis of the debates demonstrates how a particular rendering of history, thoroughly reliant on 
the mobilisation of imperial-era Island Race identity tropes, constituted the narrations of the two 
events. 
 
This history broadly dignified the Second British Empire (that is, after American independence) 
up to the Suez Crisis.  The subsequent period was characterised by Thatcher in a 1979 speech to 
the Foreign Policy Association in New York as one of ‘introspection’ and ‘paralysis’; ‘not […] 
a happy period for the western democracies domestically or internationally.’2  It was the apogee 
of what she later termed the ‘Suez syndrome’, in the thrall of which her predecessors ‘went 
from believing that Britain could do anything to an almost neurotic belief that Britain could do 
nothing.’3  The ‘recovery of our country’ to which the Conservatives committed themselves in 
their 1979 general election manifesto was predicated on—in the manner of Wæver’s argument 
about the EU looking to escape its own past—the seeking of ontological security as against this 
period since 1956 through the mobilisation of Island Race identity tropes.4  While the 
governments of that time (especially from the latter half of Wilson’s sixties premiership and 
through the seventies administrations of Heath, Wilson and Callaghan) all, to some degree, 
situated Britain’s global relevance in terms of its membership of the EC, the Thatcherite 
‘revival’ was based upon something different.  Although she presided over a party more at ease 
with itself over Europe than Labour was at the time and had not yet slipped into the febrile 
relationship with Brussels that characterised her latter days in office, Thatcher’s renderings of 
British identity in the past, present and future relied more upon specifically Island Race identity 
tropes than her predecessors.5  Brought to the fore by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 and Argentina’s of the Falkland Islands in 1982, these narratives were co-constituted by 
the discursive interactions of the contexts themselves, a reading of British historical greatness 
terminated in 1956 and the reification of the Island Race tropes of insularity, universality, the 
importance of NATO as the bedrock of a ‘special’ relationship with particularly the US and the 
concomitant global relevance of British values. 
 
Thatcher was explicit that her vision of Britain’s national rejuvenation was a return to the status 
quo ante, remarking in the New York speech: 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Callaghan: HC Deb 28 June 1973, vol. 858, col. 1743; HC Deb 25 July 1979, vol. 971, 
col. 631; Douglas-Home: HC Deb 19 March 1974, vol. 870, col. 885; Lord Carrington (Conservative, 
Foreign Secretary: 1979-82): HL Deb 22 May 1979, vol. 400, col. 235; Thatcher (1995), p. 91. 
2 Thatcher (1979). 
3 Thatcher (1995), p. 91. 
4 Conservative Party (1979); Wæver (1996), pp. 121-5, 128. 
5 Fay (1996), pp. 191-2. 
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‘The cynics among you will say that none of this is new.  Quite right.  
It isn't.’6 
Born in 1925, she identified herself as someone of the Second World War generation, with a 
special expertise from having lived through Britain’s ‘finest hour’ and its last years of imperial 
greatness.7  Indeed when describing her meeting with an ageing Sir Robert Menzies, former 
Prime Minister of Australia, she explained: ‘I was reminded not for the last time that the 
political generation that had come to maturity when the British Empire was still a world power 
retained a global perspective that its more parochial successors lacked.’8  Yet for all this, 
Thatcher and the foreign policy of the time represent something of a conundrum.  Her 
description of her own ‘global perspective’, her enthusiasm for the unbounded Second Cold 
War and her later declamations of the EC as representing a new ‘insularity’ must be weighed 
against the characterisations of others that she ‘knew little and cared less’ for international 
affairs and pursued policy ‘shaped less by longer-term aims than by a series of day-to-day 
decisions taken with little reference to a larger framework.’9   
 
What many agree on, however, is the centrality of the British ‘national myth’ to Thatcher’s 
politics.10  Bearing this in mind, what will be established in this chapter is the importance of 
Island Race identity to this myth by analysing the representations of and responses to two 
foreign policy events in her first government.  Thatcher’s charismatic and authoritarian style, 
her popularity within her party (although this was by no means unanimous), the perceived 
weakness of Labour under Callaghan (-1980) and then Michael Foot (1980-3) and the 
comfortable-to-large parliamentary majorities she commanded have all contributed to her place 
at the centre of studies of foreign policy at the time; yet attention needs to be paid also to the 
discursive practice of the parliaments in which she sat.11  Before broadening the analysis to take 
in the Commons debates on the invasions, in the ensuing section I will introduce and 
contextualize some of Thatcher’s early rhetoric concerning the Soviet Union, taking it to be in 
some ways indicative of British (or at least Conservative) foreign policy thought rather than 
                                                          
6 Thatcher (1979). 
7 Gowland et al (2010), p. 105. 
8 Thatcher (1995), p. 388. 
9 Sharp (1997), p. 28; Cradock (1997), p. 36. 
10 See, for example, Jeremy Seabrook and Kevin Blackwell’s contemporaneous piece in the Guardian, 
Patrick Wright’s, Kevin Foster’s and Anthony Barnett’s emphases on ‘mythical history’ in Thatcher’s 
governments (the latter two of which focus on the Falklands Conflict) and Oliver Daddow’s interpretivist 
contextualisation of Thatcher as part of a British ‘outsider tradition’ regarding Europe which draws on 
national, mythic elements (Seabrook & Blackwell (1982); Wright (1985), pp. 1-27, 176; Foster (1997), pp. 
235-8; Barnett (2012); Daddow (2015b), pp. 78-84).  Also: Young (1989), pp. 168-9; Sharp (1997), pp. 
171-2; Hadfield-Amkhan (2010), pp. 135-64. 
11 Anthony King and Helen Baxendale, for example, both focus on Thatcher’s personality in their studies 
(King (2002); Baxendale (2015)). 
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casting her as a completely singular figure.  This places Thatcher’s and the general 
contemporary political discourse in a constitutive relationship with one another.    
2. The Island Race and the British parliamentary response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan 
2.1. The last Cold Warrior: Thatcher and the Soviet Union 
Thatcher was openly and strongly anti-communist.  She had been leader of the Conservative 
Party for less than a year when she addressed Kensington Town Hall in 1976 to point out the 
dangers of the ‘patient, far-sighted men’ of the Politburo who were ‘rapidly making their 
country the foremost naval and military power in the world’: 
‘A huge, largely land-locked country like Russia does not need to 
build the most powerful navy in the world just to guard its own 
frontiers.  No.  The Russians are bent on world dominance, and they 
are rapidly acquiring the means to become the most powerful imperial 
nation the world has seen.’12 
Typical though this rendering of the Soviet threat is it must be seen in its immediate context: the 
long period of détente in which the First and Second Worlds had agreed to arms limitation and a 
general easing of tensions.  Contemporaneous to this, David Owen’s time as Labour’s last 
Foreign Secretary under Callaghan was marked by his entreaties that the world’s problems 
(especially in the Third World) not be seen purely through the lens of East-West relations and 
dealt with only according to that basis.13  Thatcher, as we will see, was dubious about détente, 
envisioning a permanent threat from and insurmountable differences with Russia, regardless of 
the latest treaty or summit.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, occurring early in her 
premiership, confirmed her views of Moscow and the paramount struggles of international 
politics.  In contrast to some of the rather benign remarks of her first Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Carrington, Thatcher had already characterised the 1980s as ‘the dangerous decade’ and, 
judging from their reactions, many MPs seemed to have similar views.14  Ostensibly mounted to 
                                                          
12 Thatcher (1995), pp. 361, 361, 361-2. 
13 See, for example, Owen: HC Deb 18 January 1978, vol. 942, col. 455-6; ibid., col. 459; HC Deb 02 
February 1978, vol. 943, col. 713; HC Deb 22 March 1978, vol. 946, col. 1492; HC Deb 07 June 1978, vol. 
951, col. 217; HC Deb 28 June 1978, vol. 952, col. 1375; Callaghan: HC Deb 06 June 1978, vol. 951, col. 
24. 
14 Thatcher (1979).  In his first address to the Lords as Foreign Secretary, Carrington explained: ‘The 
foreign policy of a medium-sized industrial country like Britain has a simple enough objective.  It is to 
influence the international environment so that our people can prosper in peace and security.  The 
scope for pursuing this objective is limited by the constraints of geography, by economic circumstances, 
by the state of military technology, by our national traditions, by our social and political system and, 
indeed, by the objectives and ambitions of others.  These constraints may vary slowly with the passing 
of time.  It is very rare that they can rapidly be altered.  The scope for fundamental choice is limited, and 
it is hardly surprising that successive British Governments have, broadly speaking, pursued similar 
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prop up a weak puppet in Kabul, the invasion itself was nonetheless unexpected in terms of the 
recent context; however, in longer terms it was discursively familiar for British foreign policy-
makers weaned on Cold War politics as well as the inherited, geopolitical traditions of Island 
Race identity concepts which pitted the Russian ‘bear’ as the implacable enemy of maritime 
Britain. 
 
Afghanistan had been constituted in British imperial discourse as a site of great significance.  
This was due in no small part to the ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia, the nineteenth century 
geopolitical rivalry between Britain and the Russian Empire.15  This apparent struggle for the 
soft, northern underbelly of India was productive of as much existential, strategic paranoia as 
the Cold War would be and, moreover, profoundly influenced Mackinder’s renderings of the 
global antipathy between Land and Sea power.16  India was the landward extension of Britain’s 
maritime empire in Asia; Afghanistan the buffer between it and the rapacious Tsarist realm.  
The country, as part of the Heartland of Eurasia, was a cockpit of global imperium, for ‘he who 
rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: who rules the World-Island commands the 
World.’17  Therefore, Afghanistan was not just strategically significant in and of itself; it stood 
as a marker of potential Russian (and land-based) dominance whose very status and situation 
was measured according to actual, potential or imagined Russian gains.  Furthermore it should 
be noted how Mackinder’s theories were updated for a specifically American audience in the 
1940s by Nicholas Spykman whose work also highlighted the significance of Afghanistan and 
its region and became influential in the containment theories of the early Cold War.18 
 
Given how thoroughly intertwined established Island Race tropes and Cold War politics were 
when it came to Central Asia it is not surprising that, in debating the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, a specific set of discourses co-constituted both.  In the first place, the Soviet Union 
was represented as acting in the manner of a typical Land Power.  These trans-historical 
renderings hinged not on repudiations of Marxism (of which Thatcher and many Members 
were, nonetheless, scornful) but longer-established concepts which cast maritime Britain and 
land-based Russia as geopolitically antithetical to one another.  Secondly, the strategic siting of 
Afghanistan itself co-constituted similar existential geopolitics to those advanced during the 
Suez Crisis in which an illiberal Power was advancing on the lifelines of British and Western 
prosperity, poised to sever the arteries through which Middle Eastern oil flowed.  The spatiality 
                                                                                                                                                                          
policies abroad’ (HL Deb 22 May 1979, vol. 400, col. 235).  He resigned several days after the Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands in 1982. 
15 For general overviews of the Great Game, see Hopkirk (1990); Meyer & Brysac (1999). 
16 Mackinder (1904b). 
17 Mackinder (1919), p. 155. 
18 Spykman (1942); (1944).  For a comprehensive overview of American Cold War containment, see 
Gaddis (2005). 
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of this was typical Island Race, based on Lines of Communication and the actual and desired 
reach of British and Western power.  Important corollaries to this were inherent in the 
depictions of a general decline in Western strategy and the collective sense of British expertise 
on the greater Middle East.  Thus in the debate MPs were experts in the geopolitics of the region 
and Soviet intentions and a threat was ranged against the Western community as a whole but 
based upon Island Race scripting of a world of maritime flows potentially at the mercy of Land 
Power.  The affirmative force of these constitutions reified the Island Race and ensured an 
ontologically-secure relevance for Britain in the scenario of the invasion. 
 
The British response has received relatively little scholarly attention, understandable perhaps 
given that it was confined to diplomacy, economics and—Thatcher’s favoured riposte—the 
eventually scuppered boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.19  Although worrying for Western 
Powers, it hardly provoked trauma on the scale of the Cuban Crisis of 1962, for example.  In 
any case, analyses of Thatcher’s foreign policy tend to be eclipsed by her later dealings with 
Argentina and Brussels.  While domestic problems blunted full British participation in the 
financial penalties that the US wanted to impose on the Soviet Union, Thatcher was vigorous in 
instituting diplomatic efforts, especially in recruiting the other EC countries to condemn the 
invasion.20  Hence scholars tend to be divided between those, like John Baylis, who view the 
British response as ‘strong’ and, like Michael Smith, ‘distinctly muted’.21  Most accounts place 
the invasion in the larger context of the nascent ‘Second Cold War’.22  Apart from Daniel 
Lahey’s reflections on how Thatcher saw the invasion as a crisis of Western identity and the 
depictions of the Prime Minister as a Cold Warrior par excellence there has been little sustained 
attention given to its place in a larger scale, discursive genealogy of British identity.23 
2.2. Beyond the Cold War: Land and Sea, the eternal struggle 
The discursive condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan in the Commons on 24 and 28 
January 1980 was predicated upon depictions of the Soviet Union as a typical Land Power.  The 
reiterations of this particular Island Race vintage have already been established in previous 
chapters, particularly that concerning the signing of NATO and the Suez Crisis.  These 
renderings are significant for the constitution of Island Race tropes because, through the process 
                                                          
19 Gabriella Grasselli’s is the most comprehensive overview (Grasselli (1996)). 
20 Dimitrakis (2012), p. 520; Grasselli (1996), pp. 6, 190, 195; Lahey (2013), p.25; Thatcher (1993), p. 88. 
21 Baylis (1984), p. 181; Smith (1988), p. 15.  Sir Ian Gilmour perhaps typified the reserved British 
attitude which could lead to the ‘muted’ characterisation when he announced the invasion to the 
Commons on 24 January 1980.  He described it as ‘a great cataclysmic, or almost cataclysmic, event’ (HC 
Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 667). 
22 See, for example, Carrington’s memoirs (Carington (1988), pp. 327-47).  For overviews of the Second 
Cold War, see Dalby’s critical geopolitical account and Fred Halliday’s contemporary history (Dalby 
(1990); Halliday (1986)).  
23 Lahey (2013), p. 26. 
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of differentiation, the identity of Britain in alterity is assured and, moreover, given contextual 
relevance.24  Furthermore, the predication of this Othering of the Soviet Union on an apparent 
struggle between Land and Sea Powers fixes Britain in an ontologically secure subject position 
specifically congruent with its established Island Race identity and connotes geopolitical 
relevance in the context. 
 
The process of Othering didn’t draw primarily on references to the ideological differences 
between Britain (or the West) and the Soviet Union; the defeat of Marxism was, in any case, 
‘inevitable’ according to Thatcher and, as Heath put it, ‘we are dealing with the Soviet Union 
not because it is a Marxist country’.25  Instead the Soviet actions were depicted according to the 
time-honoured classifications distinguishing Land Powers from Sea Powers.  Firstly this 
involved representations of the Soviet Union as a rapacious land-grabber, in contrast to the 
Western Powers with their respect for non-aligned countries.  Sir Ian Gilmour, chief Commons 
spokesperson for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs with Carrington in the Lords, described it 
as ‘the Soviet drive to gain wider influence wherever possible, by propaganda, by subversion, 
and, where necessary, by force.’26  Callaghan said the invasion had ‘demonstrated to the world 
that the Soviet Union will move swiftly, ruthlessly and powerfully when it makes up its mind 
that its interests require it.’27  A number of Members unambiguously termed this colonialism or 
imperialism, no doubt cognizant of the historical reiterations from Moscow that its mission was 
the emancipation of oppressed peoples from the Western capitalist yoke.28  Eden, who had 
passed away three years previously, would have been heartened by these characterisations.29 
 
The typical Land Power strategy according to Island Race identity—and what made it a 
particular locus of fear—was the limitless, tentacular spread of its expansion.  ‘One is bound to 
ask oneself where the Russian drive is to stop’, Gilmour said and, throughout the debates, 
Members busied themselves with prophesying where the next Soviet advancement would take 
place.30  Heath, for example, worried about everywhere from China and Japan to Singapore and 
Indonesia, the Indian Ocean, Yugoslavia and the Mediterranean; and Conservative Kenneth 
Warren even contended that  
                                                          
24 Butler (1992), p. 12. 
25 HC Deb 28 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 945; ibid., col. 960.  See also Thatcher (1979). 
26 HC Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 655. 
27 HC Deb 28 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 945. 
28 Callaghan: ibid., col. 945; ibid., col. 947-8; Heffer: ibid., col. 996; Julian Amery (Conservative): ibid., col. 
1009; ibid., col. 1011; ibid., col. 1013; John Biggs-Davison (Conservative): ibid., col. 1038; ibid., col. 1040; 
David Ginsburg (Labour): ibid., col. 1051; Viscount Cranborne (Conservative): ibid., col. 1053-5.   
29 Eden (1960), p. 392. 
30 HC Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 655. 
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‘Russia could capture the prize of Western Europe—this country—by 
swift attack overnight.  That is no longer a theory; it is a possibility.’31 
The point was—and this was repeated throughout the debates—that Moscow was pursuing ‘a 
global strategy’, as Labour’s Eric Heffer argued.32  The Commons collectively knew this 
because of the relevance with which Afghanistan had long been invested in Island Race 
discourse.  It was, as Gilmour—and Carrington in the Lords—put it, the ‘strategic salient into 
the region’.33  Thatcher said simply that ‘the implications of their presence in Afghanistan are 
clear.’34  References were made in the debates to the Soviet Union acting ‘as a continental 
Power in the traditional way’; ‘doing what they have always done in that part of the world’; its 
‘designs on a warm water port’; and ‘her geopolitical situation, partly in Europe and partly in 
Asia, [which] leads her into policies which can scarcely be described as defensive.’35  This 
classic geopolitical reasoning secured Britain’s Island Race identity through its differentiation 
with Russian spatial politics and co-constitutively secured its relevance in the Cold War context.   
2.3. The expertise of the Island Race: Western strategy and British identity 
That the Soviet threat was narrated as global was by now, of course, an established part of Cold 
War politics but the invasion invited a sustained Commons critique of Western strategy in the 
face of what Heath described as the Soviet Union’s ‘well-defined strategy’.36  However, if the 
West as a whole had failed to anticipate aggressive Russian geopolitics, this was in spite of 
British expertise, a view epitomised by Conservative John Biggs-Davison when he said that the 
Soviets 
‘could be forgiven for having supposed that the West had conceded 
what for a century Britain in India had denied to Russia in Asia.  Then 
[US] President Carter found Kabul and Kandahar on the map and 
began to say what had long been said about Soviet imperialism by 
[…] the Prime Minister.’37 
Afghanistan was, as Conservative Julian Amery pithily put it, the ‘Clapham Junction […] of 
Southern Asia’: ‘very few people go to Clapham for fun, but every day thousands go there on 
their way to better places’.  In other words, it was ‘the gateway to the subcontinent of India and 
                                                          
31 Heath: HC Deb 28 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 959-62; Warren: ibid., col. 1024; See also Thatcher: ibid., 
col. 944; Callaghan: ibid., col. 946; Giles Radice (Labour): ibid., col. 1064. 
32 Ibid., col. 996.  See also, Callaghan: ibid., col. 954; John Browne (Conservative): ibid., col. 1047.  
33 HC Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 655; HL Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 404, col. 530. 
34 HC Deb 28 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 938. 
35 Callaghan: ibid., col. 954; Heffer: ibid., col. 996; Radice: ibid., col. 1064 (see also Warren: ibid., col. 
1024); Ginsburg: ibid., col. 1051. 
36 Ibid., col. 959.  Russell Johnston (Leader of the Scottish Liberal Party): ‘The crux of the East-West 
problem is simply that the East knows what it wants and the West does not’ (ibid., col. 1042).  See also 
Browne: ibid., col. 1046-7. 
37 Ibid., col. 1038. 
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the Persian Gulf’, something, Amery pointed out, ‘we should know, as we fought three wars to 
prevent the Russians getting control of it.’38 
 
The invasion, as Suez had been, was represented as a chance to finally get the US as well as 
NATO and European allies interested in regions which only Britain had previously recognised 
as strategically vital.  Thusly a discursive subject position was constructed for Britain in which, 
with its vast knowledge from its comprehensive and benevolent imperium, it understood the 
global strategy that the West was lacking, not least in the Indian Ocean which was now 
apparently threatened and only, according to Heath, truly recognised by maritime Britain.39  For 
a number of Members (mostly, it must be said, Conservatives) this expertise was embodied in 
Thatcher herself who ‘alone of all the Western leaders has been consistent in her analysis of the 
Russian threat.’40  Moreover, the inherited links of the cosmopolitan, outward-looking Island 
Race allowed it to have not only knowledge of the Greater Middle East but also sited Britain—
redolent of the 1960-3 Europe debates—as a pivotal, geopolitical bridge whose Island Race 
status connoted utility in the resolution of the situation.  
   
Illustrative of this, Callaghan spoke of using Britain’s experiences with India and Pakistan 
(‘longer and richer than that of anyone else; many people from the sub-continent who live in 
Britain today have a warmth and feeling for this country and the country of their origin’) and 
how the government might take a lead in promoting growth in the Third World generally; Heath 
contrasted British (and his own) knowledge of the Muslim world with a general Western 
ignorance; Conservative Peter Tapsell and Labour’s Giles Radice did the same regarding 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; Frank Hooley of Labour argued for utilising the unique 
British links with Europe and the Commonwealth; and Amery suggested that Britain—
historically ‘the architect of the alliances that maintained some freedom in Europe’—now 
needed to ‘mobilise the United States, Europe, China, Japan and as many countries of the Third 
world as will join us.’41 
 
British foreign policy-makers, according to their own articulations of expertise and global 
linkages, knew the significance of the invasion.  Gilmour argued that it was ‘an event of the 
widest significance’ and Thatcher ‘a symbol and a warning.’42  Their colleague Patrick Cormack 
                                                          
38 Ibid., col. 1009. 
39 Ibid., col. 969.  See also Amery: ibid., col. 1011; Warren: ibid., col. 1024-5; Peter Shore (Labour, 
Shadow Foreign Secretary): ibid., col. 1071. 
40 Cranborne: ibid., col. 1055.  See also Amery: ibid., col. 1014; Michael Brotherton (Conservative): ibid., 
col. 1033; Patrick Cormack (Conservative): ibid., col. 1059. 
41 Callaghan: ibid., col. 951; ibid., col. 957; Heath: ibid., col. 966; Tapsell: ibid., col. 1000; Radice: ibid., col. 
1063; Hooley: ibid., col. 1059; Amery: ibid., col. 1014. 
42 HC Deb 24 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 655; HC Deb 28 January 1980, vol. 977, col. 935. 
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warned of ‘a policy designed to command the strategic routes of the world and to leave the 
Soviet Union poised to command the great producers of raw materials.’43  The Lines of 
Communication which had so preoccupied imperial foreign policy-makers were now flowing 
with oil, an arrangement that contributed to their continued strategic relevance in the discourse 
of these debates.  Thatcher explained that oil was  
‘the life blood of Western industrial societies.  The Straits of Hormuz 
are the artery through which it flows.  If that flow were abruptly 
stopped in the years immediately ahead there would be real doubt 
whether our societies could survive in their present form.’44 
Redolent of the Suez Crisis in chapter 3, the Middle East retained its position of critical 
importance as the arbiter of the exclusive Western way of life which had gradually become 
incorporated into British identity and was thus narrated according to its ontologically secure 
importance. 
2.4. British history and national identity: imperial past, Island Race present 
The historical erasure which comprised the Thatcherite revolution is directly relevant for this 
genealogy of British identity in foreign policy.  Explicitly and implicitly, all governments select 
which segments of national history will discursively live on and which will be subject to erasure 
or serve as warnings for current practice; in this sense Thatcher’s were not unique.45  But, as I 
have already argued, compared with the governments of the 1970s in particular, Thatcher’s 
represent a rupture.  Explicitly committed to restoring national greatness, the identity of Britain 
in this ‘dangerous’ period was discursively linked to its past as a Power of great import in order 
to secure its relevance.   
 
To reiterate: this representation of history began with the Second British Empire and ended 
around the time of the Suez Crisis and the subsequent decolonisations; the period up to May 
1979 characterised by inertia.  In this historical rendering and its aspired future projection, 
greatness and relevance would not be assured only by such narrow foci as the EC but the 
recrudescence of the Cold War tropes which complemented and dignified Island Race identity.  
Britain in Cold War politics was shoulder-to-shoulder with its Anglo-Saxon kith and kin (and 
suitable, ‘civilised’ European nations), a pivotal power with great historical expertise on crucial 
global issues beyond Europe: Africa, the Middle East and strategic Lines of Communication.  
Indeed Labour’s Greville Janner remarked: ‘I cannot help feeling that some […] from the 
Government Benches seemed rather glad that the Cold War was back’ and Gilmour argued: ‘it 
may well be that the West now needs a new strategy of the sort that Mr. George Kennan 
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evolved some 30 years ago.’46  Hence détente was, to Thatcher and others, a regrettable error 
and the analogies drawn in the House in January 1980 were with the appeasement of the 
1930s—shifted in these narratives from a temporary error into something that Britain (under 
Churchill’s wise statesmanship) had utilised as a salutary lesson for national triumph and 
renewal—and expertise gleaned from the Great Game.47   
 
These constituted the main historical references which partly comprised Conservative discourse 
in particular.48  Their dominance is illustrated by an exchange between Labour’s Clive Soley 
and the Conservative Warren.  Soley described the ‘constant fear of Russia’ that Britain had had 
through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as ‘irrational’ and the allusions to 
appeasement as inappropriate.49  Warren spoke next and described how he had been ‘frightened’ 
by the Labour Member’s speech.  The Opposition benches, he said, were ‘so capable of seeing 
every side of the argument that I fear they will still be in the House debating when the Russians 
are at the gates of Westminster.50  He went on to outline the strategic importance of Afghanistan 
and the enduring Russian search for warm water ports with reference to a secret Trotsky 
memorandum of 1919.51 
2.5. Labour opposition and dominant discourses 
Although Labour leader Callaghan’s views were largely congruent with the Prime Minister’s, 
there was a persistent tone to the counter-arguments from his benches.52  In general, they tended 
to depict the renderings of Russia’s eternal geopolitical malevolence as hysterical and inaccurate 
and hinged not on Britain’s imperial past but highlighted Western hypocrisy in standing up for 
Afghans while simultaneously ignoring a multitude of other oppressed peoples from Cyprus and 
Chile to Cambodia and Vietnam.53  Heffer was illustrative of this.  Although more robust in his 
condemnation of the invasion and less equivocal in calling for a response than some others from 
Labour, he intervened during Heath’s speech to ask whether the British outcry was based on 
human rights or strategic interests.54  The former Prime Minister failed to deal directly with the 
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point but the paramountcy of strategy was made clear throughout his address.  While Ernie Ross 
decried Thatcher’s creation of ‘an emotional atmosphere akin to a war-time psychology’ and 
James Lamond remarked that he did not believe Britain had any ‘strategic interest’ in 
Afghanistan, the dominant representations of British international interests and co-constitutive 
identity were ranged against them.55  Stanchioned by established Island Race concepts and the 
Cold War context (which had come to partly constitute the identity itself), the vitality of the 
Greater Middle East for the Western world—which, it must be said, Labour also firmly 
positioned Britain in—was thoroughly sedimented as part of ontologically secure British 
identity.  It provided the dreaded telos of the debate: Island Race reasoning cast the Soviet 
Union as a typical Land Power that would seek to expand in every direction and whose global 
strategy fixed it upon severing the Lines of Communication of the ‘free world’ (that existed in 
the image of Britain’s maritime empire); thus it would be led inexorably towards the oil fields 
of the Middle East from where it would place the Western/British way of life in mortal danger.   
 
Redolent of the Suez Crisis debates, it was said that hostile control of the Persian Gulf would 
directly affect British livelihoods and mobilised vivid renderings of the region, such as ‘our 
heart of oil’ and ‘the vital treasury on which the industry of Western Europe, the United States 
and Japan depends; if it were denied to us, we would practically be driven to surrender’.56  
Furthermore, Thatcher and her supporters unambiguously represented Britain as part of the 
democratic Western community; a depiction that was certainly undisputed by at least the Labour 
Front Bench, as Callaghan’s and Shadow Foreign Secretary Peter Shore’s remarks reveal.57  To 
this end, the invasion was ‘an affront’ to and ‘an assault on the vital interests of the West as a 
whole’.58  It was ‘absolutely necessary and vital that the unity of the West is retained’ and that 
‘NATO and Europe [not] become divided into two parts.’59  Although never predicated 
exclusively on Marxism contra democracy, the discourse was nonetheless underlined by this 
essential opposition, with the reification and ontological security of British (and Western) 
democracy partially depending upon linkages between the invasion and Soviet autocracy, 
especially the recent treatment of dissident Professor Andrei Sakharov.60  The resulting co-
constitution confirmed the solidarity of the Western world—itself constituted in the image of 
Anglo-Saxon, Atlantic, Island Race Britain (see chapter 3)—its fundamental opposition to the 
Soviet Union and an ontologically secure and contextually relevant British identity.  The British 
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subject positions fixed by the Conservatives—not least Thatcher, who drew explicitly on this 
geopolitical reasoning—were simply more established than those of Labour.61  This was a 
political configuration that would be repeated when the House debated the Argentinian invasion 
of the Falklands, to which we will now turn.   
3. An Island Race like us: the Falklands and British identity 
3.1. The Falklands Conflict, British history, identity and role-playing 
Several years further into Thatcher’s ‘dangerous decade’, Argentinian forces invaded and 
occupied the Falkland Islands, a small, isolated British dependency in the South Atlantic, thus 
making good their claim of sovereignty over what they call the Malvinas.62  Immediately 
condemned by parliament and in the media, a naval taskforce was despatched to retake the 
islands, which it did, nearly ten weeks after the Argentine invasion of April 2 1982.  The 
sustained Commons debates over the invasion itself and the response constituted a further and 
significant renascence of Island Race identity tropes.  In general terms, the novel context of the 
Argentine invasion and occupation and the journey of the taskforce were co-constitutive with a 
significant recrudescence of established Island Race identity concepts, particularly insularity 
and the universality of British values.  In contrast to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Britain 
was to be the primary—possibly the sole—actor responding to Argentina and what was at stake 
was a parcel of British territory inhabited by people who saw themselves as British.  
Nevertheless, there were a number of similarities in the discourse of the two debates, 
demonstrating how distinct contexts can both be narrated in terms which fix an ontologically 
secure subject position for Britain reliant on Island Race identity tropes. 
 
A cottage industry in and of itself, the Falklands Conflict has been fetishised in British history 
as a singular event representing a backlash against apparent national decline and used as an 
exemplar from which to approach the study of Thatcher’s leadership.63  When placed into 
historical context it is usually situated as a Thatcherite reassertion of national greatness.64  With 
her reflections on how ‘a form of discursive construction took place that knitted ideas of the 
English and British self to the actionable narrative of foreign policy’ Hadfield-Amkhan’s study 
is one of relatively few to conceptualise the place of identity in this.65  In a similar vein, David 
McCourt’s focus on Britain’s ontological security-seeking is welcome, based as it is on the idea 
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65 Hadfield-Amkhan (2010), p. 159. 
110 
 
 
 
that ‘[t]he decision to reinvade [the Falklands] had no economic or geopolitical rationale: 
Britain’s principled sense of Self was at stake, not its strategic position; its ontological security 
was threatened, not its direct physical security nor its economic interests.’66  Perhaps rightly 
preoccupied with over-throwing the tendency towards Thatcher-centrism and electoral politics 
in much scholarship on the Falklands, he focusses on Britain’s international role-playing as a 
status quo Power at the expense of endogenous considerations by arguing that ‘[i]dentity-based 
action requires the prior existence of social roles to render both the action itself and the 
underlying identity socially meaningful.’67  This rather typical post-Wendtian constructivist 
move over-simplifies what ought to be seen as a co-constitutive process in which identity and 
perceived international role constitute one another.68  So the reiterations, for example, of Britain 
upholding international norms—of which there were many—are reliant not simply on the 
existence and cognition of an ‘international society’ but also the elucidation of a secure subject 
position reliant on the established conceptions of identity themselves.69  In any case, this 
separation of identity and international role is not so easy: what was the British Empire, identity, 
role or both? 
3.2. Island Race history: the Empire Strikes Back? 
I argued earlier that the Thatcherite reading of history tended to dignify the period from the 
Second British Empire to the Suez Crisis and characterised the ensuing era as one of torpor and 
decline.  This, as we saw, relied on specific mobilisations of Island Race historical identity.  The 
national renewal of which the new Conservative government was the vanguard was to be 
achieved not by neoteric foreign policy but a return to the status quo ante, a move which had 
only been leant further grist by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  As she later recalled in her 
memoirs: 
‘From now on, the whole tone of international affairs began to change, 
and for the better.  Hard-headed realism and strong defence became 
the order of the day.’70 
Indeed ‘realism’ was invoked several times during the Falklands debates by Defence Secretary 
John Nott, Carrington’s successor at the Foreign Office, Francis Pym, and various backbenchers 
as well as serving as a counter-concept for some Labour Members who described the recovery 
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of the islands as ‘unrealistic’.71  As Liberal Russell Johnston put it regarding the debates around 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was ‘a lot of realpolitik flying about’.72  This ‘return to 
realism’ relied on specific renderings of what exactly was being returned to; in other words, 
how the (selective) history of Island Race foreign policy provided an adequate guide to the 
present situation by fixing an ontologically secure subject position for Britain in both historical 
and contemporary terms. 
 
For all the accusations of ‘blimpishness’ or ‘jingoism’ hurled at the Government and its 
supporters—and there was plenty—the history invoked in the Falklands debates rarely 
constituted explicit glorifications of empire.73  More subtle than that, it fitted the reified, 
ontologically secure tropes of Island Race identity both to the present situation as well as to past 
experiences which could then serve as salutary and relevant guidance, impelling a discursive 
congruence between the current required policy and the established tropes.  The two main 
historical events summoned in the debates were World War Two and the Suez Crisis.  The 
former of these functioned as a reminder of a supposed international role for Britain that relied 
upon its exceptional island geopolitics: standing alone against a rising tide of continental 
barbarism, it was the heroic, insular character of Britain that had saved freedom from Nazism.74  
This was discursively linked with appeasement which, instead of being a stain on Britain’s 
honour, became in its eventual reversal a symbol of its wisdom (embodied in the figure of 
Churchill) and provided MPs with apparent expertise in dealing with ‘fascist’ Argentina.  
Britain, a number of speakers reminded the House, would stand alone again if necessary.  The 
position of Suez was more ambiguous—Eden and his supporters had, after all, been explicitly 
trying to avoid the appeasement of the thirties—but its main constitution in the Falklands 
debates was as signalling the terminus of a prior era in which the geopolitics of Island Race 
identity had predominated.75  What these historical renderings constituted was an ontologically 
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secure subject position that impelled the favoured policy of sending a naval taskforce to retake 
the Falklands by locating Britain as an exemplar of global freedoms forged in its insular island 
home and with the means and outlook to enact their universal defence.  The ensuing section will 
further demonstrate this. 
3.3. Global freedoms, insularity, universality: Island Race values and the retaking of 
the Falklands 
The process of Othering Argentina was predicated relatively simply on the representation of the 
country as fascist, thereby linking it with the European dictatorships of the 1930s.  Aside from 
foreclosing the possibility of successful negotiations—‘we are dealing here not with a 
democratic country’; ‘the present-day Government of Argentina cannot be trusted to behave in a 
civilised way’—it triggered narratives of how Britain had ‘taken on’ Hitler and Mussolini in the 
name of freedom.76  Britain, it was reiterated throughout the debates, was ‘a democracy that is 
unequalled in the world’ and didn’t appease dictators.77  This is highly relevant because of the 
ways in which the British ‘stand’ against the Axis has come to be symbolised by its very 
islandness: the physical separation of the archipelago from Europe; the heroism of an insular 
and exceptional people; and the salvation provided by the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood of Greater 
Britain.  The equivalence of Argentina and Hitler’s and Mussolini’s regimes thus drew a 
simultaneous correlation between the retaking of the Falklands and Island Race identity tropes.  
Britain would have to stand alone once more if necessary.  To this end, Conservative Winston 
Churchill, grandson of the former Prime Minister, reminded the House of the UN’s (and the 
League of Nations’) poor record of ‘bringing to heel fascist dictators’, in contrast with Britain’s 
own expertise.78  In any case, as Enoch Powell pointed out, ‘the right of self-defence […] 
existed before the United Nations was dreamt of’ and the higher authority under which Britain 
acted was ‘inherent in us’.79  This condensed the uniqueness of the exceptional Island Race into 
the debate about Britain’s response and broadly sanctified the period up to the Suez Crisis as a 
belle époque of British foreign policy; hence Conservative Alan Clark’s remark: ‘I believe that 
this is the last chance, the very last chance, for us to redeem much of our history over the past 
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twenty-five years, of which we may be ashamed, and from which we may have averted our 
gaze.’80 
 
Throughout the debates there was sustained linkage between the Falklands themselves, the 
upholding of an international principle and Britain’s special expertise and duty in fulfilling this 
role.  On this, at least, the front benches could agree, as the opening address of Opposition 
Leader Foot on 3 April attests: ‘we are determined to ensure that we […] uphold the rights of 
our country throughout the world, and the claim of our country to be a defender of people's 
freedom throughout the world, particularly those who look to us for special protection, as do the 
people in the Falkland Islands.’81  From the many other remarks, several are indicative:  
‘there is the longer-term interest to ensure that foul and brutal 
aggression does not succeed in our world.  If it does, there will be a 
danger not merely to the Falkland Islands, but to people all over this 
dangerous planet’; ‘We are defending civilisation against barbarians 
as our ancestors did centuries ago elsewhere.  That is what we are 
doing.  That is what I hope we shall continue to do for the sake of the 
world’; and ‘we are upholding not some minor issue 7,000 miles away 
from our shores but a fundamental issue’.82   
More specifically, Conservative Geoffrey Rippon drew on the World Wars as evidence for 
Britain’s moral strength, describing the country as ‘the twice defender of the freedom of the 
world in this century’.83 
 
The potential and then emergent retaking of the Falklands was represented as both the parochial 
concern of Britain in recovering a lost part of its indivisible territory and a universalised 
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phenomenon of which the world should pay attention.  This epitomised the 
insularity/universality nexus which is a foundation of Island Race identity.  On one hand, the 
Falklanders were not just—as Thatcher memorably put it—‘like the people of the United 
Kingdom, […] an island race’; they were British citizens and the islands were British territory.84  
On the other, Britain was upholding an international principle by defending the islands.  The 
resulting discourse was thusly co-constitutive with Britain’s Island Race identity concepts of 
insularity and universality; ‘looking after our interests wherever they were’ as Heath argued.85  
What I mean by this is that the linkages of the historic (the reversal of World War II 
appeasement) and the contemporary (fascist Argentina taking British territory by force and the 
potential of British reach in enacting the response) condensed the discourse with ontologically 
secure renderings of Island Race identity and fixed Britain in a subject position conterminous 
with global norms and values. 
3.4. The emergent Soviet threat and the co-constitution of Cold War and Island Race 
narratives 
The appeals to the global defence of freedom implicitly fed into the Cold War narrative which 
itself had been condensed into medium- to long-term conceptions of Island Race identity.  
Redolent of the debates around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this was constitutive of a 
general questioning of Western strategy and the supposed importance of the Falklands in global 
schemes of democratic capitalism.  Once again, it was the British vision of the crucial nature of 
the islands that was valorised, as against a general Western (and, it must be said, Foreign 
Office) neglect.  Hence the gradual intrusion of the Soviet Union into the debates as the naval 
taskforce made its way to its destination.86  This reflected general patterns in the development of 
Island Race identity in which the Falklands were represented as strategically significant and 
therefore inevitably subject to the covetous designs of Moscow.   
 
                                                          
84 HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 638.  Although the early debates were characterised by a degree of 
sentimental argumentation suggesting that Britain’s response was about ‘people not territory’ and the 
freeing of British citizens from the fascist boot heel, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict Thatcher 
tended to respond rather pointedly to questions of the islands’ future by arguing that the only issue was 
territorial sovereignty (HC Deb 15 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 738).  For arguments that Britain was 
defending people not territory see du Cann: HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 642; Sir Peter Emery 
(Conservative): ibid, col. 658; David Steel (Liberal): HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 977-8; Richard 
Luce (Conservative): ibid., col. 978-9; George Cunningham (Independent Labour): ibid., col. 1000; Buck: 
ibid., col. 1011-2.  By way of counterpoint, see Enoch Powell: HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1158-9. 
85 HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, col. 967. 
86 See, for example, Keith Best (Conservative): HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1016; HC Deb 13 May 
1982, vol. 23, col. 1012; Thatcher: HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1148; Hal Miller (Conservative): 
ibid., col. 1175; John Stokes (Conservative): ibid., col. 1178; Wigley: ibid., col. 1189-90; Browne: ibid., col. 
1199; Healey: ibid., col. 1203; HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, col. 960; Winterton: HC Deb 29 April 1982, 
vol. 22, col. 1013-4; Pym: ibid., col. 1056; Sir Patrick Wall (Conservative): HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, 
col. 973; ibid., col. 975-6; Owen: ibid., col. 986-7; Colvin: ibid., col. 998-9. 
115 
 
 
 
The Soviet threat was rendered in two distinct fashions in the Falklands debates: first as an 
explicit menace to the islands themselves (the risk of ‘pushing Argentina into the arms of the 
Soviet Union’) and of its potential to exploit divisions in and break the Western alliance (‘we 
are confronted by an enormous challenge not only to Britain but to our so-called allies; they are 
on test as much as us’).87  The twofold discursive constitution of this was in the linkage of the 
maritime strategy of Island Race identity with the defence of the Western world (the Falklands 
could not be conceived of as strategically relevant in anything other than a maritime sense) and 
the enduring and renascent Soviet threat with the present issue.  In spite of representations of 
Britain’s ability to stand alone against fascism, the primary importance of NATO was 
simultaneously reified in the debates while being linked with Britain’s international identity.  
The Falklands were Britain’s concern but also—symbolically and geopolitically—highly 
relevant for NATO/the West; hence the discussions which emerged about the possible 
formation of SATO, a South Atlantic equivalent of NATO.88 
 
In order to ensure Britain’s territorial integrity, defend Western freedom and uphold 
international norms, the emergent policy was for the islands to be retaken; if necessary by force, 
unilaterally and at great cost over vast distances.  The Island Race constituted in the debates 
possessed the attributes which would allow it to do this.  Apart from its expertise in standing up 
to dictators, the physical separation of Britain and the Falklands was nulled by Britain’s national 
will and the Island Race concept of oceanic space without distance.  Against what Conservative 
John Peyton called ‘the plain fact of geography’, was ranged Britain’s possession of the third 
most powerful navy in the world and Enoch Powell’s characteristic rendition of British 
conceptions of maritime spatiality: 
‘the ocean is one, and the ability to command the ocean is one.  The 
interests and the power of a maritime nation are wherever the sea is.’89 
Distance was thus at once relevant and irrelevant (‘it matters not whether the invasion took 
place 80 or 8,000 miles away’) insofar as it represented something that could be conquered by 
ontologically-secure Island Race geopolitics with its enduring reach and global importance.90  In 
this sense it was not simply patriotic tub-thumping when, to cries of ‘hear, hear’, Conservative 
Edward du Cann announced: 
                                                          
87 Healey: ibid., col. 960; Mellish: HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 984. 
88 See, for example, Keith Speed (Conservative): ibid., col. 1016; Browne: HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 21, 
col. 1199; Amery: HC Deb 29 April 1982, vol. 22, col. 1018; Colvin: HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, col. 998-
9; Hill: ibid., col. 1003; Stephen Hastings (Conservative): ibid., col. 1018. 
89 Peyton: HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 969; Powell: HC Deb 29 April 1982, vol. 22, col. 1004.  The 
following all pointed out Britain’s enduring naval power: Amery: HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 647; 
Nott: ibid., col. 666-7; Churchill: HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1022; Glyn: HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 
21, col. 1182; Enoch Powell: HC Deb 29 April 1982, vol. 22, col. 1004. 
90 Luce: HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 979. 
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‘let us hear no more about logistics; how difficult it is to travel long 
distances.  I do not remember the Duke of Wellington whining about 
Torres Vedras.’91 
He was drawing on and dignifying a supposed heroic British history of conquering distances 
and condensing the meanings of the current situation with established Island Race tropes.  As 
the taskforce closed in on the South Atlantic, this valiant narrative of national will overcoming 
great distances was reiterated; as Pym and colleague Sir Bernard Braine, for example, put it: 
‘our naval task force is on its way to the South Atlantic; it is a formidable demonstration of our 
strength and of our strength of will’ and ‘the time for weasel words has ended’.92  Furthermore, 
the swift mobilisation itself was an act which further proved the uniqueness of Britain and the 
utility of being able to respond quickly to situations anywhere in the world, something that 
would become axiomatic in later strategic reviews.93    
3.5. Competing subject positions: opposition discourse and ontological security 
The arguments of some (mainly) Labour Members who urged that a conflict would be 
disproportionately bloody and ultimately pointless if British governments continued to negotiate 
over the islands’ future anyway were largely overwhelmed by the numerical force of those 
supporting the government.  Furthermore, their remarks tended to be dismissed perfunctorily or 
critiqued by the ensuing speakers who would instead refer to speeches supporting the 
government and repeat the truism that the House and the country ought to be united in times of 
conflict; they became aberrations in an otherwise unified discourse.  The appeals of Foot and 
Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Labour Leader Healey to trust in the jurisdiction of the 
UN did not ‘fit’ with the dominant representations of the invasion as an affront to British pride 
and sovereignty—advanced by Foot and Healey as much as anyone—and the renderings of 
Britain as superior to the UN (and its predecessor) in taking on dictators.94   
 
The specific Island Race scripting of Thatcher’s government and its supporters was pre-eminent 
because of the way that its representations of British identity—past, present and aspirational—
‘fitted’ with the advanced policy in a more ontologically-secure fashion than Labour’s position.  
In announcing the surrender of Argentine forces on June 15 1982, Thatcher argued that she 
                                                          
91 HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 643.  The Lines of Torres Vedras was a lengthy series of forts whose 
building Wellington ordered to protect Lisbon during the Peninsular phase of the Napoléonic Wars. 
92 HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 962; HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 660. 
93 See, for example, ‘the adaptable posture’ in HM Government (2010), pp. 9-10.  For encomium on 
Britain’s response to the Falklands, see Nott: HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 666-8; Churchill: HC Deb 
07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1022; Duffy: HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1167; Glyn: ibid., col. 1182; 
Wall: HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, col. 973; Emery: HC Deb 15 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 739; Thatcher: 
ibid., col. 739-40; Winterton: ibid., col. 740. 
94 Foot: HC Deb 03 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 638-9; HC Deb 14 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 1151; ibid., col. 
1154; HC Deb 29 April 1982, vol. 22, col. 985-6; ibid., col. 990; Healey: HC Deb 07 April 1982, vol. 21, col. 
965; HC Deb 29 April 1982, vol. 22, col. 1052; HC Deb 13 May 1982, vol. 23, col. 960. 
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couldn’t agree with Foot that British servicemen had ‘risked their lives in any way to have a 
United Nations trusteeship; they risked their lives to defend British sovereign territory, the 
British way of life and the rights of British people to determine their own future.’95  As in the 
debates about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the British subject positions fixed by 
Conservative Members were more ontologically secure in terms of the familiar renderings of 
Island Race identity because of the ways in which they mobilised established tropes relying on a 
unique history that was at once insular and productive of universal values. 
4. Conclusion 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Argentina’s of the Falklands were narrated by MPs in 
ways that fixed ontologically secure subject positions for Britain based upon its established 
Island Race identity tropes.  To the scholarship that has noted Thatcher’s commitment to the 
British ‘national myth’, this chapter has added a conceptualisation of the discourse of her and 
the parliaments in which she sat as forming part of the enduring social practice which reifies 
particular geopolitical identity tropes forged in Britain’s past as leader of a maritime empire.  
The contemporary foreign policy discourse was constitutive of a recrudescence of Island Race 
identity tropes because of the ways that they ontologically ‘fitted’ with the events, provided 
clear policy aims and accorded with the (largely Conservative) rendering of British geo-history.   
 
The invasions of Afghanistan and the Falklands occurred prior to the iterations of British 
identity in the Commons but they did not, as it were, bring them to life: these identity tropes 
already existed and, prompted by the events, they co-constituted their discursive representations 
according to traditions in British foreign policy thought.96  To take one example from the 
chapter: the renderings of the Soviet Union as a typical Land Power were reliant on traditional 
Island Race taxonomies of Tsarist Russia (and others) as well as more recent formulations, in 
this case the Cold War.  The discursive co-constitution lay in the securing of Britain in alterity 
as the Island Race and also the relevance of its foreign policy in the contemporary context.  
Thus it is important to acknowledge the hegemony of Cold War politics but also recognise its 
contingency and the longer-term traditions of established Island Race identity concepts.97  
 
This is not to say that the Members who spoke in these debates were, as Michael Barnett put it, 
‘cultural dupes’ but to acknowledge how they were engaging in discursive social practices 
which place a premium on the elucidation of an ontologically secure, national Self.98  By 
placing this into the larger context of this thesis, what are also revealed are changes within 
                                                          
95 HC Deb 15 June 1982, vol. 25, col. 732. 
96 Doty (1996), p. 127; Ó Tuathail (2002), p. 606. 
97 Jackson (2011), p. 400. 
98 Barnett (1999), p. 7. 
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continuity and how Island Race identity is ‘put to work’ in emergent and novel contexts which, 
in themselves, constitute evolutions as new and old historical ‘experiences’ are absorbed or 
discarded.  In this sense what has just been discussed is exemplary, for the dominant renderings 
of British history dignified a particular temporal narrative at the expense of an intervening 
period and centralised certain policy courses and representations of events.  The classic 
scholarship on British foreign policy, that it is an eternal, pragmatic pursuit of national interests, 
is shown to be lacking because of the requirement for an ‘identifiable entity to which they can 
be attributed.’99  Its continued attraction as an argument, however, is perhaps understandable 
because of the frequency and relative constancy of Britain’s identity, as well as the holistic 
nature of its geopolitics which contributes to it not resembling geopolitics at all.100  Once again, 
this hints at the value of pursuing a genealogical approach which is sensitive to both historic and 
contemporary factors within given discursive occasions.  British identity in the early 1980s was 
clearly secured through continued mobilisations of Island Race tropes with their inherent 
malleability and geopolitical holism but, as we have seen, they were absorptive of emergent 
contexts which, in themselves, became co-constitutive with and reified the identity concepts, 
adding to their status as arbiters of ontological security. 
  
                                                          
99 Dittmer & Kim (1993), p. 5. 
100 Guzzini (2012b), p. 3. 
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chapter 6   
International Communities and Island Stories: geopolitics, 
globalisation and ontological security 1997-2015 
1. Introduction 
This chapter comprises analysis of four debates from the twenty-first century, presented in order 
to make the argument that the post-Cold War environment is discursively constructed by British 
foreign policy-makers in particular fashions that co-constitutively fix ontologically secure 
subject positions for Britain according to its established Island Race identity.  This has a 
profound effect on the ways that the manifold international issues that come before parliament, 
not least relations with the EU, are discussed by Members.  Of uppermost importance to this 
argument is how MPs narrate the post-Cold War condition of globalisation by mobilising 
established British geopolitics, thus enframing contemporary issues in terms that reify the utility 
of Island Race identity. 
 
After introducing the empirical material I will present an analysis of how globalisation is 
narrated co-constitutively with established Island Race geopolitical conceptions in the context 
of the issues and events discussed in the debates under question.  This will lead into my 
argument that fundamental to this discursive practice is how the globalised environment is 
constituted as being one in which Britain can thrive because of its geopolitical attributes, 
especially its collection of unique, insular values whose universalism ensures that Britain retains 
reach and relevance in emergent contexts.  The following section concerns Britain’s relationship 
with the rest of Europe and hinges on how the balance between insularity and universality 
continues to be discursively played out in parliamentary debates.  The two main Westminster 
parties articulate competing subject positions for Britain related to the continent, both of which 
mobilise established Island Race identity tropes.  I conclude the chapter by reflecting on the 
implications of the discursive constitutions of a globalised world and the place of Britain’s 
relationship with Europe in it and draw on two recent speeches by Prime Minister David 
Cameron to argue that they and the analysis of this chapter represent the apotheosis of Britain’s 
particular geopolitical identity in which the parochial, insular Island Race is simultaneously 
invested with universal importance through discursive practices of ontological security-seeking 
in which traditional identity tropes establish certain subject positions which reify the global 
relevance of Britain as an island.    
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Examining discourse from the Labour governments of 1997-2010 alongside those from the 
successor Conservative administrations will present the former as part of a larger scale 
genealogical study rather than treating it as a singular, neoteric occurrence driven by Tony 
Blair’s messianic pursuit of the War on Terror.  Furthermore, the latest developments in 
Conservative foreign policy thinking can be also be properly contextualised within enduring 
cultures of social practice in the Commons.  As part of this thesis it will bring the genealogy up 
to date but in no way conclude it; for ontological security continues to be sought through 
discursive practices of fixing subject positions reliant on established identity tropes and relative 
to emergent contexts. 
1.1. Four ‘Debates on the Address’ 
Unlike in the previous chapters, the four debates on which this analysis is based were not called 
to announce, discuss or vote on particular issues.  Each year, as parliament is ‘opened’ for a new 
session, the government prepares a speech—‘Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’ or the 
‘Gracious Address’—for the monarch to read in the House of Lords that announces the 
legislative agenda for the coming year.  Over subsequent days, this is debated in the Commons 
and the four primary sources of this chapter comprise the ‘Debates on the Address’ of 2000, 
2003, 2012 and 2015.  This allows analysis of discourse in a less structured environment in 
which debate is more wide-ranging than when Members are called to discuss a particular issue 
or event.  Inevitably there are contemporary issues that receive greater focus from MPs and, 
given the debating cultures of the Commons, the Foreign Secretary who opens these sessions 
establishes, to some degree, what is discussed, but Members are not formally encouraged by the 
Speaker to stick to any particular subject, even those prioritised by the government.  This 
freedom within discursive constraints means that these debates are useful indicators of 
contemporary British discourse.   
 
The choices of debates were subject to certain methodological considerations.  Firstly, I wanted 
to place foreign policy discourse of the Labour governments of 1997 to 2010 and the subsequent 
Conservative administrations side-by-side rather than treating them discretely.1  Because foreign 
policy is not, in the main, a legislative arena of British politics like Health or Education, the 
distinctiveness of a ‘new’ foreign policy regime will likely be secured through the articulation 
of a change of priorities or, as we will see in this chapter, a general ‘re-engagement’ with the 
world or a specific area.  Nevertheless, there is the seemingly permanent British habit of 
representing it as a continuation of the tradition of pragmatic pursuance of national interests.  In 
                                                          
1 From 2010 to 2015 the Conservatives were in a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats but, 
as Oliver Daddow points out, exerted domination over foreign policy matters; the concessions and 
influence allowed to their partners mainly coming in the domestic sphere (Daddow (2015a), pp. 305, 
312). 
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the different emphases of new governments and oppositions, it is hypothesised that Island Race 
tropes will be upheld because of the ways in which the post-Cold War environment is narrated 
according to how ontologically secure subject positions are fixed, reliant on established British 
geopolitical tropes.      
 
When considering the Labour governments of the period, I chose one debate that preceded 
September 11 2001 and one that occurred after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in order to 
decentre the ‘Iraq-centrism’ that has inflected much scholarship on Blair’s governments.2  Also 
considered was Blair’s assertion of ‘the Doctrine of International Community’; hence my choice 
of the first debate from Labour’s time in office to postdate that.3  In a more general sense that 
also influenced my choices from the ensuing Conservative administrations, I wanted to choose 
debates that had given the governments time to elucidate a distinctive discourse of foreign 
policy.  Even though some governments come to be defined by their foreign policy (one thinks 
of Eden’s, Thatcher’s and Blair’s) it is rare that they arrive in office having campaigned on such 
issues and, in any case, one must bear in mind the reactive nature of foreign policy and its co-
constitutive relationship with contextual events and issues.  Blair, for example, ‘gave little 
attention to foreign policy’ when in opposition.4  The debates from the Conservative period in 
office since 2010 were chosen according to this criteria: the government’s first Foreign 
Secretary William Hague announced his ‘global diplomatic network’ over a series of speeches 
in 2011 and 2012.  Given the importance of this to the foreign policy agenda of his government, 
I wanted to choose one debate that took place when this policy had ‘bedded in’ and one led by 
his successor, Philip Hammond.   
 
With the Conservatives in office for more than a term, continuities in foreign policy with their 
Labour and other predecessors have begun to be noted by scholars.  In particular, Oliver 
Daddow has traced the development of ‘liberal conservatism’ under Cameron and emphasised 
its pragmatism and ‘traditional’ elements, while noting its retention of Labour’s ethical 
considerations.5  By considering a British tradition of ‘bounded liberalism’ that privileges the 
nation-state, global trade and interventionism, he and Pauline Schnapper suggest that this 
represents an attempt by Blair, Gordon Brown (Labour Prime Minister: 2007-10) and Cameron 
to reconcile older principles of realism with an appreciation of asset-maximising in the modern 
world.6  Surrounded, as Dodds and Elden note, by neo-conservatives like Michael Gove and 
leading a party that had fully supported the now toxic Iraq War (if not its aftermath), Cameron 
                                                          
2 Daddow (2013), p. 110. 
3 Blair (1999). 
4 Wickam-Jones (2000), p. 8. 
5 Daddow (2015a), p. 304. 
6 Daddow & Schnapper (2013), p. 333. 
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has been particularly anxious to emphasise a more liberal and what he sees as a traditionally 
British approach to foreign affairs, referring in 2011 to neo-conservative views as ‘rather 
naïve’.7  Taking these accounts and going further in acknowledging and exploring the 
discursive-spatial roots of the traditions and novel agendas pursued by recent governments will 
contextualise them with one another and the broader scheme of this genealogy.  To begin doing 
so, I will introduce several underlying discourses from the four debates. 
1.2. Underlying discourses: ‘strategic shrinkage’ and ‘outward-facing’ Britain 
Running through these debates and their contexts—prominent issues included relations with the 
EU and NATO, the War on Terror, the Arab Spring, and Russia and Ukraine—are two 
particular underlying discourses.  Firstly and especially, although not exclusively, important to 
2012 and 2015, there was a reiterated truism that Britain was undergoing a process of ‘strategic 
shrinkage’.  This was articulated differently by Members from the ruling party and the 
Opposition and had its own set of political complexities, i.e. Cameron’s government argued that 
it was reversing Labour’s shrinkage; Labour asserted the obverse.8  Impelled by the recent 
publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and reaction to it from the 
media and the Defence Committee, a number of Members in 2012 and 2015 quoted from 
newspaper articles and interviews with American officials apparently concerned with Britain’s 
‘retreat’ from the world.9  In the earlier debates, Conservative MPs characterised Labour’s 
foreign policy (especially in 2000) as a strategic void, particularly drawing on the Strategic 
Defence Review from 1998 and accusing the document of a lack of direction.10  The idea of 
strategic shrinkage is of particular relevance to a discursive genealogy of Island Race identity 
because of the ways in which global relevance has persistently been constituted as an 
ontologically secure marker of Selfhood in British foreign policy discourse.   
 
                                                          
7 Dodds & Elden (2008), pp. 351, 355-7; regarding Gove, see, for example, his 2004 piece ‘The very 
British roots of neoconservatism and its lessons for British Conservatives’ (Gove (2004); HC Deb 28 
February 2011, vol. 524, col. 38. 
8 Hague: HC Deb 15 May 2012, vol. 545, col. 415; ibid., col. 429; Douglas Alexander (Labour, Shadow 
Foreign Secretary): ibid., col. 431; Steve Gilbert (Liberal Democrat): ibid., col. 442; James Morris 
(Conservative): ibid., col. 467; Andrew Murrison (Conservative): ibid., col. 472; Hammond: HC Deb 01 
June 2015, vol. 596, col. 317-20; Sir Alan Duncan (Conservative): ibid., col. 337; Madeleine Moon 
(Labour): ibid., col. 359; Nadhim Zahawi (Conservative): ibid., col. 380; Albert Owen (Labour): ibid., col. 
393; Jonathan Ashworth (Labour): ibid., col. 415. 
9 HM Government (2010); House of Commons Defence Committee (2011); Alexander: HC Deb 15 May 
2012, vol. 545, col. 430; Denis MacShane (Labour): ibid., col. 471; Mike Gapes (Labour Co-operative): HC 
Deb 01 June 2015, vol. 596, col 317; Hilary Benn (Labour, Shadow Foreign Secretary): ibid., col 327; Sir 
Gerald Howarth (Conservative): ibid., col. 347; Jeremy Corbyn (Labour): ibid., col. 353.  For the obverse 
in 2000 see Francis Maude (Shadow Foreign Secretary): HC Deb 11 December 2000, vol. 359, col. 393. 
10 HM Government (1998).  Maude: HC Deb 11 December 2000, vol. 359, col. 390; Michael Ancram 
(Shadow Foreign Secretary): HC Deb 27 November 2003, vol. 415, col. 156-7. 
123 
 
 
 
This is linked to the second underlying discourse: how Members from all sides reiterated the 
aphorism that Britain was, by nature, ‘outward-facing’ or ‘outward-looking’.11  Thus we can see 
how an ‘external’ discourse of Britain undergoing ‘strategic shrinkage’ permeated these debates 
and impelled the response that Britain was outward-facing which, in itself, drew on the 
established and fundamental Island Race identity trope of universality.  Crucial too in this 
regard was how the global environment was narrated by British foreign policy-makers in the 
debates, scripting it as a place in which modern states were required to be outward-facing in 
order to both take advantage of and mitigate the opportunities and risks inherent in their own 
depictions of globalisation. 
2. Globalisation and the British: spatializing the post-Cold War world 
British foreign policy-makers have narrated the post-Cold War world first and foremost as 
subject to the forces of globalisation which are themselves scripted in specific fashions co-
constitutive with historic Island Race identity tropes.  One of globalisation’s most noted scions, 
Thomas Friedman, described it as ‘the one big thing’ that ought to be focussed on in order to 
‘understand the post-Cold War world’.12  Its depiction of political, economic and social 
interdependence in a shrinking global environment has been thoroughly adopted by British 
governments as the primary narrative of modern politics.  Like the Cold War, it is presented 
(not just by the British) as ‘an unavoidable and irreversible process, which is rolling over us like 
some major natural phenomenon’.13  Yet while Thomas Barnett argues that it is not ‘a national 
choice but a global condition’ others like Luke Martell and Paul Hirst and Graeme Thompson 
suggest precisely that British governments (especially since 1997) have explicitly made 
globalisation a central policy.14  Whether globalisation is fictive or real is hardly the point 
though for—as Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan put it—if ‘believed by sufficient numbers of 
people […] then any myth, however outrageous or outlandish, to some extent becomes a 
‘reality’.’15 
 
The commitment to globalisation narratives across successive governments since the end of the 
Cold War is highly relevant to this thesis.  The genealogical nature of the study of identity 
                                                          
11 Robin Cook (Foreign Secretary): HC Deb 11 December 2000, vol. 359, col. 378; Nicholas Soames 
(Conservative): ibid., col. 418; Hugh Robertson (Conservative): HC Deb 27 November 2003, vol. 415, col. 
209; Morris: HC Deb 15 May 2012, vol. 545, col. 466; James Lefroy (Conservative): ibid., col. 488; 
Hammond: HC Deb 01 June 2015, vol. 596, col 317; Benn: ibid., col 327; ibid., col 335; Gapes: ibid., col. 
370; Zahawi: ibid., col. 380; Phil Wilson (Labour): ibid., col. 412; Jonathan Reynolds (Labour Co-
operative): ibid., col. 413; Justine Greening (Secretary of State for International Development): ibid., col. 
425. 
12 Friedman (1999), p. xxi. 
13 Went (2000), p. 5. 
14 Barnett (2009), p. 4; Martell (2008), p. 253; Hirst & Thompson (2000), p. 336. 
15 Cameron & Palan (2004), p. 3. 
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means that it must pay attention to the contextual factors which come to exist co-constitutively 
with it.  The scripts of globalisation thus underpin this chapter in the way that Cold War 
geopolitics frequently did in the previous ones: identities are not (re)constructed in a vacuum; 
they interact with, shape and are shaped by extant discourses as foreign policy-makers seek 
ontological security by discursively fitting one to the other in ways that are established and 
familiar.16  The way globalisation has been historicised also means that it has a particular 
relevance to British foreign policy, geopolitics and identity.   
 
A range of authors have come to conceptualise ‘modern’ globalisation (usually, but not 
exclusively, theorised as being unleashed by the demise of the Soviet Union) as being either a 
descendent of or at least strongly resembling what Friedman called ‘the first era of 
globalisation’: the age of European imperialisms.17  The British Empire especially has been cast 
as exemplary in this regard; Martell contending that it was ‘as close as it was possible to get to 
globalization in its period.’18  The language itself of globalisation, despite claims of ‘radical 
novelty’, ‘often simply replicates the ways in which the late Victorians interpreted the dynamics 
of global politics.’19  Most obviously we have Mackinder’s reflections on a ‘closed political 
system […] of world-wide scope’ in which ‘[e]very explosion of social forces, instead of being 
dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-
echoed from the far side of the globe’.20  The scripting of oceanic space without distance that I 
introduced in chapter 1 also hints at the ways in which discourses of islandness are imbricated 
in both British imperialism and globalisation: how Britain’s ambiguous position in a limitless 
maritime environment is an ‘elastic geography’ in which distant locales are opportunities and 
proximal threats can be ‘balanced’ from a distance.21  The same compressions of space and time 
that could bring the Russian or Germanic hordes to the Low Countries and threaten the island 
sanctuary also offered Britain exotic imperium in India and the Far East.22 
 
Such discursive spatialisations have been evident in British foreign policy since well before 
‘globalisation’ specifically spoke its name.  The earliest post-War foreign policy-makers 
frequently spoke of how the world was smaller than it had ever been before; pro-Europeans in 
the early 1960s argued that interdependence made it senseless to reject a unifying Europe; their 
                                                          
16 Vucetic (2011a), p. 14. 
17 Friedman (1999), pp. xvii-ix.  He later recast this periodisation into globalisation 1.0 (1492-1800), 2.0 
(1800-2000) and 3.0 (2000- ) (Friedman (2006), pp. 9-10).  See also Thrift (1995), p. 22; Fernández-
Armesto (2004), pp. 22, 30. 
18 Martell (2008), p. 453.  See also Elden (2005), pp. 15-6. 
19 Bell (2007), p. 84. 
20 Mackinder (1904b), p. 27. 
21 Nicolson (2002), p. 141.  See also Swyngedouw (1997), pp. 139-41; Armitage (2007), p. 9. 
22 Kern (1983), pp. 10-35, 131-80, 211-40. 
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opponents at the time and since made the opposite case: that a shrinking world meant Britain 
had to reach out beyond Europe; and Wilson’s government in the late 1960s used it to justify its 
jettisoning of British military bases east of Suez.23  Although no administration has been 
identified more with globalisation than the Labour governments of 1997-2010, we might first 
consider some remarks from Malcolm Rifkind, the last Conservative Foreign Secretary before 
Labour’s victory, in order to make the point that Blair and colleagues’ narratives were not 
entirely novel and introduce some discursive themes of importance to this chapter.   
 
In several Commons addresses in the autumn of 1996 Rifkind explained his ‘four pillars of 
British foreign policy’ in a globalised age.  Hardly unique in themselves (the EU as a 
partnership of nations; the transatlantic relationship; the Commonwealth and English-speaking 
world; global free trade), what is significant is the ways in which these classic tropes of British 
foreign policy were linked with a world now subject to globalisation.24  They gave Britain ‘a 
unique role in the world’ and allowed it to seek three particular national interests: ‘peace 
throughout the world’, ‘prosperity’ and ‘global respect for personal liberty and for the rule of 
law’.25  These interests, he said, ‘coincide with the interests of the world community as a whole’ 
and, being a ‘merchant nation’, ‘Atlantic as well as […] European’, meant Britain was ‘better 
placed than any other […] to champion free trade and open markets on a global scale.’26  
Rifkind’s characterisations fixed Britain in a subject position geopolitically suited for a world of 
globalisation.  He did so by fusing classic Island Race identity tropes—the partial stance vis-à-
vis Europe, the Transatlantic relationship, the global links of a trading nation and bearing a set 
of values that were at once unique (rule of law and personal liberty had, he explained, ‘existed 
and flourished in this country probably for longer than in any other country’) and cosmopolitan 
and universal—with his narration of the ‘development of global politics’.27 
 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Eden (1939), pp. xii-xiii; Eden: HC Deb 22 August 1945, vol. 413, col. 673; HC Deb 22 
November 1945, vol. 416, col. 612; Attlee: HC Deb 22 August 1945, vol. 413, col. 670; Bevin: HC Deb 07 
November 1945, vol. 415, col. 1336; HC Deb 25 July 1946, vol. 426, col. 327; HC Deb 05 May 1948, vol. 
450, col. 1274; HC Deb 12 May 1949, vol. 464, col. 2017; Lloyd: HC Deb 30 October 1958, vol. 594, col. 
320; HC Deb 04 December 1958, vol. 596, col. 1379; Macmillan: HC Deb 27 October 1959, vol. 612, col. 
75; Michael Stewart (Labour, Foreign Secretary: 1965-6; 1968-70): HC Deb 17 November 1966, vol. 736, 
col. 677; Heath (1972); Callaghan: HC Deb 29 June 1976, vol. 914, col. 198; HC Deb 24 November 1976, 
vol. 921, col. 36; Owen: HC Deb 01 March 1977, vol. 927, col. 197-8; Pym: HC Deb 04 November 1982, 
vol. 31, col. 130. 
24 HC Deb 24 October 1996, vol. 284, col. 139-40; ibid., col. 142-3. 
25 Ibid., col. 143. 
26 Ibid., col. 143; HC Deb 11 November 1996, vol. 285, col. 22; ibid., col. 22; ibid., col. 21-2. 
27 HC Deb 24 October 1996, vol. 284, col. 143; ibid., col. 130. 
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Globalisation under the successor Labour governments was represented as inevitable.28  Blair 
and his first Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, respectively remarked: ‘even if I resented it, I 
would have to accept it as a fact, possibly, the fact, of modern politics’;  
‘If you asked me whether I am in favour of globalisation, I would give 
broadly the same answer as Tom Friedman.  My attitude to 
globalisation is much the same as my attitude to the dawn.  On 
balance, I think it is a good thing that the sun rises every day.  But I 
also know there is nothing I can do to stop it even if I wanted to.’29 
Moreover it was, as the likes of Attlee, Bevin and Eden had earlier recognised concerning 
interdependence, a double-edge sword bringing both threat and opportunity to Britain.  The 
debit side of this had been characterised by Douglas Hurd (Conservative Foreign Secretary: 
1989-95) as the condition of ‘new world disorder’ in which there would be multiple threats to 
the global order following the demise of the stable, Cold War situation; on the credit side, 
Rifkind outlined the ‘major new opportunities’ for political and economic gains in the former 
Soviet sphere and beyond.30  Similarly Cook described ‘new opportunities and new threats’ and 
Blair how the ‘international has become domestic and the domestic international’ meaning that 
if ‘one part of the world has a problem, the rest of the world has too.’31 
2.1. Fixing Island Race identity around globalisation narratives 
The globalisation discourse given such great prominence by the Labour government of the late 
1990s drew on established notions of Island Race identity; since 2010 Members continue to 
seek ontological security in broadly the same fashion because of the ways globalisation has 
come to co-constitutively ‘fit’ with established Island Race tropes.  Moreover, as we will see in 
the ensuing sections, these spatialisations discursively mobilise certain ideas of Britain’s 
enduring relevance in the world.  Firstly, and building on the introduction above, I will present 
the contours of the specific global environment which was depicted in the four debates.   
 
The first characteristic evident in the debates is high levels of interdependence.  Shadow 
Secretary of State for International Development, Labour’s Mary Creagh, explained how ‘the 
global village’ was becoming ‘smaller and more connected’.32  Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
described ‘the interlinked nature of today's world’ and Labour Co-operative Member Mark 
Hendrick an emergent future in which communications ‘bind together disparate and diverse 
cultures, languages and traditions’ and ‘the boundaries that have existed for centuries will be 
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swept away, because the economic, social and political forces that are developing will make 
them irrelevant.’33  In what Hammond called a ‘rapidly globalising world’, Hague’s Shadow 
Douglas Alexander contended that problems were increasingly found to ‘transcend borders’.34  
Hammond’s Shadow, Hilary Benn, depicted ‘our increasingly interdependent and 
interconnected world’ where ‘events across the globe are seen and reported as they happen’.35 
 
Secondly, power was said to be shifting away from the West.  In the earlier debates, Members 
depicted a ‘rapidly changing’ or ‘fast-moving world’, an ‘unpredictable’ environment of ‘global 
change’ that was either, as Cook had it, ‘multipolar’ or, according to Conservative Hugh 
Robertson, dominated by the sole, American ‘hyperpower’.36  Preoccupied with European 
defence and, in 2003, al Qaeda, the specifics of these alterations were ill-defined; by 2012 and 
2015 there was consensus around the idea of shifting global power, what Alexander called 
‘dramatic events’ that were shaking ‘the foundations of the global order’.37  In 2012 Hague 
emphasised this point repeatedly by drawing attention to the importance of ‘new and emerging 
powers’ and ‘the growing economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America’.38  Alexander 
described—an assertion echoed by Benn in 2015 in very similar language—‘an ever-
accelerating movement of wealth and power from north to south, from west to east’, a ‘profound 
reordering of geoeconomics and, potentially, geopolitics’, and Conservative James Morris a 
‘grand transition in international affairs, with the axis of global power shifting from the west to 
the east.’39  Dan Jarvis of Labour pointed to the importance of the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China), and Conservative Robert Jenrick to ‘the great new powers and the 
exploding consumer markets of Asia, Africa and Latin America’.40 
 
Typical of globalisation rhetoric but also impelled by the open-ended nature of the debates, this 
environment was rendered as productive of both threats and opportunities.  In 2000 
Conservative Nicholas Soames identified ‘an arc of danger’; in 2003 Straw characterised a 
world ‘less certain and more dangerous today than it has been for decades’ in which ‘awareness 
of global insecurity is probably greater than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis in the 
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early 1960s’ and his colleague Donald Anderson talked of ‘manifold threats’; in 2012 
Conservative Richard Benyon described ‘a more dangerous world than has existed at any time 
in my lifetime’; and in 2015 Crispin Blunt, also of the Conservatives, said ‘we are facing the 
most challenging foreign policy environment since the end of the Second World War.’41  Other 
Members emphasised the social, political, cultural and economic opportunities inherent in this 
scenario.42 
 
The particular international environment constructed comprised interdependence, an ongoing 
process of global reconfiguration that, by the later debates, was articulated as power shifting 
away from the West, and a multitude of threats and opportunities.  As I have argued, this was 
very much in keeping with contemporary globalisation rhetoric and shows that such discourse 
was to be found beyond just that of Blair; it was shared by many Members.  In the ways in 
which the world was constituted spatially, we see continued mobilisations of Island Race 
identity.  I am now going to build on this argument by analysing how specific renderings of 
British attributes formed part of this discourse and fixed ontologically secure subject positions 
for Britain in this environment.   
2.2. An ideal environment: British geopolitical relevance in a globalised world 
The collectively constructed world I have just presented was an environment in which Britain 
could thrive because of the established notions of Island Race identity that co-constituted it.  
This argument hinges on two main points: through representations of Britain as a ‘trading 
nation’ that recall its Sea Power past, Britain is given a special stake in the maintenance of 
international order that, like its old Lines of Communication, require superintendence; and the 
main policy frameworks of the period (Blair’s ‘liberal interventionism’ and Hague’s ‘global 
diplomatic network’) are co-constitutive of both the apparent contemporary globalised 
environment and established Island Race identity tropes of universality and global reach.   
 
Britain as a ‘trading nation’ has often served as a designator since the Second World War.  In 
chapter 3 we saw its importance in the narration of the Suez Crisis as maintenance of British 
imperial Lines of Communication were yoked to ideas of global prosperity and Western 
stability.  Heath, Michael Stewart and George Brown (Foreign Secretaries in Wilson’s 1960s 
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governments) were particularly prone to using it.43  This self-ascription has particular 
geopolitical connotations exemplified by Owen in his first Commons address as Foreign 
Secretary in 1977.  ‘We are an island race, part of Europe, but with the Atlantic breaking against 
our coast’, he explained.  This meant that Britain had traded and invested all over the world and 
could not now ‘restrict our horizons and […] think and act as if in a continental cocoon’; ‘the 
scale of our international interests is not such that we could withdraw from them even if we 
wished to do so.’44  Thatcher and her Foreign Secretaries also utilised this theme and, in the 
newly ‘globalised’ world after the end of the Cold War, Hurd, Major and Rifkind all drew on 
it.45  There is obvious nostalgia in this designation but, more importantly, ‘trading nation’ 
establishes Britain in a subject position as a state with particular investment in the smooth 
running of an interdependent world, whose interests become congruent with Britain’s.  As 
Heath put it in 1970:    
‘our interests as a nation coincide closely not only with those of our 
friends and allies but with those of the international community as a 
whole.  We share with the rest of the world the desire to promote 
peace and to further development, and as a trading nation we probably 
have greater interests at stake than any other country in this respect.’46  
 
Although Labour Co-operative Member Mike Gapes described a ‘narrow mercantilist 
government’ and his colleague Meg Munn urged ‘surely our diplomatic efforts should be about 
more than just trade’, this designation of Britain as a trading nation has been an important theme 
in recent Conservative discourse.47  Richard Ottaway was typical as he linked ‘the defence and 
security of this country’, ‘our trading interests’ and reducing ‘global tension’.48  Hammond 
expanded upon this as he argued that maintaining a ‘significant role in world affairs’ was ‘very 
much in our national interest’.  He cast Britain as ‘one of the most open economies in the world, 
a nation that earns its living through trade in goods and services across the global commons’ 
and, as such, it had ‘a greater stake than most in securing […] a rules-based international order 
that is in Britain’s interest but is also in the interest of building stability, security and prosperity 
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for the world’s population as a whole.’49  The ‘three key immediate challenges’ that he said 
Britain faced—Russia/Ukraine, Islamic extremism and resolution of the relationship with the 
EU (he also highlighted Chinese actions in the South China Sea)—were constituted as threats to 
this stable order in which, he had made clear, Britain had a great stake.50  He was supported by 
Sir Gerald Howarth who conflated ‘threats to our kingdom’, ‘broader interests around the 
world’ and the need for ‘international stability’ to safeguard trade.51  In 2012 their colleague, 
Christopher Pincher, said he was inspired by an Asa, now Baron, Briggs book (probably The 
Age of Improvement or A Social History of England) from which he drew the characterisation of 
the British as ‘buccaneers on the high seas of trade’.52  Bearing this in mind in the twenty-first 
century would be ‘good for our prosperity, good for our security and good for our trading 
partners.’53  Similarly Jenrick urged the conception of ‘Britain as a trading nation sending out 
ships to emerging markets’ and Nadhim Zahawi described ‘a tradecraft honed over many 
centuries of global engagement.’54 
 
Cameron would also designate Britain as a ‘trading nation’ on a number of occasions but his 
first Foreign Secretary, Hague, placed trade within a larger framework that he labelled a 
‘reinvigoration’ of Britain’s ‘global diplomatic network’ ‘to make it ready for the twenty first 
century’ and its ‘networked, highly connected world’.55  Britain, he explained, already had a 
‘unique network of partnerships’ but by opening, re-opening or enlarging embassies and consuls 
around the world, Hague would be ‘spreading British diplomacy to places that have not felt it in 
decades’ and ‘significantly strengthening our presence in many other locations.’56  As Morris 
pointed out, it emphasised Britain’s ability to reach anywhere in the world and the national 
interests which would be fulfilled through enacting this poise.57  Furthermore this globalised 
world of trading opportunities and multi-vectored diplomacy required a set of norms or rules for 
its superintendence.  Indeed Hammond’s main quarrel with Russia’s ‘annexation’ of Crimea 
was how it threatened ‘the rules-based international system’.58  Britain, Gapes noted, had 
‘defined international standards in 1948 and […] so we should be at the forefront of trying to 
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defend and strengthen those today.’59  The previous year, at the height of the tensions in 
Ukraine, Cameron had staked Britain’s claim in the matter by explaining that ‘Britain’s own 
future depends on a world where countries obey the rules’ and ‘we are an international country: 
a country that relies on the world’s markets being open, and on countries obeying norms and 
standards of behaviour.’60 
 
The different rhetorical emphasis of the preceding Labour governments nonetheless mobilised 
the same set of spatialisations which fixed Britain in a subject position of global relevance.  In 
2003 Straw drew on Blair’s notion of the ‘international community’ when speaking about Iraq 
and global terrorism.  Tackling terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were, 
he said, ‘vital to protecting our security’ but Britain also needed to  
‘pursue longer-term goals that will create a more stable world and 
tackle state breakdown and the conditions in which violence and 
extremism can thrive.  The world today is too interlinked and 
interdependent for us to be indifferent to insecurity in any region, 
however remote it may appear to be.’61 
British participation in the intervention in Iraq—making it ‘free, prosperous and stable’—was 
thus concerned with restoring the country’s ‘normal relationship with the international 
community’.62  While Conservatives emphasised the trading aspects, Straw linked his thinking 
to the ‘internationalist’ strand of Labour’s identity.  ‘We are all internationalists now’, Blair had 
written the previous year; in the 2003 debate Straw reflected, ‘whether or not internationalism 
was ever an idealist luxury, today it is an essential part of pursuing our national interests.’63  By 
the later debates, the concept had positive connotations across the House; Secretary of State for 
International Development Justine Greening, for example, explained how Britain had ‘taken on 
global problems and made them our own.’64   
 
Crucially, and as Blair always maintained, the globalised, modern world implicitly and 
explicitly superintended by an exclusive ‘international community’ relied on rules, norms and 
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standards of behavior although, like Cook’s ‘ethical foreign policy’ (Conservative Mike Trend 
said that use of the ‘once golden phrase’ had given ‘a foolish hostage to fortune’), it rapidly 
became discursively passé.65  The evergreen ‘internationalism’, however, was still narrated in 
the same fashion, as evidenced by the remarks of Hendrick in the 2000 debate: ‘to be successful, 
internationalism needs rules, laws and order’.66  Clearly in Blair’s thinking, the writ of these 
rules ran beyond previously sacrosanct territorial boundaries and, even without ‘boots on the 
ground’, Cameron’s participation in the ousting of Libya’s Gaddafi and airstrikes in Iraq and 
Syria suggest that Daddow and Schnapper are right to point to the influence of ‘liberal 
interventionism’ on both.67 
2.3. Ensuring reach in a globalised world: Greater Britain redux and the projection 
of values 
The globalised space constructed in the Commons discourse of these debates was the natural 
environment for Britain to thrive in because of its designation as a leading member of an 
exclusive international community and/or a trading nation at the centre of a global diplomatic 
network.  Underpinning this was, as I have already hinted, the historically constituted attributes 
of Britain and its ability to project its values around the world.  What made Britain ‘unique’—a 
common designation in these debates and beyond—was the clutch of organisations of which it 
is a member but also the particular set of values which the country is said to embody.68  Whether 
conceptualised as the Doctrine of International Community or the Global Diplomatic Network, 
British foreign policy in the period under question has been underpinned by this idea of 
projection of values.  A hauntology of Greater Britain and imperialism in general, the projection 
of values is intimately (but not exclusively) linked to globalisation narratives as well as the 
spectre of strategic shrinkage.  This fixes a subject position for Britain of relevance within an 
international environment that has been rendered as a space suitable for, and requiring British 
values.  So conceived it is a fait accompli as international context and national attributes are 
elucidated around and amongst one another in ways that reify an ontologically secure Self. 
 
Cultures of imperial Island Race identity, as I argued in chapter 1, similarly co-constituted a 
world in which universal British values were of great import.  In competition with the 
degenerate values of imperial rivals like France and Russia, they would civilise the native 
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populations of Africa, Asia and the Pacific and be carried forth and perpetuated by the white 
settler colonies.  This situation was not terminated during decolonisation as the West sought—
however ham-fistedly—to ensure continued ‘development’ and, more importantly, protect the 
infant, independent nations from Soviet influence.  This was implicit in chapter 3 as we saw 
how the inception of NATO constituted the importance of British values in the new post-War 
order.  In many ways, this reached its apex in the era of globalisation, mobilised by a multitude 
of phenomena.  The demolition of global communism signalled the triumph of Western values 
yet, in an environment of dissolving boundaries in which there would be no more state-on-state 
conflict, failed and rogue states and amorphous terrorist organisations seemed only to confirm 
the need for their proselytising power and reach.  Consequently Blair argued: 
‘the distinction between a foreign policy driven by values and one 
driven by interests, is wrong.  Globalisation begets interdependence.  
Interdependence begets the necessity of a common value system to 
make it work.  Idealism becomes realpolitik.’69 
These values are often vaguely defined but nevertheless sharply identified in their presence or 
absence, as in Barnett’s distinction between a ‘Functioning Core’ and a ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ 
and Robert Cooper’s ‘postmodern world’ and the ‘zone of chaos’ or ‘pre-modern world’.70  
Thus globalisation, like the Cold War, becomes a profoundly normative project.  Just as the 
late-Victorian oceanic imperium was both an entirely natural expression of British geopolitics 
and something that required urgent and constant vigilance; so the Anglo-American ‘agents’ of 
globalisation are the embodiment of the values required to superintend it.71  
 
The discourse of the importance of British values was instrumentalised across the multiple 
scenarios of the four debates, ensuring British relevance and allowing reach in a time (especially 
since 2010) of spending cuts; indeed in Cameron and his Liberal Democrat Deputy Nick 
Clegg’s foreword to the SDSR, they described Britain’s ‘proud history of standing up for the 
values we believe in’.72  Cook defined these as ‘freedom, decency and justice’; Straw as ‘justice 
and democracy’; and Hague spoke of what Britain ‘stands for in the world’: ‘human rights, 
development and freedom’.73  ‘Projecting’ these values was, Hammond explained, ‘at the heart 
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of our strategy.’74  The coupling of these Foreign Affairs debates with Defence in 2000 and 
2003 and International Development in 2012 and 2015 meant that matters pertaining to both 
‘hard’ (although the divisive issue of Trident renewal was largely absent) and ‘soft’ power were 
discussed.  While laudations for the British military abounded, it was generally assumed that 
Britain’s soft capabilities were just as vital for the projection of its values; as Conservative 
James Heappey put it: ‘British culture and values reach far further and carry more influence 
than even the largest military ever could.’75   
 
This also served to draw a line between Labour’s adventurism and the succeeding Conservative 
governments which had supported the Iraq invasion in opposition.  Although many 
Conservative Members in 2012 and 2015 emphasised the importance of military power Zahawi, 
for instance, argued that ‘the nation-building approach of the 2000s was not realistic.’76  Britain, 
he said, needed ‘a new approach to foreign policy: one that recognises that, although we cannot 
design the world in our own image, we are not powerless to influence events’; and ‘although we 
cannot act alone, we occupy a unique position in international diplomacy, with disproportionate 
soft power as the closest ally of the world’s only superpower and with the finest diplomatic 
service in the world’.77  Similarly, in linking Blair’s interventionism to the new environment of 
globalisation, Patrick Grady, International Development Spokesperson for the Scottish National 
Party, explained that ‘our global economy and our environment are too fragile and too 
precarious to take the shocks that come from military adventurism and old-school projection of 
power.’78 
 
Britain was constituted as being particularly well-endowed with regard to soft power; ‘we have 
a lot going for us’, remarked Zahawi.79  Hague exemplified this in a 2013 speech in California 
in which he said ‘I sometimes urge British diplomats to imagine that we had just woken up 
today to find our country had been planted in the world overnight’.  He catalogued Britain’s 
assets—the English language, the UNSC seat, EU, NATO and Commonwealth membership, the 
diplomatic network, the nuclear deterrent, the British Army, the development programme and 
‘all the ingenuity, creativity and resilience that is such an ingrained part of our national 
character’—and declared: ‘we would rejoice in our good fortune’.80  In the 2012 debate he 
announced that his reinvigorated diplomatic network would equip Britain to pursue ‘two 
principal aims: […] respond to urgent challenges and crises in ways that promote Britain’s 
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national interest and our democratic values, including human rights, poverty reduction and 
conflict prevention, and […] equip our country to be a safe, prosperous and influential nation 
for the long term.’81  Straw in 2003 referred to ‘a widely respected and growing aid programme; 
the network available to us through the Commonwealth and the English language; and our 
strong relationships across the world’ and noted how Britain was a member of ‘more 
international organisations than any other country except France’.82  The emphasis was often 
different between Conservative and Labour Members but both upheld the fundamental notion 
that the world needed British values and that Britain had the capability to project them; a poise 
whose ontological security relied upon established, geopolitical designations of Britain in the 
world.  So while Hammond privileged the security aspects of value projection (especially 
relating to ISIL and the Middle East and Russia/Ukraine), Labour Co-operative MP Gavin 
Shuker argued that ‘from the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea, freedoms that we take for 
granted are under threat: freedom of religion and belief, freedom to love, and freedom of 
speech; those freedoms require not our tacit acceptance but shoring up.’83   
 
These values were both parochial and universal; their methods of transmission particular and 
unique to Britain but of global significance.  Away from the Commons, Cook had contended in 
2000 that ‘the global community needs universal values’ and, after the Iraq invasion that had 
caused Cook to depart from the Cabinet, Blair told the US Congress that ‘ours are not Western 
values, they are the universal values of the human spirit.’84  These, according to Labour’s Alex 
Cunningham in the 2012 debate, gave Britain ‘the power to bring about change in the world’.85  
Hammond had it that Britain was ‘one of only a small number of countries with both the 
aspiration and the means’ to do this.86  Even those such as Benyon who warned the House to 
treat phrases such as ‘projecting power’ and ‘punching above our weight’ (a favourite of 
Cameron) with caution, still asserted that Britain should play ‘a leading role in the world.’87  
Benn argued that ‘Britain retains influence and reach in global affairs’ because of the typical 
array of assets and that they brooked a ‘particular responsibility to use Britain’s place in the 
world’.88  We can see in all this a self-fulfilling prophecy that is symptomatic of geopolitical 
culture and discursive practices of fixing ontologically secure subject positions.  The global 
environment and Britain’s place within it were co-constitutive of one another and narrated 
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according to each other’s terms so that British values were not only given importance but their 
projection positively impelled.  Spatially, this was possible because of the geopolitics of 
globalisation and the characteristics of the Island Race; politically, it was desirable because of 
the universal appeal and origin of the values in Britain’s particular island forge. 
3. Europe and the Island Race in the twenty-first century       
3.1. Introduction: Britain and Europe from Thatcher to New Labour 
Since the events of chapter 4 in which Britain began negotiations with the EEC before being 
rebuffed by France, Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe has been more or less 
controversial in Commons discourse; in 2015 Blunt called it ‘a sore that has run through British 
politics’.89  This section comprises an analysis of discourse on Britain-EU relations from the 
four debates.  It explores how the two main Westminster parties articulate competing subject 
positions for Britain that mobilise Island Race identity tropes.  In a foreign policy realm that is 
frequently consensual, discourse on Europe remains highly partisan but, as I will show, that of 
both Labour and the Conservatives rely on the established tropes of Island Race identity in order 
to elucidate their often competing visions for Britain and the rest of the continent.    
 
The electorate voted to remain in what was by then the EC in 1975 but Thatcher’s views on 
Europe became increasingly hostile and, after her political demise, Major presided over 
Britain’s ejection from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and endured years of hostility 
from his own Party over it and his participation in the so-called ‘Maastricht Treaty’.  The 
Conservative schisms epitomised the discursive conundrum of Island Race identity: Major 
wanted Britain to be at the ‘heart of Europe’ yet, as Thatcher recorded in her memoirs, this was  
‘a plain impossibility in more than merely the geographical sense, 
since our traditions and interests diverged sharply in many areas from 
those of our Continental neighbours.  [… I]n trade generally, and in 
agricultural trade in particular, Britain is both more open and more 
dependent on countries outside Europe than are our European 
partners.’90 
She pointedly told the Lords in 1993 that she ‘could never have signed’ Maastricht.91  Perhaps 
cognizant of his predecessor’s scathing views of former Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (who 
precipitated her downfall when he resigned from the government, ostensibly over Europe) and 
his ‘misty’, ‘romantic longing’ for a Europe that was ‘a touchstone of highmindedness and 
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civilized values’, Major (as Blair would) characterised his own enthusiasm for continental ties 
as ‘a cold, clear-eyed calculation of the British national interest’.92  Europe was cast as the 
pragmatic choice over his infamous, Baldwinesque panegyric to a disappearing Albion of ‘long 
shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers’.93   
 
Blair’s opposition taunted Major over the apparent divisions in his party.  The Prime Minister, 
Blair said, was caught ‘in the middle’, between two hostile camps, ‘never making up his mind’ 
whether to fully commit Britain to the European project or not and Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Cook characterised the government as ‘retreating into the rhetoric and mind-set of an 18th-
century nation state’ when Britain ‘could not be isolated from the world’.94  In this discursive 
battle over the balance between insularity and universality, Labour, ensconced with 
globalisation narratives which impelled Britain to be engaged on all fronts wherever possible, 
accused the government of overly emphasising insularity.95  Major responded by casting Blair 
as a crypto-federalist, obsessed with ‘handing powers’ to the EU in spite of Britain’s ‘very deep 
attachment to the nation state’.96  The continued presence of the Maastricht ‘rebels’, not to 
mention their supporters in Major’s cabinet (he was infamously overheard in 1993 calling them 
‘bastards’), furthered the perception of a divided Conservative government increasingly existing 
at the whim and sufferance of the Eurosceptics.97  Yet what is striking about particularly 
Rifkind’s time as Major’s last Foreign Secretary is how much his rhetoric resembled that of the 
contemporaneous Labour Party as he described how British ‘geography and history’ meant it 
had ‘an Atlantic and a European identity’ and that choosing between the two was not 
‘appropriate or relevant’.98  Six months later, debating his first Gracious Address as Prime 
Minister, Blair said: ‘there will be no false choices between the Atlantic and Europe.’99 
 
This was more than just party politics, for the ways in which the Labour attacks on the 
government were constituted reveal much about practices of ontological security-seeking and 
British geopolitical identity (re)formation.  As each side tries to elucidate a vision of the British 
Self regarding Europe, they mobilise established tropes to fix an ontologically secure subject 
position for Britain.  In the ensuing section we will see how this played out in the four debates. 
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3.2. Competing subject positions: the EU and NATO 
In 2000 and 2003 the Labour government accused the Conservatives of wanting to isolate 
Britain (a misreading of insularity); the Conservative opposition tarred Labour with embedding 
Britain in a federal superstate, thus compromising universality as well as the treasured Atlantic 
security pact which had embodied the values of Greater Britain (see chapter 3).  In 2010 and 
2015 the Conservatives suggested that an unreformed EU risked irrelevance in a globalised 
world in which Britain ought to thrive; typically Labour accused the government of an 
international retreat and failing to grasp the imperative to engage simultaneously on all fronts, 
thus deranging the balance between insularity and universality. 
 
Throughout the 2000 and 2003 debates, the Conservative opposition discursively established a 
subject-position in which Britain was being led towards a European defence scheme which 
would compromise the primacy of NATO.  We have already seen across the chapters, but 
especially in 3 and 5, the importance of NATO to British conceptions of security and also how 
it was originally constituted as a recrudescence of ideas of Greater Britain: an organisation 
embodying British cultural values which would ensure its superiority as against the forces of 
Sovietism.  In the debates in question here, the Conservative accusations against Blair’s 
government were constituted by several discursive themes.  Broadly, Britain was cast as being 
reliant on NATO first and foremost for its security because of its Atlantic identity.  Negative 
characterisations of the EU exploited established Island Race characterisations of the Continent 
and were ranged against NATO through the constitution of threats that could only be mitigated 
by the sort of asset inherent in NATO rather than the EU. 
 
NATO, it was agreed by all who spoke in the debates, was vital for the security of Britain.  For 
Conservatives this was becoming imperilled by EU defence schemes.  The ways in which this 
was characterised signifies the continued importance of Island Race tropes in constitutions of 
identity in British foreign policy discourse.  NATO was proof of Britain’s ties with and 
relevance to a larger region than just Europe.  The Shadow Foreign Secretary in 2000, Francis 
Maude, warned that a ‘separate European army’ would risk relegating NATO to ‘a relic of the 
past’.100  It would, Soames said, ‘split NATO asunder’ and, while he acknowledged Blair’s 
‘Atlanticist credentials’, his colleague Michael Howard decried the Prime Minister’s ‘notorious 
weakness for trying to appear to be all things to all men.’101  Redolent of discourse responding 
to de Gaulle’s rebuff of Macmillan’s EEC application (see chapter 4), both men rendered the 
scenario as one in which Britain was being hoodwinked by the duplicitous French.  Howard 
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described them as ‘opportunist’, yet exhibiting behaviour that was entirely ‘consistent’ given 
how, as Soames described while reminding the House of de Gaulle’s veto, they had ‘worked for 
years to undermine and dilute the American influence in Europe.’102  This, the latter said, was 
France’s ‘greatest ambition’.103  Shadow Defence Secretary Iain Duncan Smith also saw French 
influence behind the scenes and suspected that the schemes would ‘dilute NATO and eventually 
decouple the United States from the defence and the alliance of Western Europe’.104 
 
Michael Ancram, Shadow Foreign Secretary in 2003, noted how the French wanted to ‘corrode’ 
NATO: in contrast to them and the Labour government, ‘we believe that the wholehearted 
commitment of the United States to NATO is vital, and we deprecate the tacit anti-Americanism 
that motivates some European leaders to seek a separate European military capability.’105  
Alongside the historically established Othering of France, the more pertinent discursive point 
was how the positively represented quality of Atlanticism was—as with insularity and 
universality—a delicate balancing operation.  Therefore this aspect of Commons discourse was 
hardly a series of splenetic anti-European rants but rather attempts at suggesting how the 
government had misunderstood or deranged the balance between the European and American 
postures.  In other words: ontological security was sought by elucidating how Britain ought to 
retain partial but definite ties with the rest of Europe without compromising NATO or the 
‘special relationship’; an ‘island nation’, as Hague told Conference in 2007, ‘that is never 
insular’.106  The aim was—as Thatcher had hoped and Blair would emphasise—to be something 
like a bridge between the two: in both camps but retaining a privileged position as a pivotal 
balancer achieving both partial insularity from Europe and a universal aspect on world affairs; 
not, as Blunt described, a ‘poodle’.107  Robertson exemplified the conceptual, Island Race roots 
of this poise when he argued that there was ‘a huge cultural difference between NATO and the 
EU, because as an organisation the EU tends to concentrate on inward matters.’108    
 
The stance towards Europe was not one of complete rejection; Soames, for example, was ‘fed 
up with my party being characterised as anti-European.’109  His colleague Bowen Wells was 
also broadly pro-Europe but drew on Eurosceptic former Labour Member Peter (now Baron) 
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Shore’s recent book, Separate Ways: Britain and Europe.110  ‘The people of Britain’, Wells 
explained, ‘do not want a European identity, but identify more readily with the English-
speaking world and the Commonwealth.’111  In this we see the crux of the Conservatives’ 
discursive practices of ontological security-seeking: the drawing of a distinction between a weak 
European identity and a stronger ‘Anglosphere’ one that privileged established Island Race 
identity tropes of insularity, universality and Greater Britain.112  Complete identification with 
both was represented as impossible, hence Ancram’s remark concerning Blair that one cannot 
be ‘pro-American one day and pro-European the next.’113 
3.3. Insularity and universality: the EU in a globalised world 
In office and having promised a referendum on EU membership preceded by negotiations to 
reform Britain’s terms, the Conservative discourse of the 2012 and 2015 debates articulated a 
different conception of European relations.  Amongst the contextual landscape of now deeply 
embedded notions of globalisation and the more recent argots of apparent strategic shrinkage in 
a world of multiple and complex threats, some questioned the EU’s suitability and relevance.  
This mobilised established Island Race identity tropes to fix Britain in a subject position of 
global relevance while avoiding too many European entanglements.   
 
Of the two Foreign Secretaries, Hague’s 2012 speech was dominated by his diplomatic network 
rather than Europe; Hammond grouped the relationship with the EU along with threats like 
Russia/Ukraine and ISIL as something that needed ‘resolving’.114  ‘In a rapidly globalising 
world,’ he explained, ‘the European Union has demonstrated fundamental weaknesses that have 
to be addressed.’115  In keeping with globalisation narratives and what was by now an 
established Conservative assertion that the EU—in Cameron’s words—needed to ‘act with the 
speed and flexibility of a network, not the cumbersome rigidity of a bloc’, Hammond contended 
that the EU ‘has to change course’ to become ‘more outward looking’ and ‘competitive’.116  As 
Ancram had in 2003, Jenrick warned that the EU ‘risks being hopelessly outmoded in a world 
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that demands flexibility, decentralisation and, above all, openness to the markets beyond’.117  
The size of the EU as a market—something Labour had persistently reiterated as a boon—was 
irrelevant to Mike Wood if Europeans ‘barricade themselves off from the rest of the world.’118  
Morris noted the ‘grand transition in international affairs’ towards a ‘complex, uncertain and 
often chaotic’ environment which called into question the ‘policy consensus’ on Britain’s 
membership of the EU if it was deemed not sufficiently ‘outward facing’.119  In dealing with 
such challenges—including countering ‘Sun Kings, emperors, Führers or Russian bears’—
Richard Graham wondered whether current ‘global structures’ were ‘fit for purpose […] in this 
age […] in which governments feel more fragile, less in control of our future and less sure about 
the value of our different unions’.120  Of these organisations, it was the Commonwealth that was 
preferred by Eurosceptic Labour MP Kate Hoey; Hague suggested that the EU needed to act 
more like the Commonwealth and ‘use its collective weight in the world’.121  While 
acknowledging the importance of the EU, Pincher emphasised its many troubles and how they 
further impelled Britain ‘to raise our sights above and beyond Europe, as we always have 
done’.122  The two Conservative positions of arguing that the EU was compromising NATO and 
becoming less relevant in a globalised world are co-constitutive of Island Race identity tropes 
insofar as they privilege relations beyond Europe and discursively enact the poise of insularity 
from Europe and universality. 
 
Labour’s persistent retort during this period also mobilised these tropes by articulating a 
subject-position for Britain in which it did not have to choose between Europe and the rest of 
the world because of its ‘outward facing’ identity.  They accused the Conservatives of overly 
privileging insularity through its partial stance towards the rest of Europe.  In 2000 Cook 
mocked the parochial Conservative reaction to the proposed Treaty of Nice that he had just been 
negotiating, telling the House that it would ‘not bring the white cliffs of Dover crumbling 
down.’123  In targeting a recent international policy statement of the Opposition he said it was 
‘the first time in history that a party has tried to produce a foreign policy while solving the 
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problem of not having to work with foreigners.’124  The Conservatives, he said, had a ‘vision of 
Britain in the world’ as ‘a timid, frightened little thing staying at home with the door locked, 
[…] a Britain with no leadership to offer the international community’.  By contrast, the Labour 
Party believed ‘in a nation that deserves leadership, not isolation, in the world’.125  His 
colleague Anderson talked of the Conservatives’ ‘pygmy views’ on Europe; and he and Straw 
contended that, with a Conservative government, Britain would be ‘isolated’ and 
‘marginalised’.126  Hendrick drew on Churchill’s 1946 speech in Zürich—‘if Europe were once 
united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, to the 
prosperity and glory’—and contrasted it with the ‘Tory recipe for the isolation of Britain in an 
era of globalisation’.127  Hence any ‘choice’ between Europe, the US and the wider world was, 
as Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon and Straw put it respectively, ‘dangerous’ and ‘false’ and 
unnecessary given Britain’s ‘important assets’.128  These assets meant, in classic Labour 
parlance, that Britain could act as a ‘bridge’.129 
 
In Opposition after 2010 Labour members continued to accuse the Conservatives of overt 
insularity.  Alexander characterised the government as pursuing ‘isolation’, lack of ‘relevance’, 
‘self-congratulation, schadenfreude and a hint of imperial delusion’ ‘at a time when Britain’s 
influence in the world has rarely been more needed’.130  ‘Impotence, not splendour, is the 
consequence of isolation in today’s world.’131  Denis MacShane ridiculed Hague’s diplomatic 
network as ‘portakabin foreign policy’ and argued that it could be ‘summed up in two words: 
unsplendid isolation’; Cunningham remarked that, under the Conservatives, Britain was 
‘shirking our responsibilities’.132  Ivan Lewis, the Shadow Secretary of State for International 
Development, used the same terms as Anderson and Straw had earlier and warned of ‘isolation’ 
and ‘marginalisation’.133  Phil Wilson declared that he did not believe in ‘a little Britain’ and 
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Labour Co-operative Member Jonathan Reynolds pithily observed that ‘a sizeable number of 
Conservative Back Benchers would not be happy even if our European neighbours agreed to 
change the name of Europe to “Greater Britain”.’134 
 
These differences in emphasis and tone reflected mobilisations of the established identities of 
both parties.  Yet, in spite of the contrasts, both sets of Members were primarily drawing on 
broader, Island Race identity tropes.  The politics is located in the contest to elucidate the most 
ontologically secure rendering of Britain in the world, a social discursive practice which 
mobilises, first and foremost, Island Race identity tropes.  This impels a conception of debates 
over, not about, Britain’s established identity.  What I mean by this is that the essential subject-
position of Britain as a globally relevant actor with ties to Europe, the US and the wider world is 
secure; MPs discursively compete to elucidate the most appropriate rendering of this.  In doing 
so, they each draw on the most established, geopolitical identity tropes. 
4. Conclusion ‘plus’: Our island story 
In concluding this final empirical chapter I want to highlight two extra-parliamentary speeches 
that Cameron made in the 2010s because of the further light that they shed on constitutions of 
Island Race tropes in recent times and how they fix ontologically secure subject positions for 
Britain.  To lead into the concluding chapter, I will begin to reflect on the implications of this 
for the future of British foreign policy identity. 
 
In January 2013 the Prime Minister signalled the beginning of his attempts to negotiate a new 
relationship for Britain with the EU, an issue that he promised to hold a referendum on, in a 
speech in London.  It exemplified the continued relevance of insularity and universality to 
attempts to elucidate subject positions congruent with established notions of British 
international identity.  Britain, said Cameron, approaches the EU ‘with a frame of mind that is 
more practical than emotional’ and views it as ‘a means to an end—prosperity, stability, the 
anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores—not an end in 
itself.’  But Britain had ‘always been a European Power’ and ‘always will be’, making a ‘unique 
contribution’ to the continent.  Leaving the EU would no more change these ties to ‘our 
geographical neighbourhood’ than it would erase the stellar continental contribution that he said 
Britain had made: ‘from Caesar’s legions […] to the defeat of Nazism, we have helped to write 
European history and Europe has helped write ours.’  This Anglo-centric European history fixed 
Britain in a subject position of great importance, fundamental to what he called Britain’s ‘island 
story’:  
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‘our geography has shaped our psychology; we have the character of 
an island nation: independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our 
sovereignty.  We can no more change this than we can drain the 
English Channel.’135 
 
That Britain was ‘characterised by its openness’ and had ‘always been a country that reaches 
out, that turns its face to the world’ would constitute a major thrust of his Lee Valley speech the 
following year, a major intervention in the lead up to the Scottish independence referendum that 
would take place six months hence.136  Britain, under threat from Scottish nationalism, was ‘the 
winning team in world history’ and ‘the most extraordinary country in history’, embodied in the 
Prime Minister’s affection for Henrietta Marshall’s Our Island Story, an illustrated young 
person’s history book first published in 1905 that Cameron said he wanted ‘to give […] to my 
three children, and I want to be able to teach my youngest, when she’s old enough to 
understand, that she is part of this great, world-beating story.’137  Britain was ‘the soft power 
superpower’ from which emanated admired culture and values that represented ‘a source of 
hope for the world’: 
‘Our values are of value to the world.  In the darkest times in human 
history there has been, in the North Sea, a light that never goes out; 
and if this family of nations broke up, something very powerful and 
very precious the world over would go out forever.’ 
Remarkable, insular Britain was an inspiration to the world but also ‘earns its living through its 
international ties’.138  When considered in sum with Hague’s contemporaneous ‘global 
diplomatic network’ we see a quintessence of the co-constitutive notions of parochialism and 
universalism that is at the heart of Island Race identity.   
 
These speeches need to be conceptualised differently to the House of Commons debates largely 
relied upon in the previous chapters.  They did not form part of the debating culture of 
parliament and the Prime Minister would not be responded to immediately by either colleagues 
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or opponents.  As the speeches were provoked and driven by two particular issues, they 
nevertheless formed part of larger, ongoing debates that penetrated well beyond Westminster.  
The same, of course, can and ought to be said of the Commons debates themselves: 
Westminster, although frequently characterised as a ‘bubble’, is not a ‘black box’ and the 
debates that take place there cut across broader, societal ones found in traditional and social 
media, academic discourse and those undertaken verbally by British people every day.  
Cameron’s two speeches also directly reached a larger and less rarefied audience than 
Commons addresses.   
 
However conceptualised, these latest manifestations attest to the continued fecundity of Island 
Race identity in fixing Britain in ontologically secure subject positions relative to novel 
contexts.  The fact that the 2014 speech concerned a ‘domestic’ issue (however complex and 
loaded that expression is in this particular scenario) signals how these tropes are mobilised 
beyond ‘foreign policy’.  Indeed, Cameron’s first Education Secretary, Gove, told the 
Conservative Conference in 2010 that the country’s History teaching ought to reflect Britain’s 
‘island story’ and altered the GCSE English Literature curriculum to prioritise books by British 
authors.139  The question is provoked: are we witnessing a substantial renascence of Island Race 
identity under Conservative governments since 2010?  More pertinently, one might ask: how is 
it historically possible for these discursive themes to be mobilised by Cameron et al?  The first 
question would require a greater quantity and plurality of source material and a quantitative 
approach at odds with the methodology of this thesis but we have gone some way towards 
answering the second.  The part that this chapter has played in this regard has been to 
conceptualise how, under both Labour and Conservative governments, the ‘new’ environment 
of post-Cold War globalisation has been narrated in such a way that fixes Britain in 
ontologically secure, geopolitical subject positions in which its established Island Race identity 
ensures continued relevance.  Certainly Cameron’s ‘island story’ represents some of the most 
explicit and sustained renditions of islandness probably since Thatcher’s post-Falklands 
rhetoric, yet the discourse of Labour Members under Blair and since has similarly reified Island 
Race identity tropes and, important though the grandstanding of Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Secretaries are, what this chapter and the thesis as a whole have done is to situate them within 
broader, discursive cultures that are properly conceived of as forms of social practice.140   
 
In the ensuing and concluding chapter, I will be able to reflect more fully on the chapters in 
summation, taking into account my original intention to decentre the ‘present’ by examining 
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constitutions of discourse and identity (re)formation over an historical period.  This chapter has 
added to this study by showing the endurance of the insularity/universality nexus that is vital in 
understanding the attempts of foreign policy-makers to fix Britain in ontologically secure 
subject positions regarding Europe and the rest of the world.  Furthermore it has demonstrated 
that, in a scenario persistently depicted as ‘new’ by MPs—the post-Cold War world—Island 
Race identity tropes have remained discursively important because of the ways in which this 
novel context is narrated according to the established spatialisations of Britain’s geopolitical 
identity which render its unique values as internationally essential. 
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chapter 7 
Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
This thesis was set out to offer a new reading of British foreign policy since 1949 by 
foregrounding discursive constitutions of an established geopolitical identity that I call the 
Island Race.  I made the claim that five, interlinked tropes of Island Race identity had been 
crucial in the narration of the British Empire, especially from the late-Victorian era, and 
hypothesised that they had not simply disappeared with the gradual ending of British 
imperialism but remained crucial to how British identity has been secured since.  In order to test 
this hypothesis and trace the recrudescence of these identity tropes over the period in question I 
employed an interpretivist, genealogical approach that highlighted how they were mobilised 
across a multitude of scenarios as British MPs sought ontological security in their parliamentary 
debates.  This was provoked by the neglect of geopolitics and identity in studies of modern 
British foreign policy that are so often preoccupied with charting post-imperial decline, 
assessing the effectiveness of the pursuit of national interests or else articulating an under-
explored Self/Other dynamic to explain relations with the rest of Europe.   
 
By conceptualising foreign policy in terms of geopolitics and identity and political debate as the 
co-constitutive fixing of ontologically secure subject positions around long-standing and 
emergent contexts, I have found that Island Race identity has remained significant across time 
and in a multitude of scenarios because of the ways in which they are narrated according to 
established British geopolitical precepts.  So thoroughly was Britain conceptualised as the 
Island Race during its imperial moment that, even without the Empire, British MPs have 
continued to mobilise these spatial identity tropes as they navigate new events in the period 
under question.  In this chapter I will synthesise the empirical findings that have led me to this 
conclusion and then reflect on the future of British foreign policy, identity and geopolitics, and 
potential avenues for research that have been opened up by my study. 
2. The five tropes of Island Race identity: a genealogical overview 
I began this thesis by positing the importance of five, interlinked discursive tropes of Island 
Race identity and their enduring importance in how ontologically secure notions of Britain are 
sought in the House of Commons.  Each chapter focused on parliamentary debates concerned 
with several events as I traced how these tropes were mobilised around these contexts.  Taking 
the chapters as a whole, I will now present an overview of the development of Island Race 
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identity tropes in British foreign policy discourse since 1949.  As I suggested in chapter 1, the 
tropes were not just interlinked but thoroughly constitutive of one another and should be 
considered in totality.   
 
The posture of partial insularity from the rest of Europe was at its most explicit in chapter 4 
concerning the Macmillan government’s eventually scuppered negotiations to join the EEC in 
the early 1960s.  As Members debated this in 1960 and 1961, ontological security was sought 
through the fixing of Britain in a variety of subject positions relying on the insularity trope of 
Island Race identity.  Britain, it was said by many, had a great deal of affinity with the rest of 
Europe but was culturally and historically apart and had a vital role in balancing the continent 
so that it would not be dominated by a single Power.  Chapter 6 demonstrated the continued 
relevance of this notion, as Members accused the Labour governments from 1997 of subsuming 
Britain in a federal Europe that was alien to the country’s separate and distinct instincts.  This, 
as has so often been characterised, has drawn upon practices of Othering Europe; but it is more 
than simply xenophobia.  The reification and continued relevance of Island Race identity in the 
context of European integration relies, to some degree, on the constitution of Europe’s 
separateness as the brute proof of Britain’s islandness itself.  Thus Othering of Europe 
comprises part of the praxis of fixing an ontologically secure subject position for Britain that 
depends upon the established notions of proximal separateness.  In other words, marking a 
distinction between Britain and the rest of Europe is not an end in itself but merely part of the 
means of establishing a secure identity.  By articulating antithetical qualities, Britain is not 
necessarily fixed as anti-European or Eurosceptic but as a particular, differentiated subject 
defined according to established Island identity tropes.  Furthermore, by chapter 6, insularity 
had become an execration.  Clearly Britain’s insular past, in the discourse of the time, had been 
productive of a unique set of values, but to remain insular in the modern world (and one could 
be insular by either remaining in an unreformed EU or leaving it) conflicted with the 
universality trope of Island Race identity that was being emphasised in the narration of 
globalisation.   
 
Yet, as I argued in chapter 1, the concern here must not only be with Europe and this thesis has 
demonstrated the co-constitutive nature of insularity and universality insofar as the marrying of 
parochialism with globalism relies on both partial insularity from the rest of the continent and a 
universal aspect on world affairs.  Hence its great significance in the debates of 1960 and 1961 
when potential membership of the EEC was weighed alongside Britain’s global ties and 
interests.  In 1963, Members discursively reacted to de Gaulle’s veto precisely by emphasising 
this; the Othering of France that took place—of which there was a great deal—relied also upon 
149 
 
 
 
distinguishing between narrow continental practices and the open outlook of Britain.  It was not 
just a matter of Britain being different from Europe but how it was represented as such.   
 
Insularity and universality also partly constituted the debate on the inking of NATO in chapter 3 
with some Members pointing out how the limited area covered by the treaty might compromise 
the latter and represent contracting British horizons when global reach had been an important 
and ontologically secure part of Britain’s identity.  The attraction of a defence pact with the US 
ultimately trumped these concerns and, with North America in some ways a signifier for at least 
part of ‘the rest of the world’, NATO was represented as striking the right balance, 
notwithstanding the anti-Americanism of some Leftist MPs.  The Suez Crisis too was 
significant in the discursive negotiation of these interlinked tropes as the scope of British 
universality and reach was called into question by the apparent impotence of Britain in the face 
of Nasser’s affront; both Eden’s and Gaitskell’s supporters sought to fix Britain in ontologically 
secure subject positions dependent on established British identity tropes.  The narration of the 
Falklands Conflict in chapter 5 further showed the importance of insularity and universality 
with Members elucidating secure subject positions for Britain in which it was able and impelled 
to reach the South Atlantic against the odds.   
 
The debates on NATO, Suez and the Falklands also demonstrate how insularity and universality 
function in a co-constitutive fashion with the Greater Britain trope in the sense that it is the 
projection of British values—uniquely forged because of insularity—that is most often 
represented as ensuring universality in situations where threats to established, British 
conceptions of international order are constituted.  The discursive recrudescence of a 
metacommunity of British values such as democracy, rule of law and individual freedoms 
(sometimes also the English language), was embodied immediately in NATO and has remained 
more or less significant as Britain’s actual or military power has waned.  This shouldn’t, 
however, be seen as just a proxy for declining power: at the height of Britain’s imperial naval 
supremacy, the projection of values was still an important, constitutive part of the discourse of 
empire.  This intertwining of the parochial and the global that we have seen throughout the 
thesis means that this trope should properly be seen in sum with insularity and universality in 
the sense that the separation from Europe and the unique and sheltered development that this is 
said to have fostered allowed the nascence of a unique set of values that were of universal 
importance.  This was clearly important in an unsettling period by articulating ontological 
security for Britain through the fixing of its particular values as having global reach and 
relevance. 
 
150 
 
 
 
In chapter 3 Eden’s narration of the Suez Crisis concerned not only the physicality of the Lines 
of Communication but also how Nasser’s actions threatened the projection of British values; 
Gaitskell’s constituted the threat in the very prospect of a unilateral British response denigrating 
its role as an arbiter of the rule of law and scion and beacon of democratic, internationalist 
values.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Falklands Conflict in chapter 5 were both 
said to threaten the supremacy of this unique cache of British values, the importance of which 
was reified in the act of constituting them as being under threat.  As we saw in chapter 6, the 
most recent constitutions of British foreign policy fix a similar subject position in which the 
globalised world requires unbounded, universal (Western) values, with Britain the vanguard of 
this normative project by virtue of its outward-facing instincts.  In the manner of Suez, 
Afghanistan, the Falklands, Bosnia, Crimea and all manner of other issues, the War on Terror 
had only confirmed this.  Blair might have described how, after September 11, ‘the clarity was 
plain, vivid and defining’ but this simply reinforced what he had explained to the Lord Mayor’s 
Banquet in 1999 about not only Britain’s values but its central, geopolitical position in their 
global projection: ‘We have a new role […] not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a 
power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its 
future.’1  It was, in other words, unremarkable because the reiterated idea that Britain had, as 
Mike Gapes MP put it, ‘defined’ modern ‘international standards’ in the late 1940s, meant that 
even what Cameron called a ‘generational struggle’ against Islamic extremism was, in fact, the 
latest recrudescence of how ontological security is sought through the fixing of Britain in a 
subject position relying on historical constitutions of the Island Race trope of Greater Britain 
according to which British values have global significance.2   
 
The conception of the Lines of Communication facet of Island Race identity invited in this 
thesis retains relevance precisely because of the above.  In imperial terms, they were symbolic 
of a British geopolitical order of oceanic supremacy and unfettered reach across the globe that 
was never narrated purely militarily.  In chapter 3 we saw how they were represented as 
threatened by the Suez Crisis, as Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union severed the most 
accessible link between Western Europe and the Persian Gulf and Far East.  Without imperial 
India—the focal point of the Lines of Communication—Eden universalised the significance of 
the Crisis, consecrating the spatial nomos of the British Empire as being beneficent for the 
entire world.3  In the highly partisan debates of the time, Opposition leader Gaitskell’s warnings 
about the Prime Minister’s favoured violent, unmediated response did not dispute the 
designation of Suez as a globally significant locale; amongst the party politics, both sides of the 
                                                          
1 Blair (2010), p. 343; Wickam-Jones (2000), p. 19.  See Ingram & Dodds (2009b), p. 7. 
2 Gapes: HC Deb 01 June 2015, vol. 596, col. 370; Cameron: HC Deb 21 January 2013, vol. 557, col. 27. 
3 Schmitt (1950), pp. 172-3, 178. 
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House upheld the importance of the Lines of Communication for global order.  Although Britain 
was less directly involved, the ways in which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was debated in 
chapter 5 show how this spatial, ordering trope retained significance for British ontological 
security in the ensuing period.   
 
In the British representations of the post-Cold War situation in chapter 6 we can see further and 
significant echoes of this.  The new globalised order, with its ‘space of flows’ is not simply 
redolent of the old Lines of Communication, it replicates both its language and the ways in 
which Britain (and its allies) is held to be of importance as arbiter and guardian of a benevolent, 
global system superintended by values.4  The transcendent globalisation of New Labour, and the 
ways in which the already mutable distances inherent in Island Race identity were stretched 
even further, is shown to be reliant on normative conceptions of particular values and their 
utility in the world.  In these particular spatialisations it is the British conception of 
globalisation—narrated according to its own historic oceanic tendencies—that impels the need 
for a values-driven order and thus connotes ontological security by reifying both its own 
discourse of imagined, geopolitical space and Britain’s pivotal place within it.  Here too is the 
co-constitutive significance of Cameron’s ‘island story’ and Hague’s ‘global diplomatic 
network’: its consecration of a global order superintended by unique, exceptional British values. 
 
For much of the period analysed in this thesis, the Soviet Union played the role of geopolitical 
antithesis in discursive constitutions of Britain that mobilised established Island Race tropes.  It 
was important in the ways in which the formation of NATO and the Suez Crisis were narrated 
in chapter 3 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Falklands Conflict in chapter 5.  
The Soviet Union functioned as the Other against which ontologically secure British qualities as 
a Sea Power could be defined: benevolent, democratic, freedom-loving, favouring non-
contiguous, sovereign communities of values over autocratic and expansionist land blocs.  The 
Soviet ‘presence’ in these episodes meant that ontological security could be fixed by its 
summoning as a threat to the established British identity tropes, thereby confirming their 
existence and importance.  Yet, as in the case of France in chapter 4 and, indeed, the EU in 
chapter 6, what is important is not just that Soviet Russia was an Other, but the particular 
fashions in which it was designated thusly.  Communism was only the latest manifestation of 
the traditional rapacity of Russian Land Power that has its antecedents in the rule of the Tsars.  
Narrated according to established Island Race tropes the Cold War was, in British discourse, a 
developing context that confirmed and reified British identity in various, ontologically secure 
subject positions reliant upon island geopolitics.  
                                                          
4 Thrift (1995), pp. 18-9; van der Wusten & Dijkink (2002), p. 34; Burman (2008), p. 70. 
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Island Race identity so conceived in this thesis represents a comprehensive set of framing 
devices for British foreign policy-makers when securing meanings of the state in manifold 
international contexts.  It comprises a geopolitical totality in which the island geography of 
universality is the deus ex machina in a multitude of situations, giving British foreign policy a 
particular, transcendent relevance according to its own logic.  In this way it is not dissimilar to 
French ‘exceptionalism’ or the US as ‘the exemplary nation’.5  Too often conceptualised as 
simply imperial nostalgia, this thesis has shown how dependent British foreign policy is on 
discursive practices of ontological security-seeking which rely on the tropes of islandness that 
narrated the Empire.6  Furthermore, what is opened up is how the discursive habits which make 
up the reiterations of Island Race identity have become sedimented practice in the Commons, 
perhaps now another one of the august traditions of the Lower House in British politics.  Like 
all traditions, it is more dynamic than it might at first appear: responding and adapting to 
neoteric arrangements like NATO, the Cold War, European integration and globalisation by 
narrating them as fitting with established identity tropes, fixing ontologically secure definitions 
of Britain while maintaining contextual relevance. 
3. The future of Island Race identity 
It would be easy to say that, given my arguments, we cannot expect any serious changes to this 
pattern of recrudescing Island Race tropes in fixing Britain’s identity.  It would also, in some 
senses, be true.  But that would be to oversimplify what has been presented in this thesis.  While 
it is far from a fait accompli that British foreign policy-makers always take recourse to these 
established notions of identity, they are nonetheless constrained by them.  Yet, as I have shown, 
ambivalent subject positions need to be secured in a dynamic environment, hence there are 
changes within the continuity of Island Race identity.7  This thesis has shown how these identity 
tropes are mutable and sensitive to the influence of ‘external’ events which themselves are 
narrated according to formulations of identity and co-constitutively ‘become’ one another.  In 
this sense, identity discourse must be conceived as dynamic.8  There are alterations of emphasis, 
exclusions and silences and unexpected moments in which figures come to prominence with 
their own renditions of Britishness and there are singular events which require hasty mediation 
and representation.  When several of these combine, the smooth narrative of a national identity 
can become derailed, sometimes permanently altering its course, sometimes to be redirected 
                                                          
5 Treacher (2003), p. 5; Burman (2006), p. 19. 
6 Northedge (1972), p. 23; Cox (1981), p. 140; Thornton (1984), p. vii; Wallace (1991), p. 70; Law (2005), 
p. 275. 
7 Campbell (1998), pp. 5-6, 12. 
8 Adler (1997), pp. 322-3. 
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later.9  At the risk of engaging in counterfactuals, who could say that if Thatcher hadn’t emerged 
or triumphed in 1979, Callaghan, Owen, Healey, Foot, or Heath or Howe would have embraced 
the Second Cold War as enthusiastically or narrated the Falklands Conflict in the same fashion?  
The hypothetical erasure of a particular figure at a particular moment can be tempting if 
intellectually questionable.  But the point is, and this is the richness and value of a genealogy, to 
note how certain discourses are historically possible by analysing not just the ‘roots’ or the 
present but the multitude of contexts in between, how the discursive constitutions of national 
identity were altered and shaped through time and what that implies for what came after.  
 
For the first time since the 1980s there is an Opposition Leader in Jeremy Corbyn who threatens 
to radically realign British foreign policy should he ever hold office.  Indeed, it is precisely his 
stance on fundamentals like the nuclear deterrent, NATO and—far more ambiguously—the EU 
that inform those, including some from his own party, who say he is unelectable.  The Scottish 
National Party is similarly revisionist and, with fifty five MPs, has transcended the ‘celtic 
fringe’ and gained the potential to not only play kingmaker in a future election but also to 
influence the parameters of Commons debate.10  But this represents a complex politics because 
of their aspirations for an independent Scottish state.  The issue of which, should another 
referendum return an affirmative result, is potentially of either great or marginal import for 
British foreign policy identity if, as some have argued, what we see projected on to the 
international stage is primarily an English identity.11   
 
At the time of writing, campaigning on the referendum on EU membership is beginning to 
emerge; it is reasonable to expect further mobilisations of the long-standing Island Race 
conundrum of insularity and universality, as it was in the original negotiations for membership 
of the EEC in 1960-3.  Relations with the rest of Europe have consistently been narrated as the 
search for an ontologically secure balance between insularity and universality with even 
‘outliers’ articulating a British subject position that is at once eternally European and yet reliant 
also on worldwide ties.  Cameron is undoubtedly pro-European by instinct, as is most of the 
current British political élite (although Corbyn and some of his Shadow Cabinet might be 
characterised as pro-Europe but, on anti-capitalist grounds, EU-sceptic), and the recent 
European Migrant Crisis has precipitated reiterations of at least one existing facet of Britain’s 
partial European poise: non-involvement in the Schengen Agreement on open borders.  The fact 
                                                          
9 Legro (2005), pp. 21, 24-48; Kleuters (2009), pp. 520, 523; Chacko (2014), pp. 435-7. 
10 Showalter (2010), p. 146. 
11 Doty (1996), p. 124; Hadfield-Amkham (2010), p. 203; Marquand (1995), pp. 188-9; Kumar (2003), pp. 
1-17, 121-74; Webster (2005), pp. 1-18. 
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that Cameron welcomed Chinese and Indian leaders to Britain at the height of the crisis is 
suggestive of a prioritising of global ties at a time of European uncertainty.   
 
The ongoing civil war in Syria, the territorial gains made by ISIS there and in Iraq and the Paris 
attacks of November 2015—all discursively intertwined with the Migrant Crisis—are set to 
constitute further debate on the nature of Britain’s universality in the twenty-first century, with 
Cameron securing parliamentary approval for the bombing of targets in Syria, having been 
voted down in August 2013.  Discourse on post-Soviet Russia that was, as we saw in chapter 6, 
beginning to be constituted again by the established Land Power/Sea Power dichotomy might be 
realigned in the light of perceived common interests in the Middle East.  Additionally, MPs will 
soon vote on whether to renew the Trident system of submarine-based nuclear weapons and the 
debates will likely constitute the articulation of British subject-positions according to the 
universality trope of Island Race identity and just how far, fast and deep Britain is and ought to 
be able to reach into global affairs.  With a majority of MPs seemingly favouring renewal, its 
scrapping appears at the time of writing to be relatively unlikely; yet chapter 4 showed how the 
failure of a policy supported by a majority of MPs can nonetheless be narrated in terms which 
aggrandise Island Race identity tropes.  In other words: in the hypothetical scenario of the 
abandonment of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent one can conceive of how Members 
would constitute Britain in a subject position in which it remained able to reach out and 
influence global politics, probably through the projection of its values.  Regardless of Trident, 
the issues of foreign policy never cease and hence MPs are nearly constantly invited to reflect 
on what is in Britain’s interest to be involved in or not.  The recent scripting of globalisation 
narratives are but the latest manifestation of a spatial politics in the thrall of which British 
foreign policy-makers tend to discursively articulate the need for global involvement and 
relevance.  
 
The presence of values and international norms seems to be more prominent than ever in British 
parliamentary discourse, mobilising the Greater Britain Island Race identity trope to narrate a 
multitude of international issues.  Perhaps above all, this thesis has shown this, alongside 
insularity and universality, to be of singular importance to constitutions of identity in British 
foreign policy discourse with the successive elucidation of the parochial alongside the global 
frequently mobilised to fix Britain in ontologically secure subject positions across time and 
context.  The above suggestions of future issues which the Commons will be debating would 
seem to impel the further sedimentation of constitutions of the global importance of British 
values.  The Syrian civil war and its many related issues have already brought this to bear, as 
did the Scottish independence referendum, as, no doubt, will the EU referendum.   
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4. Theory and its implications 
The theoretical approaches pursued in this thesis have demonstrated their utility in gaining a 
richer understanding of British foreign policy since the middle of the twentieth century.  Taking 
a critical geopolitical approach has allowed a general questioning of the established spatial 
tropes of British foreign policy by revealing them to be the non-neutral and dynamic products of 
history as much as any geographic ‘reality’.  That critical geopolitics has largely been absent 
from larger-scale analyses of British history (and vice versa) reveals the paucity of many of 
these accounts in that they take for granted repeated spatialisations without probing and 
problematizing their history and contingent geographies.   
 
The combination put to work in this thesis of critical geopolitics with the insights of those who 
have theorised about ontological security-seeking has proved worthwhile by suggesting the 
appeal of spatial narratives in the articulations of Selfhood that are a constant preoccupation of 
foreign policy-makers as they attempt to elucidate secure notions of ‘Britain’.  By 
conceptualising ontological security-seeking as part of discursive practice relying on 
geopolitical (among other) tropes, this thesis has been able to open up the possibilities of 
identity (re)formation beyond only the much rehearsed Self/Other dynamic.  The positing of 
broader identity tropes in this case has shown the complexities of geopolitics and identity and 
how ontological security can be sought through multiple and contested subject positions that do 
not necessarily rely on an Other. 
 
Through employing an interpretivist approach that is ordered by genealogical methods it has 
been possible to demonstrate the social practices of identity in a co-constitutive rather than 
causal fashion over an extended period by allowing interplay with multiple contexts and agents.  
Constructivist scholarship continues to be haunted by the accusation of unduly prioritising 
continuity over change in such matters yet this thesis has shown how multiple and contingent 
identities are disciplined into a shared collectivity and how change is mediated within this 
through adaption to new circumstances and historical erasures that themselves mobilise 
established identity tropes to fix the state in particular subject positions.   
 
Finally, my choice of primary material has shown the utility of honing in on one area of 
discourse from a national polity.  It allowed a focus on the specific discursive practices from a 
single site that more plural approaches might lack.  This is important not just because it has 
been strangely neglected in studies of British foreign policy but also because the Commons is 
clearly a prime locus of debate on international issues. 
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This thesis suggests it and other national assemblies as possible sites for future research perhaps 
in tandem with systematic studies of media discourse or extra-parliamentary speeches in order 
to show how they might co-constitute one another around specific events or over a period of 
time.  Issues of the geopolitical foreign policy identities of the Westminster parties also invite 
further studies.  I have hinted at this often in the preceding chapters, impelled by certain issues 
such as the Suez Crisis in chapter 3 and EU relations in chapter 6 in which distinct party 
positions were articulated.  There are genealogical histories to be written, perhaps 
comparatively, about the specific foreign policy identities of both the Conservative and Labour 
Parties. 
 
The nature of national identity construction itself invites more work.  What I have posited in this 
thesis is not a new theoretical framework with which to approach future studies but it has 
thrown up certain issues which suggest avenues of reflection.  The nature of conducting 
interpretivist studies means that the possibilities are wide-ranging to say the least, but, instead of 
the geopolitical focus taken herein, one might consider constitutions of particular temporal, 
racial or gender identities in British foreign policy or even the ebb and flow of a number of 
different types of identity and if and when they come to particular prominence in varied 
contexts.  Furthering the study of the British geopolitical identity might provoke a comparison 
with other island states like Japan to gain further insights into whether British islandness is 
unique or whether there is a shared set of geopolitical understandings amongst élites of island 
states.12 
 
Finally, this has been a largely state-centric thesis as, in many ways, it has had to be for what 
has been analysed is the subject position of Britain, expressed in terms of the state as a foreign 
policy actor.  This pays deference to interpretivism in the sense that British foreign policy-
makers, even as they narrate an increasingly borderless world, still implicitly and explicitly 
normalise a situation in which sovereign states are the most important, global actors.  I have 
also regularly gone beyond this Westphalian scripting in analysing the constitution of the 
Greater Britain Island Race trope and conceptualising a Western metacommunity of values 
based, in British discourse, on historic values.  But perhaps this could be taken further and the 
‘Western’ identities of other countries examined conterminously to see if there is really a 
shared, discursive core or whether it tends, as I have conceptualised regarding Britain, to be 
mobilised as the extension of particular conceptions of national values. 
                                                          
12 See the Alessio Patalano edited volume of essays comparing the maritime strategies of Japan and 
Britain (Patalano (2012)). 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Any study of foreign policy history encompassing nearly three quarters of a century necessarily 
entails not just dealing with a huge body of empirical material but also with the many extant 
studies.  J.G.A. Pocock described how ‘studying the history of a people who have diligently 
studied it themselves’ means traversing a corpus ‘already thickly populated with paradigms’ 
and, nevertheless, how its attraction ‘usually proves irresistible.’13  In this case, the already 
existing paradigms were indeed part of the attraction, insofar as many of them seemed 
singularly unsatisfactory.  By placing geopolitics, identity and ontological security-seeking at 
the heart of this thesis, I have been able to present a new reading of this history that can help in 
gaining a richer understanding of the period and the present that it produces and is produced by.  
Identities are fundamental to foreign policy and yet the famous British predilection for 
pragmatism and stolid notions of national interest pursuance has, it seems, concealed the 
(re)formation of a thoroughly geopolitical identity that is embedded in the social discursive 
practices of the House of Commons. 
 
It may well be that the British have never ‘got over’ their Empire or, as Wallace has it, remain 
‘fixed on nostalgia’ and thus face obstacles ‘to the pursuit of altered objectives in changed 
circumstances’, but the evidence of this thesis suggests something more complex.14  It is 
through the very narration of these changed circumstances that British foreign policy-makers 
have co-constitutively mobilised the established tropes of identity from their imperial period.  
This is the nature of the ways in which discursive identity is both continuous and dynamic and 
explains why the tropes of the Island Race appear at once to be so mutable and yet so constant. 
  
                                                          
13 Pocock (2005), p. 36. 
14 Wallace (1991), p. 70. 
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